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Russell Hoban, born in Pennsylvania in 1925, is the author 
of fifty children's books and eight novels. This thesis 
provides a critical reading of his nove~Kleinzeit (1974), 
The Medusa Frequency (1987), Riddley Walker (1980) and 
Pilgermann (1983). 
The thesis argues that the alienation of the 
protagonist from his society -- a theme common to the novels 
above -- is the result of the operation of the Derridean 
process of displacement. Hoban's novels work 
deconstructively to undermine binary oppositions (such as 
"reality" versus "fantasy'~ I argue that the novels aim to 
recuperate the marginal by displacing the centre. 
In Kleinzeit and The Medusa Frequency, reality itself 
is figured as an absent centre. Through a discussion of 
magical realism, I show how Hoban questions the idea of a 
"consensus reality". I argue that by denying authority to 
the authors in these texts, Hoban privileges the uncertain 
authority of language itself. Using Derrida's concept of 
differance, I show that language in Kleinzeit is figured as 
an endless deferral of meaning. 
In Chapter II, I turn to an analysis of the invented 
post-atomic language of Riddley Walker, and examine how the 
neologisms and futuristic orthography of the text contribute 
towards significant wordplay. I argue that Riddley's 
attempts to read his culture's past offer a critique of the 
contemporary reader's assumptions, both about her present 
and about reading itself. I rely on Mircea Eliade's The 
Myth of the Eternal Return (1965) in discussing the nature 
of myth-making in Riddley Walker. 
In the final chapter, I discuss in detail the mechanism 
of displacement in Pilgermann. By examining the role of the 
grotesque in the novel, I argue that Pilgermann can be read 
~ymeneutically. Derrida's figure of the hymen becomes the 
emblem of marginalisation. Using the example of the mode of 
the grotesque {which is prominent in the novel), I argue 
that the marginal is always already present in the very 
centre which would expel it. Pilgermann is read as an 
attempt to recuperate the margin in spite of "the confusion 
between the present and the non-present" (Derrida, 1984: 
212) which is the hymen. 
Finally, I conclude that Hoban's works, while focussing 
on displacement, unwittingly displace women, by figuring 
them as absences whose existence is primarily metaphorical. 
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Since the publication of his first novel, The Mouse 
and His Child, in 1967, Russell Hoban has established 
himself as one of the most thought-provoking novelists 
writing today. Although most criticism of his work has 
been favourable -- his novels have been described as 
"fascinating, intelligent and disorienting" (Olsen, 1988: 
3), "brilliant, puzzling and disturbing" (Lynn, 1986: 19) 
-- some critics have found Hoban's fiction to be 
"bloodless and disembodied" (Leader, 1983: 259) and 
"increasingly indulgent and out of control" (Uglow, 1980: 
1221). 
It is most often Hoban's style and its 
appropriateness to his choice of subject which attracts 
commentary. While one critic labels Hoban's style an 
"awkward and effortful reaching for significance" (Inglis 
in Lynn, 1986: 20), another praises it as "hover(ing) 
between the playful and the profound, between the patent 
wish-fulfillment of fairy stories and the shamanistic 
preaching of parable" (Dowling, 1988: 179). Indeed, 
Hoban describes himself as a "mystic ... someone who 
thinks that the things that really matter are not those 
that admit of rational explanation" (Hitchcock, 1977: 
28). The rational world is often undermined in Hoban's 
novels. His protagonists usually participate in an 
alternative reality: ·in The Lion of Boaz-Jachin and 
Jachin-Boaz (1973), for example, Jachin-Boaz confronts a 
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dangerously aggressive lion, which is invisible to other 
characters, in a country where lions have long been 
extinct. The lion is at once figured as objectively real 
(it attacks Jachin-Boaz, wounding him severely), and 
symbolic (it can be read as a personification of Boaz-
Jachin's anger towards his absentee father). 
Hoban's most recent publication, The Moment Under 
the Moment (1993), is a collection of short stories, a 
libretto, and essays. He has collaborated with The 
Impact Theatre Co-operative in the stage production of 
The Carrier Freguency (1984), which developed from the 
work in progress, The Medusa Freguency (1987). His 
fourth full-length novel, Turtle Diary (1975) was made 
into a film in 1985; the script was written by Harold 
Pinter. It is unsurprising that Hoban is active in so 
many fields; he came to novel writing via a career as 
free-lance illustrator and advertising copywriter 
(Wilkie, 1989: 21). Jack Branscomb suggests that 
Hoban's background as an illustrator may contribute 
to the unusually strong sense of controlling images 
at the heart of his novels.{1986: 30) 
This assertion is borne out: Vermeer's "Head of a 
Young Girl" is discussed at length in The Medusa 
Freguency {1987: 15), and the paintings of Hieronymus 
Bosch are meticulously evoked by the nightmarishly 
grotesque scenes of Pilgermann (1983: 54-55). 
David Dowling traces the influence of Hoban's 
earlier works of children's fiction on his later novels, 
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saying that Hoban ''always endorsed the child's viewpoint 
for its anarchic challenge to the adult ways of doing 
things" (1988: 179). Perhaps this accounts for his use 
of a child protagonist in Riddley Walker (1980); 
certainly, all of Hoban's protagonists come to question 
accepted societal norms in their struggle to assert their 
unique perceptions of their worlds. 
Hoban's novels have been compared to the work of 
many other contemporary writers; Jeffrey Porter (1990: 
450) and Thomas Morrissey (1984: 197) compare Riddley 
Walker (1980) to Walter Miller's A Canticle for Liebowitz 
(1960), while A. Alvarez compares the same novel to Mark 
Twain's Huckleberry Finn (1981: 17). Porter compares the 
"astonishing, bizarre and forbidding •.. neobarbaric 
language" (1990: 451) of Riddley Walker to Burroughs' 
Naked Lunch (1966) and Burgess's A Clockwork Orange 
(1962). Christine Wilkie, author of the only full-length 
study of the works of Russell Hoban to date (Through the 
Narrow Gate: The Mythological Consciousness of Russell 
Hoban, 1989), writes 
Hoban's writing does not fit easily into any 
contemporary patterns of Euro-American literature. 
It has the intelligence, invention and a 
preoccupation with paradox that is evocative of the 
Argentinian Borges. It bears some of the features 
of experimental contemporary writers, among whom are 
Thomas Pynchon and Kurt Vonnegut •.. Hoban shares 
with John Barth a mythical basis for his writing 
together with a sense of contemporary society living 
in a contracting universe.(1989: 16) 
3 
Hoban himself sees 
the writer's job (as being) to invoke the universal 
by means of the particular. (1980b: 175) 
While precedents for both the style and subject 
matter of Hoban'~ novels can be found, his voice remains 
strikingly original. Riddley Walker, which received much 
critical acclaim, broadened the scope of its predecessors 
(The Mouse and His Child (1967), The Lion of Boaz-Jachin 
and Jachin-Boaz (1973) and Kleinzeit (1974)) from the 
domestic to the global. However, the focal issues of the 
novels have remained unchanged: Hoban writes of the 
individual displaced from both society and self; often 
the displacement is facilitated by language, which is, 
for Hoban, an unreliable vehicle of meaning. He uses the 
metaphor of disease to emphasize the necessity for a 
renewed wholeness, both spiritual and physical, in all of 
his protagonists. Hoban is "a writer who patiently 
explores consciousness" (Wilkie, 1989: 15), generally 
employing an isolated protagonist and a bizarrely 
animated universe whose conflicting voices clamour for 
recognition. 
Most of the critical work on Hoban takes the form of 
journal articles in response to Riddley Walker, while 
Wilkie's full-length analysis is focussed on the thematic 
tracing of Jungian archetypes in Hoban's work, rather 
than providing a rigorous critique. Riddley Walker, the 
futuristic account of a boy's journey through a post-
nuclear English wasteland, attracted the most critical 
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interest: it is referred to by critics working generally 
in the field of apocalyptic literature (Dewey, 1990; 
Hollinger, 1990; Lewicki, 1984; Morrissey, 1984; 
Schwenger, 1992), as well as by those more specifically 
interested in the invented 'decayed' language of the 
novel (Dowling, 1988; Lake, 1984; MacLean, 1988; Maynor 
and Patteson, 1984; Porter, 1990; Schwetman, 1985). 
While Jennifer Uglow accuses the nove·l of "projecting 
into the future a pessimistic contempt of the masses 
which is hardly balanced by the promise of mystic 
intuition for an artistic elite" (1980: 1221), she is in 
the minority. Praise for Riddley Walker is high --
Maynor and Patteson claim that 
(it) is perhaps the most sophisticated work of 
fiction ever to speculate about man's future on 
earth and the implications of a potentially 
destructive technology. (1984: 18) 
Most of Hoban's novels have elicited widely 
differing opinions. Lance Olsen condemned The Medusa 
Frequency, disagreeing with Tom LeClair's assertion that 
it is "fascinating and intelligent" (1988: 3), while 
concurring that the novel is "disorienting" (1988: 3). 
Zachary Leader found Pilgermann "bloodless" (1983: 259), 
while Leonard Cheever argues that it "is one of the most 
interesting genres of science fiction to appear in years" 
(1986: 339). 
Hoban is clearly a controversial and provocative 
author; his novels Kleinzeit (1974), Riddley Walker 
(1980), Pilgermann (1983) and The Medusa Frequency (1987) 
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are discussed in this thesis. Detailed examination of 
both The Lion of Boaz-Jachin and Jachin-Boaz (1973) and 
Turtle Diary (1975) is omitted. While The Lion of Boaz-
Jachin and Jachin-Boaz explores issues of authority in 
the patriarchal family (a father abandons his wife and 
teenage son, and both men re-negotiate their identities 
by resolving the aggression of the generations, which 
appears in the form of a lion) I have chosen to explore 
the relationship between authority and identity in 
Chapter I: Identity and Authority in Kleinzeit and The 
Medusa Frequency. 
Turtle Diary relates the efforts of two isolated 
individuals, William G and Naera H, to release giant sea 
turtles from their captivity in the London Zoo. I have 
not included an analysis of Turtle Diary in this thesis, 
as it differs in many significant ways from the texts I 
have chosen to discuss. While the other novels explore 
the predicament of individuals who have been marginalised 
against their will, and whose difference has been 
forcibly inscribed upon them, William and Naera have 
chosen their separateness, seeming reconciled to "the 
unenviable circumstances of their everyday lives" 
(Wilkie, 1989: 44). Turtle Diary lacks the wit and 
sparkle of the other texts under discussion, and Hoban's 
penchant for magical realist episodes is not indulged. 
The vitality of Hoban's language is not pronounced, and 
as language attracts much commentary in this thesis, 
Turtle Diary does not demand inclusion. The conclusion 
of the novel leaves William and Naera isolated from one 
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another, and the liberation, regeneration and 
reintegration which characterises the other novels is 
experienced only vicariously through the release of the 
turtles. Elements of a similar futility in Pilgermann 
are discussed in Chapter III: Recuperating the Margin. 
The scope of this thesis embraces an investigation 
of the metaphors of language and writing in Hoban's 
novels. Rather than repeating Wilkie's Jungian analyses, 
or remaining concerned solely with the nature and role of 
language in Riddley Walker (as do most critics), I have 
endeavoured to reformulate Hoban's obsessive concern with 
language and the way it structures reality, in terms of 
its intersection with current literary theory. I have 
found Derrida's figures of differance, the hymen and the 
notion of the apocalyptic particularly useful in this 
regard. As Porter points out: 
Derrida's .•. own obscurity is in principle modelled 
on paronomasia.(l990: 464) 
The approach I have taken towards Hoban's work is 
designed to highlight a similar multivalency of meaning 
in his novels. I have read them as collections of 
conflicting voices -- an animated universe argues 
vociferously with the protagonist in both Kleinzeit and 
The Medusa Frequency --- as well as portrayals of the 
individual marginalised by society, who must needs try to 
re-establish his authority in the face of his inescapable 
difference. 
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Chapter I: Identity and Authority in Kleinzeit 
(1974) and The Medusa Frequency (1987) discusses the 
negotiation of identity in a world where authority seems 
to be denied. The chapter begins with an analysis of the 
narrative technique which Hoban employs to destabilise 
any confident assumption of fixed "reality" in both of 
these novels. Magical realism accentuates the 
displacement of the protagonists from the consensus 
reality of their peers. The subsequent sections discuss 
the authority of the proper name, using the structuralist 
model of the sign and Derrida's ee"ee~~ of differance to 
trace the absence of meaning, and the protagonists' 
insistence on presence. 
Chapter II: Future Present: The Apocalyptic Language 
of Riddley Walker (1980) focusses on the authority of 
mythmaking in the novel. The "decayed English" of the 
novel and the prominence of the cultural myths offer an 
opening into a discussion of the role of language in 
creating reality, and the role of story-telling in 
Riddley's society. Riddley Walker is discussed as a 
polyglot novel (which) offers a radical example of 
antilanguage that is noteworthy largely because it 
derives from the primary story of the new physics --
radioactive decay. (Porter, 1990: 450) 
The chapter argues that Riddley is able to offer 
hope of ending the destructive cycles of his community 
when he authorises a new type of story-telling. 
The final chapter, Recuperating the Margin: 
Pilgermann (1983) and the Hymen Effect examines the 
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mechanisms of displacement common to all of Hoban's 
novels, but most pronounced in Pilgermann. Pilgermann's 
castration becomes the emblem of his displacement, which, 
it is argued, marginalises him both as man and as author. 
Derrida's figure of the hymen is used to examine 
marginalities in the text; Pilgermann is further 
marginalised through the use of the modes of the 
fantastic and the grotesque in the text. 
Each chapter is intended to emphasize different 
aspects of Hoban's works which are common to all of the 
novels under discussion. As Branscomb has pointed out: 
The complexity of Hoban's treatment of theme and 
symbol has increased greatly over t.he past twelve 
years, but his concerns and methods have remained 
essentially the same. (1986: 29) 
However, the underlying connection between all of 
the ch_apters is the focus on Hoban's vision of language, 
and by extension, story-telling, as therapeutic: despite 
the inevitable and unavoidable displacement of authority, 
the writer continues to manufacture 'presence' in the 
form of the text from his own 'absence'. Indeed, Hoban 
draws his inspiration from absence: 
for me the black is primordial creation. It's not 
the black of despair, the black of depression --
it's the darkness of the mother goddess, it's the 
darkness inside the womb of the mother goddess, it's 
the darkness of the sexuality of the mother goddess 
from which everything comes. (1984: 79) 
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Hoban succeeds, as Derrida has done, in displacing 
presence; his novels concur with Derrida's statement 
that: 
Literature belongs to this nuclear epoch, that of 
the crisis and of nuclear criticism, at least if we 
mean by this the historical and ahistorical horizon 
of an absolute self-destructibility without 
apocalypse, without revelation of its own truth, 
without absolute knowledge. (1984: 27) 
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Ch.a.pt~:r:- .1: 
Id~~tity a.~d A~th.~:r:-ity i~ 
Kl~i~z~it 
a.~d Th~ M~d~sa. F:r:-~g~~~cy 
Although Hoban wrote four novels between the publication 
of Kleinzeit (1974) and The Medusa Frequency (1987), both 
these texts explore the same themes: writing, reality 
and the negotiation of identity. These issues underlie 
all of Hoban's novels discussed in this thesis, but 
Kleinzeit and The Medusa Freguency foreground Hoban's 
metafictional concerns. The protagonists of both novels, 
Kleinzeit and Herman Orff, are writers: Kleinzeit loses 
his copywriting job at the outset and spends the rest of 
the novel trying to learn "HOW - (TO) - MAKE - WORDS -
STAY- ON- THE- PAPER?" (Kleinzeit 168), while Orff has 
completed two novels, but seeks inspiration for a third. 
The Medusa Freguency can be read as an epilogue to 
Kleinzeit in that the former develops the Orpheus and 
Eurydice fixation introduced in the latter. Kleinzeit's 
problem is to overcome writers' block -- to learn to 
"find what's there and let it be" (Kleinzeit 168); Orff 
struggles to identify the sources of inspiration. 
Because both novels are concerned with aspects of the 
writing process, both return obsessively to the idea of 
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naming. The search for the name, and for the authority 
to use the name, will form the focus of this chapter. 
Both novels expose the fragile fabric of reality by 
rendering "consensus reality" (Hume, 1984: 21) 
vulnerable to invasions by characters whose existence is 
fantastic. Kleinzeit confronts and eventually befriends 
a bestial Death: 
HOO HOO! yelled Death. I'LL BLOODY TEAR YOU APART 
... It stuck its fingers through the letter box. 
Bristling black and hairy, with disgusting-looking 
long grey fingernails. 
(Kleinzeit 122) 
Herman Orff chats ~miably with the rotting head of a 
dismembered Orpheus which makes regular appearances. 
Before discussing the novels in detail, it is useful to 
examine the narrative technique which Hoban uses to 
introduce the idea of conflicting realities. 
A conversation between the protagonist of The Medusa 
Frequency, Herman Orff, and his lover, Melanie 
Falsepercy, takes as its subject Rousseau's painting of 
the 'Sleeping Gipsy': 
"Looking at the 'Sleeping Gipsy', I said, 
"What do you think is going to happen in that 
picture?" 
"First tell me what you think." 
"I think the gipsy is in a dream. The lion 
isn't in the dream so the gipsy is safe for 
the moment. But if the gipsy wakes up or the 
lion falls asleep there could be big trouble." 
(The Medusa Frequency 110) 
The Medusa Frequency can be read as an account of 
the "big trouble" that results from the collision of two 
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realities, the 'real' reality of every day, and the 
"Medusa frequency'' of the title. Herman Orff lives in 
what Katherine Hume has termed "consensus reality''; 
however, he is plagued throughout the novel by the head 
of Orpheus, which is so bizarre as to be immediately 
placed beyond the boundaries of the real. Yet simple 
distinctions between reality and fantasy cannot be made 
in the novel; although the head of Orpheus is the more 
apparently fantastic of the two characters, it is through 
Orff's conversations with him that both Orff and the 
reader come to question the conventional categorisation 
of reality. By the end of the novel, this culminates in 
the realisation that Orff is just as much a fabricated 
character in the story of his own life as Orpheus is a 
character in an ancient myth. The Medusa Frequency is a 
highly complex series of games in which the 'real' is 
played off against the 'fantastic'; Herman Orff's 
apparently predictable, intelligible universe is 
gradually dissolved into one where the usual categories 
no longer have any validity. As Rosemary Jackson writes: 
Since this excursion into disorder can only 
begin from a base within the dominant cultural 
order, literary fantasy is a telling index of 
the limits of that order. Its introduction of 
the 'unreal' is set against the category of the 
'real' a category which the fantastic 
interrogates by its difference. (1981: 4), (my 
emphasis) 
The narrative method which naturalises the bizarre, 
and functions as a tool of the interrogation which 
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Jackson mentions above can be defined as magical realism. 
Angel Flores coined the term in 1955, defining it as 
preoccupation with style and ... transformation of 
the common and the everyday into the awesome and the 
unreal ... The practitioners of magical realism 
cling to reality as if to prevent "literature" from 
getting in their way, as if to prevent their myth 
from flying off, as in fairytales, to supernatural 
realms. (1955: 188-89) 
since this initial definition, many critics have 
elaborated and expanded the range of the term 1 Although 
there is no theoretical consensus on an exact definition 
of magical realism, it is possible to identify its 
characteristics by looking at particular examples from 
the text. The episode when Herman Orff wakes up after 
his first night with Melanie Falsepercy, finds the head 
in his fridge, and eventually confronts her with it, is a 
case in point: 
I went down to the kitchen and opened the 
fridge. There were three cans of beer, most of 
a salami, a rnouldering of old cheeses, half a 
tub of margarine, half a jar of marmalade, half 
a pint of milk and the head of Orpheus. 
"Loss!" it said. "That's what she was to 
me , you know • . . " 
Just then I heard Melanie's bare feet on the 
floor behind me and I closed the fridge as she 
carne into the kitchen. 
"Anything good in there?" she said. 
"Three cans of beer, most of a salami, a 
mouldering of old cheeses, half a tub of 
margarine, half a jar of marmalade, half a pint 
of milk and the head of Orpheus." 
"Let's have a look at the head of 
Orpheus." 
I opened the fridge. 
"Oh my God," she said. 
"What do you see?" 
"It's all right, it's only a rather filthy 
old cabbage but I must be very suggestible 
because just for a moment I could've sworn I 
14 
saw this dreadful-looking head with no eyes and 
the flesh all eaten away." 
"Yes," I said, "it's a dreadful-looking 
thing." The head of Orpheus went on being 
itself but it kept its mouth shut as I carried 
it into the hall and put it in the larder under 
the stairs. 
(The Medusa Frequency 73) 
Characteristically, magical realism involves the 
introduction of supernatural events into the narrative in 
such a way that they are accepted without disbelief by 
the characters. The narrator often appears to recognise 
the fictional impossibility of the event, but seldom 
draws direct attention to this, leading the reader to 
suspend her disbelief as well. In this extract, Herman 
Orff, the first person narrator, who has previously 
doubted the reality of his Orphic experiences, has 
clearly reached a point where he has suspended this 
disbelief. To him (and to the reader as well by this 
stage), the question has become immaterial, and indeed, 
it is more likely that the head is real than that it is 
not. 
A further condition of magical realism is that the 
fantastic be portrayed as objectively real, as it is in 
the extract. The idea that the conversations with 
Orpheus might be hallucinations is gradually rejected, as 
the episodes are internally coherent and based entirely 
on rational norms, apart from the single, and apparently 
unimportant, fact that the partner in the dialogue is a 
'mythical rotting head. 
In the passage quoted above, further evidence for 
the reality of Orpheus is given when Melanie Falsepercy 
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almost sees it: she cannot hold the (literal) vision 
because she is not seeking the (metaphoric) vision of 
creativity which Orff, Fallok and Kraken have sought. 
This is perhaps the reason that Orff's denial of the 
vision of the head (he accuses it of being an 
hallucination, whereupon it "stops thinking" Orff (The 
Medusa Frequency 32)) leads to the punishing heart pain: 
a conscious rejection of the possibility of the 
impossible is, in reality, a sign of the potential death 
of the creative urge. However, Melanie Falsepercy does 
get a glimpse of it, if only for an instant. Another 
characteristic of magical realism is that it is often 
episodic in nature, occurring in short bursts of 
alternative perception. Again, Orff's periodic 
conversations with Orpheus fulfill this requirement. 
The humour of magical realism lies in its deadpan 
delivery. At the same time as emphasizing the 
strangeness of the magical realist episodes by providing 
no easy (that is, "real") explanation for them, the 
distance between magical realism and textual 'reality' is 
diminished owing to authorial reticence. The narrator 
"present(s) a world view that is radically different from 
ours as equally valid" (Chanady, 1985: 30); an example of 
this is the calm listing of the items in Orff's fridge, 
culminating almost nonchalantly in mentioning the head of 
Orpheus. The narrator does not question the event, but 
rather seems to substantiate it by providing a wealth of 
specific details. Verisimilitude serves to detract 
attention from the absurdity of there being a head in the 
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fridge; the needlessly descriptive cataloguing places the 
bizarre within the category of the real, and the fact 
that Herman Orff is more surprised that the head should 
immediately begin speaking than that the head is there at 
all, illustrates the effectively naturalising function of 
authorial reticence in magical realism. 
By using this narrative mechanism to destabilise the 
"consensus reality" in which both his characters and the 
reader participate, Hoban complements in narrative style 
the diegetic agenda of both Kleinzeit and The Medusa 
Freguency. The remainder of this chapter will examine 
the characters' search for a guiding authority sufficient 
to stabilise the conflicting realities of their worlds . 
.i.i: Th~ A~tho~ity ~f tn~· 
Na.nt~ 
The first reading of both The Medusa Freguency and 
Kleinzeit overwhelms the reader with a proliferation of 
names; not only the main characters, but also peripheral 
figures are referred to by names which are clearly 
intended to be significant. David Lodge points out that, 
despite the "fundamental principle of structuralism 
'the arbitrariness of the sign' •.. In a novel names are 
never neutral. They always signify, if it is only 
ordinariness" (1992: 36-7). Hoban is clearly aware of 
this, and plays on the convention of significant naming 
to humorous effect in both novels: 
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NOW SHOWING: 'KILL COMES AGAIN'. They were all 
dying to come with him! On the poster a man in 
tight fitting clothes aimed a double barreled 
shotgun from between his legs. Behind him naked 
girls lay stacked like cordwood .... Starring PRONG 
STUDMAN, MAXIMUS JOCK, IMMENSA PUDENDA ... 
(Kleinzeit 24) 
My first novel, Slope of Hell (Mumchance Press, 
1977), sold 1,731 copies before being remaindered. 
The Times found the writing 'a little slippery'; the 
Guardian noted that the story was 'a downhill sort 
of thing'. My second one, World of Shadows (Reedham 
& Weap, 1978), sold 1,247 copies before the 
publisher went into receivership. 
(The Medusa Frequency 12) 
The first extract parodies the hyperbole of 
advertising by commodifying the actors through the 
allocation of suggestive stage names. In the second 
passage, the names of the publishing houses seem to be 
wry retrospective acknowledgements of the futility of 
Herman Orff's pretensions to literary success. In both 
examples, the name is clearly linked to the nature of the 
named. Lodge identifies this as an attempt to recover 
"that mythical, prelapsarian state of innocence in which 
a thing and its name were interchangeable" (1992: 40). 
Obviously, a return to this Edenic unity of sign and 
signified is impossible. Lodge's argument implies that 
the nostalgia for a unified whole serves only to 
highlight the irretrievable and to emphasize the widening 
gap between word and object. However, rather than 
tacitly recognising the chasm between the name and that 
which it represents, in both Kleinzeit and The Medusa 
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Frequency the connection between name and named is 
treated as if it were inviolate. This is emphasized by 
the way in which characters fear the name given to 
something, as they believe that the name will predict the 
nature of that thing. Kleinzeit himself attempts to 
thwart the power of naming by mis-translating his name in 
conversation with Sister: 
"Kleinzeit, does that mean something in German?" 
"Hero," said Kleinzeit. 
"I thought it must mean something," said Sister. 
(Kleinzeit 15) 
Sister's expectation that meaning be attached to the 
name confirms the anxiety which compels Kleinzeit to 
change his name through misinterpretation. Although she 
discovers the truth (that Kleinzeit means small-time), 
Sister maintains that "'Only a hero would say that 
Kleinzeit means hero'" (Kleinzeit 18). In a way, the 
apparently deterministic nature of naming transforms 
Kleinzeit from a small-time player to a hero once he 
adopts the new name for himself; he re-creates himself in 
an act of re-naming. Rimmon-Kenan notes the important 
function of names in characterization, arguing that 
the analogy may emphasize either the similarity or 
the contrast between the two elements compared, and 
it may be either explicitly stated in the text or 
left for the reader to discover. (1983: 68) 
In the case of Kleinzeit, the analogy created 
emphasizes contrasts rather than similarities, for 
Kleinzeit is an anti-hero, a passive, ineffectual man who 
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is obliged to assume the role of hero of the novel. He 
gains heroic stature in his own estimation as the novel 
progresses, starting with his act of re-naming. The 
analogy is ironic, and explicitly stated. 
Once Klein?eit has claimed the identity of the hero, 
it is easy to reread his actions as heroic ones, even 
when the tone is mock-heroic. An example is the passage 
describing his preparations to go·to the hospital. 
"Right," said Kleinzeit. That afternoon he bought a 
a pair of adventurous-looking pyjamas, selected from 
his shelves books for the hospital. He packed 
Ortega y Gasset, Meditations on Quixote. He'd 
already read that, wouldn't have to read it again. 
Thucydides he would carry in his hand. 
(Kleinzeit 13) 
The incongruous image of the patient arming himself for 
battle with an unknown disease contributes to the humour 
of the unlikely hero. Kleinzeit is figured as a 
pretentious man camouflaged in "adventurous pyjamas", 
whose greatest adventure is provided by his illness. At 
this point in the novel, the books which Kleinzeit 
carries seem useless weapons, and as the stereotype of 
the bookish weakling, he appears to be the ideal prey of 
a beast such as Hospital. Indeed, Hospital is 
simultaneously animated and personified as an apparently 
kindly, but nonetheless vicious, old uncle; in his 
presence, Kleinzeit is reduced to the insignificance and 
vulnerability of a scuttling insect: 
The next day Hospital unsheathed its claws, sheathed 
them again, made velvet paws, put its paws away, 
shifted its vast weight from one buttock to another, 
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crossed its legs, played with its watch chain, 
smoked its pipe, rocked placidly. 
Shall I tell you something, my boy? said 
Hospital. 
Tell me something, said Kleinzeit, 
scuttling like a cockroach away from one of the 
rockers as it came down to scrunch him. 
(Kleinzeit 39) 
As the novel progresses, the tone alters from 
lightly mocking to more serious; Kleinzeit becomes more 
of a hero as he grapples with the challenges presented 
both by his ailing hypotenuse and by the yellow paper. 
When a series of operations seems inevitable, Kleinzeit 
escapes from Hospital in a truly heroic manner: 
On the second floor the A-4 fire exit door opened, 
two Pain Company scouts came out, weapons at the 
ready ... Action whistled, the scouts whistled back. 
The rest of Pain Company came out, some of them 
supporting Kleinzeit, one of them carrying his case, 
the others guarding his rear. Kleinzeit, dressed 
for the street, was very pale. 
(Kleinzeit 163) 
Furthermore, the books themselves become the only 
weapons which can aid him in his fight against his 
mysterious ailment; after his relapse, Kleinzeit turns 
to Thucydides for solace. He sees his plight (as both a 
writer and as a sick man) as parallel to that of the 
Athenians, who are fighting a hopeless battle: 
Athens has been defeated, he said. We mourn the 
loss of comrades and brothers. Looked at in another 
light, however, Athens has not lost, Sparta had not 
won ... 
You know how it is, said Thucydides. You're 
winning, so you think why quit now. 
I've done three more pages, said Kleinzeit, but 
nobody's making peace offers. 
(Kleinzeit 158, 126) 
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Not only Thucydides's book, but the beginnings of 
his own novel, bolster Kleinzeit in his fight. By re-
naming himself "Hero", Kleinzeit alters his place in the 
world of the texts; he becomes a hero, and the books 
which he carries become his weapons. 
Similar punning on proper names is indulged in The 
Medusa Freguency. Melanie Falsepercy is an enigma to 
Hermann Orff. Her name offers a combination of 
morphological analogy and mythological allusion (Rimmon-
Kenan, 1983: 67): her first name-- derived from the same 
base word which produces "melanin" -- means 'black 
beauty', while her surname hints at Percy-phony. 
"Falsepercy" is the reverse of "Persephone", and both 
Orff and the reader come to realise that she is not a 
pure Persephone figure, but a false·one. When Melanie 
Falsepercy betrays Herman Orff by sleeping with his 
employer, a new reversal takes place. So, in order to 
understand the allusion, the reader needs firstly to 
reverse "Falsepercy", which gives Persephone, and thus 
propels Melanie into the mythical subtext of the novel. 
However, her Persephone-nature is reversed again when she 
deceives Orff through her infidelity -- falsehood is 
reinstated at the beginning of the name. This can be 
simplified as follows: Falsepercy = Persephone (first 
reversal); but "False" remains the prefix, and she 
becomes a False Persephone. However, this interpretation 
cannot be made immediately the character is introduced, 
primarily because the Persephone motif has not yet been 
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fully emphasized, and the reader is likely to miss the 
"percy" allusion. The truth is only revealed when 
Melanie Falsepercy admits her infidelity, and the meaning 
of the name is intended to be as much of a surprise to 
the reader as the betrayal is to Orff. 
Hoban obviously intends the reader to interpret the 
names of the characters in all of his novels: Riddley 
Walker "walks his riddles" through the post-apocalyptic 
devastation; Pilgermann is the pilgrim; Herman Orff is --
despite an ironic distance -- an Orpheus forever enslaved 
to a woman (her man); the list continues. Joseph Ewen 
points out that 
many ... analogies may have developed out of 
conceptions involving causality, ... but they are 
grasped as purely analogous characterisation when 
the causal connection is no longer strongly 
operative. (1983: 67) 
Hoban intends the causal implication of the analogy to 
remain prominent in the reader's mind, and it is this 
emphasis on cause-and-effect which lends an apparently 
deterministic power to names in his novels. 
The apparent power of the name to determine its 
subject offers the possibility of redemption from fate 
through re-naming, but simultaneously, it is a 
threatening power when lodged in the hands of another. 
If the relationship between name and named is somehow 
inviolate, then the authority to confer the name is that 
which causes most anxiety. Indeed, the authority of the 
name, the authority to name, and the name of the author 
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are central to my analysis of both Kleinzeit and The 
Medusa Frequency. 
The name has authority because it is awarded 
semantic intent (Lodge, 1992: 225), and yet at the same 
time, it has no authority, because, as the structuralists 
have pointed out, the sign is arbitrary. Kleinzeit is 
simultaneously obsessed with, and indifferent to, 
meaning; he struggles to make sense of pervasive enigmas, 
such as the "barrow full of rocks" permutations, and yet 
is completely indifferent to meaning, such as the meaning 
of his own name, "Kleinzeit". At once, he believes that 
meanings are fixed -- there is a solution to the "arrow 
in a box" riddle -- and that he is empowered to change 
meanings -- through his act of renaming, for example. 
The anxiety about the name which I indicate above is the 
result of this paradox. Lodge writes: 
The often asserted resistance of the world to 
meaningful interpretation would be a sterile basis 
for writing if it were not combined with a poignant 
demonstration of the human obligation to attempt 
such interpretation, especially by the process of 
organizing one's memories into narrative form. 
(1992: 225) 
An example of the "resistance of the world to 
meaningful interpretation" is the series of puzzling 
phrases which haunt Kleinzeit from the first pages of the 
novel. Having found a piece of yellow paper in the 
Underground, Kleinzeit uses it to write the commercial 
for Bonzo toothpaste which gets him fired. His 
advertising concept is based on a man pushing a barrow 
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full of rocks. The phrase mutates and reappears 
throughout the novel, always recognisable because of its 
meaningless assonance. The permutations are as follows: 
barrow full of rocks ( 11) 
MAN WITH HARROW FULL OF CROCKS ( 20) 
arrow in a box ( 23) 
Yarrow, Fullest Stock ( 26) 
SORROW; FULL SHOCK ( 37) 
borrow fool's pox? ( 41) 
Narrow, cool. The flock. ( 129) 
Sparrows rule the clocks ( 131) 
Kleinzeit is puzzled and frustrated by the apparent 
meaninglessness of these strings of words; he cannot 
admit that the world he inhabits is one of signifiers 
endlessly loosened from their signifieds. As many of 
these phrases are uttered by fellow patients, Kleinzeit 
must acknowledge that "the sign is transsubjective by its 
very nature" (Thiher, 1987: 71). Indeed, Derrida 
(following Saussure) writes that 
there can be arbitrariness only because the system 
of signs is constituted solely by the differences in 
terms, and not by their plenitude. (1978: 10) 
The arbitrary nature of the cryptic phrases, whose 
only similarity is phonic, makes them resistant to 
Kleinzeit's understanding. The words in the phrases are 
meaningful as units, but every phrase is enigmatic; 
Kleinzeit attempts to understand them by observing the 
relationship of every phrase to the other. Indeed, 
through his attempts to read the repeated phrases in a 
meaningful way, Kleinzeit is obliged to recognise that 
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every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system 
within which it refers to the other, to other 
concepts, by means of the systematic play of 
differences. (Derrida~ 1978: 11) 
Derrida's name for this "play of differences" is 
differance. In defining the term, it is necessary to 
return to the root word, differer, which has two 
meanings: "to temporize", and "to be not identical, to be 
other" (Derrida, 1982: 8). Kleinzeit's conceptual 
confrontations with the "barrow full of rocks" 
permutations consist of an endless deferral of meaning: 
he awaits the final revelation of a transcendental 
signified which would serve to explain the phrases. As 
Derrida has indicated, "the sign itself is deferred 
presence", as it "represents the present in its absence 11 
(1982: 9). However, that deferred presence is deferred 
further when it becomes apparent that every new phrase is 
a permutation of the previous one, and not the final 
signified to which its predecessors refer. The absence 
of meaning is passed along an interminable chain, always 
just beyond the grasp of Kleinzeit's understanding, yet 
continually promising the full presence of meaning which 
he seeks. Even though the final link in the chain, 
"Sparrows rule the clocks", submits to the grammatical 
rules which define it as an independent sentence, its 
meaning remains elusive. It is Kleinzeit's belief in 
"the thing itself" (Derrida, 1982: 9), the possibility of 
the presence of the signified, which propels his search. 
The process of his discovering that all the other 
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patients in the hospital ward have been plagued by one or 
another version of the initial phrase is a discovery that 
the substitution of the sign for the thing itself is 
both secondary and provisional; secondary due to an 
original and lost presence from which the sign thus 
derives; provisional as concerns this final and 
missing presence towards which the sign in this 
sense is a movement of mediation. (Derrida, 1982: 9) 
Just as the sign is endlessly in movement, a 
mediation which Derrida calls the "play (of) differance" 
(1982: 11), so every phrase is linked in a chain. What 
Kleinzeit seeks is the original, lost presence. However, 
the play of differance itself puts into question 
precisely the quest for a rightful beginning, an 
absolute point of departure, a principal 
responsibility. (Derrida, 1982: 6) 
Kleinzeit's search for the original meaning of the 
"barrow full of rocks" chain of phrases seems doomed to 
failure. He is able to understand a measure of what they 
signify by reading their relationship to one another, but 
as units of meaning, every phrase remains unintelligible. 
After writing down every phrase, Kleinzeit draws the 
conclusion that 
When all the existing data have been correlated and 
analysed .•. we find nothing whatever ... There may 
be, however, some evidence, as yet unconfirmed, of 
the existence of a group of yellow paper men. There 
may possibly be a whole ward of them in hospital 
I am one of the A4 men ... The etiology of the 
various malfunctions and diseases in Ward A4 is 
unknown to me, said Kleinzeit. 
(Kleinzeit 125) 
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The meaninglessness of the phrases written by the 
sick men is mirrored in the apparent non-referentiality 
of their diseases. Kleinzeit is admitted for tests on 
his hypotenuse, which seems to be skewed; Flashpoint has 
a distended spectrum, and Redbeard suffers a slipped 
fulcrum. Although all of these ailments appear to be 
terminal, none is identifiable as purely physical or 
psychological in origin. Rather, they are described in 
the abstract language of mathematical formulae, and could 
thus be interpreted as being diseases 'in the mind', just 
as mathematics is cerebral. The only clue the reader 
receives that the diseases are not mere figments of the 
imagination that Hospital is not, in fact, Mental 
Hospital -- is the conversation between Kleinzeit and the 
nurse who is trying to coax him to sign a surgery release 
form: 
"Then sign this and let's get on with it ... I 
should think you'd have a little consideration." 
"I have a lot of consideration," said 
Kleinzeit. "I'm considering hypotenuse, asymptotes 
and stretto. That's a lot to consider. I want to 
keep my angle right even if my hypotenuse is skewed, 
I want my asymptotes to keep approaching the curve 
they never meet, I want to keep my stretto even if 
it can't channel entries any more ... " 
"Cor," said the bosom lady. "I think they've 
put you in the wrong kind of hospital •.. " 
(Kleinzeit 144-45) 
The ailments, then, are physical, indeed, terminally 
so: they lead to death, the absolute absence-of-presence. 
Kleinzeit's search for the meaning of the yellow paper 
phrases parallels his desire to live: both are attempts 
to re-establish presence. 
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Inevitably, Hoban reveals the signified for which 
Kleinzeit has been searching. Kleinzeit himself does not 
make the discovery; the truth is revealed by Word to the 
yellow paper. The implication is that meaninglessness 
can only be resolved through the attempt to make meanings 
of one's own; through writing itself. This idea -- of 
writing as therapeutic -- is repeated in Riddley Walker, 
when Riddley writes the narrative of his experiences, 
which leads to his "writing" of the Punch and Judy 
alternative to the destructive Eusa shows. 
Despite the implied promise that the 'meaning' of 
the "barrow full of rocks" phrases will be discovered, 
the moment of revelation is denied. The conversation 
between Word and the yellow paper perpetuates the chain 
of deferral while ostensibly revealing the transcendental 
signified: 
Barrow full of rocks? said the yellow paper. 
That's just my name for it, said Word. A 
pneumatic. 
Mnemonic, said the yellow paper. 
Whatever you like, said Word. The line itself 
is by Pilkins. 
Milton? said the yellow paper. 
Something like that, said Word. "Hidden soul 
of harmony" is what he said. I like that. It 
sings. "Untwisting all the chains that ty I The 
hidden soul of harmony." ••• 
Do you mean to tell me, said the yellow paper, that 
"Barrow full of rocks" is nothing more than a 
mnemonic for "Hidden soul of harmony"? 
(Kleinzeit 161) 
A mnemonic is, of course, a signifier whose meaning 
is the deferral of other signifiers. "Barrow full of 
rocks" serves as a mnemonic for other mnemonics, which 
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represent a line from Milton, valued not because of its 
meaning at all, but because "It sings"! Further, as 
Wilkie points out, 
(the) two lines from Milton's L'Allegro (are) quoted 
here for (their) significant connections with the 
myth of Orpheus. (1989: 39) 
"Barrow full of rocks" is a mnemonic for "Hidden soul of 
harmony", which functions as a mnemonic for the Orpheus 
myth. Kleinzeit's hunt for the presence of meaning is 
thus ultimately denied: just as every mnemonic is a 
mnemonic for another, so the signifiers signify only 
other signifiers. Presence is continually deferred; the 
chain of differance continues. 
iii: 
I have argued above that the authority to confer the 
name causes extreme anxiety for Hoban's characters. 
Kleinzeit's act of self-naming has the effect of altering 
the way he is perceived, both by himself and by others, 
but the change is not threatening, as Kleinzeit has 
exercised the power to name himself. The anxiety of 
which I write is that experienced by a character who is· 
named by another. Kleinzeit's world is totally animated; 
everything speaks, from the advertisements in the 
Underground to the yellow paper on which he writes. 
Wilkie observes that 
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Kleinzeit is surrounded by their voracious 
presences, each insisting on its own verbosity, its 
own distinct and inescapable presence, its own 
particular perspective, and its own individual brand 
of realism. (1989: 37) 
Here lies the clue to the terror of naming: every 
speaking subject is able to determine "its own individual 
brand of realism"; what this means for Kleinzeit and Orff 
is that consensus reality 2 is dissolved in an uproar of 
conflicting voices, each authorised by the fact of its 
individual subjectivity to create reality: to confer the 
name. Kleinzeit's experiences with the grotesquely 
animated universe which he inhabits reveal the authority 
of his own subjectivity as mere illusion. The individual 
certainty of the Cartesian "I think, therefore I am" 
dissolves into a frightening multiplicity of authority: 
He put his face in front of the bathroom mirror. 
I exist, said the mirror. 
What about me? said Kleinzeit. 
Not my problem, said the mirror. 
(Kleinzeit 7) 
The mirror, which should be just a reflection of 
Kleinzeit's presence, and thus confirm his authority, is 
instead portrayed as an independent subject whose 
existence is confirmed by any reflection. When Redbeard 
removes all of Kleinzeit's possessions from his flat, the 
mirror is reanimated: 
I exist, said the bathroom mirror as it looked into 
Redbeard's face. There is world again. The face 
came and went. Lights went on and off. Sounds, 
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voices. , Life, said the mirror. Action. Silence 
again. 
(Kleinzeit 101) 
Kleinzeit seems completely replaceable: any person 
is good enough for the mirror; any number of yellow paper 
men have preceded and will succeed Redbeard; any number 
of writers pass through ward A4. The struggle to assert 
individuality is a struggle to maintain authority. 
Kleinzeit expresses his greatest happiness in terms of 
possession: 
The world is mine, sang Kleinzeit. Sister loves me 
and the world is mine. 
Cobblers, said Hospital. Nothing is yours, 
mate. You least of all are yours. 
(Kleinzeit 50) 
.... 
However, that authority which he would claim is 
denied. Kleinzeit is least of all in control of himself: 
in the physical sense, organs he was totally unaware of 
are mutinying without apparent reason; his stretto, 
asymptotes and hypotenuse are all acting up, and not even 
the medical authorities are able to evaluate the 
potential damage. He cannot possess the world because he 
cannot possess himself: he is not in control of his own 
identity, because he is just another subject in a world 
of clamouring subjectivities. The mere existence of 
Underground, Hospital, Death, Word and so on as speaking 
subjects robs Kleinzeit of the authority which he 
desires. He is vulnerable to endless misrepresentation, 
which greatly disturbs him even though he claims "I 
don't care if God forgets my name" (Kleinzeit 95), the 
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insult of being called Krankheit and Klemmreich is added 
to the injury of being referred to as "I, the undesigned" 
in the hospital surgery release form. 
"'Undesigned'," said Kleinzeit. "That may be 
your opinion, but I'm God's handiwork just as much 
as anyone else." His voice broke on the last word. 
(Kleinzeit 79) 
Kleinzeit's concern to establish and secure his 
individuality underlies his anxiety about living in a 
universe where Hospital says "Nothing is special about 
you" (Kleinzeit 172) and even God forgets his name. God, 
the ultimate authority, has abdicated His role as a 
personal God, similarly to the God in Pilgermann; He is 
deposed, portrayed as forgetful and disinterested: 
You've got to move with the times, said God. 
Are we talking about the same thing? said 
Sister. 
One usually does, said God. I mean how much is 
there to talk about really. It's pretty much all one 
thing, isn't it. 
(Kleinzeit 84) 
In a world where God is no longer a reliable 
repository of authority (and thus of meaning), the only 
alternatives left to Kleinzeit are either to name 
himself, or to submit to being named by others. He 
resists the latter: 
"You see?" said the fat man. "You simply won't 
bear examination, will you? It's almost as if you'd 
made yourself up on the spur of the moment." 
(Kleinzeit 35) 
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by indulging in the former: 
Sister pearly in the dusk, silky on the flowered 
sheets, tasty in the mouth, opulent to the touch, 
Kleinzeit, overwhelmed, became nothing, disappeared, 
reappeared, from nowhere entered, inventing himself 
as theme, as subject. 
(Kleinzeit 86) 
Kleinzeit resists being named by another: he is not 
"the undesigned", he will not lose the battle with 
anonymity and death as the Athenians are always fated to 
be defeated by the Spartans in Thucydides. However, his 
resistance takes the form of running away: he is 
continually escaping from the hospital; he seems 
deliberately to have forgotten his past. Adopting the 
name "hero" was just a desperate man's attempt to bluff 
himself (and Sister) into believing in his own 
importance. Kleinzeit has to learn to name himself. For 
this reason, he remains afraid of the authority of 
others: 
Dr Pink lowered his eyes tactfully ••• "you'll feel a 
little breathless and as if everything is piling up 
inside you from behind while at the same time you 
are quite unable to move forward to get away from 
it" ..• 
Dr Pink's voice had become a long and massive 
sunday afternoon through which Kleinzeit drowsed 
like a fly in amber. At the end of his remarks it 
was Monday morning, a change not necessarily for the 
better. Kleinzeit felt breathless and as if 
everything was piling up inside him from behind 
while at the same time he was .quite unable to move 
forward to get away from it. Its marvellous the way 
Dr Pink knows exactly how it feels, he thought. I 
wish I'd never met him. God knows what'll come into 
his head next and I'll feel it. 
(Kleinzeit 78) 
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Why does he insist on naming everything, 
thought Kleinzeit. 
(Kleinzeit 118) 
Although Kleinzeit feels trapped by the authority of 
others for most of the novel, he changes from the 
insecure and insignificant man who believes himself to be 
at the mercy of forces greater than himself: 
I'm no better off than that chap with a barrow 
full of rocks, he thought. I wrote him and there he 
was. Nothing behind him and rocks ahead. 
(Kleinzeit 52) 
Kleinzeit becomes the hero of his own novel: he 
regains his lost authority, or, as Hospital woul~ have 
it, he remembers himself. This is a great struggle for 
Kleinzeit; even in the closing pages of the novel, once 
he realises that he is not merely the hollow "Hero" of 
his first conversation with Sister, he is unable to name 
himself: 
What are you? said Hospital. 
I don't know, said Kleinzeit. 
Be that, said Hospital. Be I-Don't-Know. 
HOW? yelled Kleinzeit. 
BY REMEMBERING YOURSELF, roared Hospital. 
(Kleinzeit 173) 
"Remembering yourself" refers Kleinzeit to the myth of 
Orpheus, who was dismembered. Hoban uses dismemberment 
as a metaphor for psychological disintegration, for the 
loss of authority which Kleinzeit suffers. Christine 
Wilkie notes: 
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His universe dislocates the structures which would 
lend pattern and meaning to an otherwise 
conventional unquestioned and unquestioning world. 
(1989: 37) 
One of these dislocated structures is the structure 
of authority. Kleinzeit's illness -- the skewing of his 
hypotenuse -- can be read as a metaphor for this 
dislocation of authority: he attempts to keep his angle 
right whilst his points of reference wander. 
The Na~e of the A~tho~ 
Kleinzeit tries to claim authority by becoming an 
author. He believes that the author has authority; that 
the one who writes is in control of what is written. For 
this reason, he challenges Redbeard to explain the 
cryptic "barrow full of rocks": 
"'Morrow's cruel mock,'" said Kleinzeit. 
"What's it mean?" •.• Redbeard stared at him 
"You!" he said when he had finished chewing. 
"You're no better than a little sucking baby. You 
bloody want answers to everything, everything 
explained, meanings and whatnot all laid on for you. 
What's it to me what the yellow paper does to you? 
Do you care what it does to me? Of course you 
don't. Why should you?" 
(Kleinzeit 56-7) 
Hoban portrays the writing process as something 
which does not originate from the will of the author at 
all, but finds its source outside himjher. Herman Orff 
describes the writing process as one of receiving a 
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transmission -- and, indeed, he is one of the few "tuned" 
to the "Medusa frequency" of the title: 
the words come out of green dancing and the 
excitation of phosphors. I'm the one who makes the 
words appear, but I don't always know who or what is 
speaking ... after all, why did I sit here like a 
telegrapher at a lost outpost if not to receive 
messages from everywhere 
(The Medusa Frequency 8-9) 
For Hoban, the author has none of traditional 
authority in the sense of final control over what is 
written. Rather, Hoban believes that writing functions 
to save readers .from the authority of what he terms the 
"limited-reality consensus": 
The writer has to listen to those voices because the 
straight people seem not to have the capability of 
living in full reality. The straight people live in~ 
a limited-reality consensus in which the chair is 
real, .the table is real ..• but what is inexplicable 
and ungraspable and nameless isn't real. So the 
writer has to find names and handles, the writer has 
to find words to make it real. (1992: 189) 
Kleinzeit's greatest anxieties are caused by naming; 
for Herman Orff, on the other hand, it is the way names 
are joined into stories which presents a terrifying 
threat to his individuality. Orff is haunted by the 
spectre of his lost love, Luise. He discovers that he 
has been merely one in a seemingly endless chain of 
lovers, all of whom lived with Luise for exactly two 
years, were involved in the creative arts, and were 
intrigued by the myth of Orpheus. Orff is trying to 
write a third novel, and in so doing, he hopes to break 
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away from historical patterns of failure, both in his 
personal and in his professional life. His efforts, like 
Kleinzeit's, can be read as an attempt to regain his 
authority, to structure his world according to his own 
will. 
The anxiety of authorship is another facet of the 
anxiety of naming. Orff wants to resist the roles life 
seems to thrust upon him, in much the same way as Orpheus 
tries to conceal his identity from Aristaeus: 
"My name is Aristaeus." He stood there as 
if listening for something that only he could 
hear. 
"What are you listening for?" I said. 
"Your name." 
I didn't say anything, I didn't want to tell 
him my name. 
"You don't want to tell it," he said. 
"You're afraid." 
"Afraid of what?" I said. 
"Afraid to hear the sound of your name in 
this place." 
"I'm not afraid." 
"Then tell it." 
"My name is Orpheus," I said. Still he 
seemed to be listening for something else. 
"What are you listening for now?" I said. 
"The olive trees whisper," he said. "I 
always listen. You are the one who is 
Orpheus." 
"I've just told you that." 
"Not just your name," he said. "You're 
going to do it, you're going to be Orpheus." 
"What else can I be?" 
"You are the story of yourself," he said. 
With his finger he traced figures in the air. 
"What's that you're doing?" I said. 
"Your name. You are the story of 
orpheus." 
"How can I be a story? I'm a man. A live 
person." 
"You're a story.~· 
"Not a story," I said. I began to run. 
(The Medusa Frequency 38-39) 
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No sooner is Orpheus caught up in "the story of 
himself", than Herman Orff feels a similar horror of the 
same thing overcoming him. He writes a dramatis personae 
of his life, asking "Is there a story of me? Am I in 
it?" (The Medusa Frequency 46). For Hoban's characters, 
the source of the anxiety about naming could be termed 
"syntactic". Names are susceptible to stories in the 
same way that words are susceptible to sentences. Once 
something has been named, the authorial control over that 
thing passes from the subject who bears the name to 
another, the one who names the name. The name moves the 
subject from the world of subjectivity into the world of 
objects, and it is this move which robs the subject of 
its authority. 
Similarly, narratives themselves become objects 
jostling to establish 'truth value' -- the gam yawncher 
man's argument with Kleinzeit over their roles in one 
anothers' life stories is a good example of the way 
narratives are denied absolute authority. If the 
universe continually fluctuates around whatever is 
perceived as centre, then one's own life-story takes no 
priority over those of others: The story one perceives 
as one's own life is no more 'true', 'real' or 
'objective' than the story-lives of others. This is 
demonstrated in The Medusa Frequency by the character 
Go~ert Yawncher, who first meets Herman Orff on the 
Underground, after Herman has been for his initial 
session of electrical therapy. Yawncher relates his own 
experiences with mental 'problems': "I never asked them 
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to take away the voices, but there it is, you see: who am 
I? Nobody. I'm not entitled to hear voices unless it's 
somebody asking me questions ... Don't let them empty you 
out, they've got nothing better to offer 11 (The Medusa 
Frequency 29). This advice confirms on the diegetic 
level what is suggested on the thematic level: alternate 
realities are not necessarily less valid merely because 
they fail to conform to 11 consensus reality 11 • It is for 
this reason that Orpheus may truly exist, because his 
11Medusa frequency 11 is the point of configuration of his 
universe. 
Orff meets the stranger again in the 11 Cheshire 
Cheese 11 bar, where they recognise one another: 
As the gom yawncher man passed me I recognised 
him as the man in the broken-brimmed hat who'd 
spoken to me in the underground when I was on 
my way home from Istvan Fallok's studio with 
electrodes all over my head. 
"Hello," I said. 
"Nimser vo," he said. 
"You weren't talking like that the other 
day. How come?" 
"I must've been somebody else then." 
"How's that?" 
"Economy. You have a little chat with a 
stranger now and then, right? So do I, so does 
everyone. How many lines has the stranger got? 
Two or three maybe. There's really no need for 
a new actor each time, is there?" 
"So you play them all." 
"The same as you." 
"What do you mean?" 
"Yesterday you were the conductor on the 
11 bus and you also did quite a nice little 
tobacconist in the Charing Cross Road. 
Actually London hasn't got that big a cast, 
there's only about fifty of us, working flat 
out." 
"Are you writing a novel?" 
"Novel-writing is for weaklings," he said, 
and moved on. 
(The Medusa Frequency 56) 
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The man appears again to sell Orff the cabbage which 
is the head of Orpheus, and later turns up as a busker in 
the Charing Cross Road underground, where his challenge 
to Orff's authority is the least disguised. Orff 
condescends to him: 
"Really," I said, "your eagerness to make 
an appearance and be noticed however briefly is 
pathetic. can it possibly matter that much to 
you to play these tiny scenes and speak your 
few little lines?" · 
(The Medusa Frequency 116-17) 
His anxiety at the partial recognition of himself 
and his own role in that of the other man does not remain 
concealed for long: 
"Let's get something straight," I said. 
"I'm not a bit player in your story, you're a 
bit player in mine." 
"Oh yes. Says who?" 
"This is intolerable " 
(The Medusa Frequency 116) 
Herman Orff is forced to recognise his tenuous 
position in his universe; he can no longer "configure 
(himself) as centre" (The Medusa Freguency 38). His loss 
of centrality is an eroding of the authority of the 
centre: he cannot "limit what we might call the play of 
the structure" (Derrida, 1978: 278). Rather, he is 
subsumed and becomes part of the "play", which liberates 
him from an authority which demands adherence to 
consensus reality. Orff realises the truth of Orpheus's 
words: 
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"Of course when I sang there was the music 
of it ... I don't think it actually moved 
stones and trees; what it did was put them in a 
new place for those who heard the singing ... " 
(The Medusa Frequency 72) 
Orff is "put in a new place" -- decentralised, if 
you will -- and it is this shift in perspective which 
frees him from the creative stagnation which impedes him 
at the outset. 
While Orff must recognise and accept the erosion of 
his authority, Kleinzeit is initially a man entirely 
disempowered, who tries to overcome his loss of authority 
by becoming an author. Hoban uses the metaphor of lion-
taming to represent the relationship which Kleinzeit 
believes exists between the author and hisjher subject: 
Right, said Kleinzeit. Enough. He opened the door 
of the yellow paper's cage, and it sprang upon him. 
Over and over they rolled together, bloody and 
roaring. Doesn't matter what the title is to start 
with, he said, anything will do. HERO, I'll call 
it. Chapter I. He wrote the first line while the 
yellow paper clawed his guts, the pain was blinding. 
It'll kill me, said Kleinzeit, there's no surviving 
this. He wrote the second line, the third, 
completed the first paragraph. The roaring and the 
blood stopped, the yellow paper rubbed purring 
against his leg, the first paragraph danced and 
sang, leaped and played on the green grass in the 
dawn. 
(Kleinzeit 108) 
Kleinzeit uses language as an instrument; he attempts to 
dominate his subject, and thus make his mark as author. 
Hoban implies that this is a false representation of the 
writing process; he credits language with more authority 
than the writer, and personifies it as Word: 
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Morrows cruel mock, said the paper. 
I told you I was tired of that, said Redbeard. 
Bad luck, said the paper. Morrows cruel mock. 
I don't want to, said Redbeard. 
Let's get this straight, said the paper. It 
isn't what you want. It's what I want. Right? 
Right, said Redbeard. 
Right, said the paper. Morrows cruel mock. 
That's all for now. I'll be in touch with you 
later. 
(Kleinzeit 47) 
Even when Kleinzeit believes that he has triumphed over 
the first few paragraphs of his novel, the narrator 
reveals that Kleinzeit has been used as the instrument of 
Word, rather than the other way around: 
Under the yellow Ryman bag that was its cover the 
yellow paper growled softly. Lover, come back to 
me, it whispered. It was so good, so good the last 
time when you took me whilst I was sleeping. Where 
are you? 
He's not here today, said Word. I am. 
Not you, whimpered the yellow paper. Not the 
enormity of you. No, no, please, you're hurting me. 
0 my God the awful tremendousness of you, you, you, 
you, 
Like thunder and lightning the seed of Word jetted 
into the yellow paper. Now, said Word, there you 
are. I've quickened you ... 
The yellow paper was weeping quietly ... He 
wanted to be the only one, he wanted to do it all 
himself. 
Nobody does it all himself, said Word. 
(Kleinzeit 160) 
Herman Orff knows that he cannot do it "all 
himself", which is why he approaches Istvan Fallok, who 
promises to stimulate his creativity with "low powered 
electrical charges" and "complementary sonic patterns" 
(The Medusa Frequency 24). What Orff finds is not what 
he expects: the rotting, eyeless head of the dismembered 
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corpse of Orpheus manifests itself to him, and through 
their discussions, Orff learns about the process of 
writing. The head of Orpheus repeats the gist of Word's 
argument to the yellow paper, saying 
"The story is different every time ... and 
every time there are difficulties -- I always need 
help with it and I'm always afraid it won't go all 
the way to the end." 
"Different each time. How can that be?" 
"How can it not be? A story is a thing that 
changes as it finds new perceptions, new ideas." 
(The Medusa Frequency 100-101) 
Herman Orff believed than Fallok's machine would help him 
to write his own story; instead, it makes him the 
instrument of Orpheus's story. Where Kleinzeit cannot 
write without Word, Orff cannot write without Orpheus. 
Orpheus implies that authors are not needed to write new , . 
stories, but rather to provide new perceptions of old 
stories -- and indeed, this is what Hoban has done in 
offering two novels which replay the Orpheus myth. 
The Medusa Frequency is about finding the sources of 
inspiration, and relaying the words onto the page in the 
act of writing. Hoban foregrounds the process of 
fiction-making, and portrays it as a bricolage of pre-
existing words and ideas. Writing is described as a play 
of structure, where words and ideas are in continual 
flux, always changing and re-arranging themselves in 
relation to each other. The head of Orpheus describes 
his own story-telling as follows: 
"Broken pieces want to come together," said the 
brain, "they want to contain something. I see 
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Aristaeus with his broken bits of fired clay, each 
one only big enough for a word or two. ORPHEUS, he 
has written on one piece, THE TORTOISE on another. 
As soon as these words are put next to each other 
there want to be more words: THE ROAD; THE RIVER; 
EURYDICE. Or perhaps EURYDICE is the first word and 
in the empty space next to it there appears THE 
TORTOISE. Or first THE TORTOISE, yes of course, THE 
TORTOISE first because it is the centre of the 
' II un1verse •.. 
(The Medusa Frequency 118) 
In Orpheus's view, writing is not the perfect 
representation of a pre-existing idea, but rather a 
patchwork of broken words and phrases which are free to 
break loose from the structure of the story and coalesce 
in new patterns. From the extract above, the concern 
with establishing "the centre of the universe" is 
emphasized; Orpheus wants to write 'from the centre', but 
at the same time, must acknowledge that "the centre is 
not the centre" (Derrida, 1978: 279). 
"You know how you'll hear a sound while you're 
asleep and there comes a whole dream to account for 
it and in the dream there are things that happen 
before and after the sound might it be that the 
whole universe has no purpose but to explain the 
killing of the tortoise? Do you see what I mean? 
Perhaps the universe is a continually fluctuating 
event that configures itself to whatever is 
perceived as centre. Do you think that might be how 
it is?" 
(The Medusa Frequency 38) 
Derrida explains the importance of the centre in the 
structuralist mode by saying: 
the function of this centre was not only to orient, 
balance and organize the structure ... but above all 
to make sure that the organizing principle of the 
structure would limit what we might call the play of 
the structure ..• as centre, it is the point at 
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which the substitution of contents, elements or 
terms is no longer possible. (1978: 278-9) 
.For Hoban's characters cling to a necessary centre, 
but are at a loss as to what the nature of that centre 
might be. Indeed, the identity of the centre seems open 
to change, depending on the subject who perceives it. 
Thus, TORTOISE can be substituted for EURYDICE as long as 
one of the terms retains the central role. What Hoban 
does in both Kleinzeit and The Medusa Frequency is to 
shift the characters' central point, thus relocating the 
infinitely substitutable elements of the overall 
structure. Kleinzeit wants to establish himself as 
centre by regaining his authority and thus confirming his 
individuality; instead, he finds that Word is the point 
of origin, without whose intervention yellow paper will 
remain forever barren. Herman Orff seeks inspiration and 
finds the rotting head of Orpheus at the centre; but the 
head is not an unwavering centre. The head of Orpheus 
appears in many guises, firstly as a stone (p 31), then 
as a head of cabbage (p 60), then as a football (p 97) 
and finally as half a grapefruit (p 115). Any head-
shaped object may at any time transform into the head of 
Orpheus; as Fallok says, "I was hoping not to (see the 
head again) but a kind of madness came on me and I bought 
a large Edam cheese and when I took it out of the bag 
there was the head of Orpheus continuing its variations" 
(The Medusa Frequency 43). The effect of this continual 
mutation is reminiscent of the endless play of 
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differance; the head slips from signifier to signifier, 
much like 
an interlacing which permits the different threads 
and different lines of meaning ... to go off in 
different directions, just as it is always ready to 
tie itself up with others. (1982: 3) 
That centre which Kleinzeit and Orff seek is 
authority; the centre authorises the structure and limits 
play, and both characters yearn for the limitation which 
would accord them a fixed and stable identity. However, 
as Derrida notes, the centre can never be a part of the 
structure which it is supposed to inhabit; it cannot 
participate in the play of the structure, and therefore 
cannot be in it at all: "the centre is not the centre" 
(1978: 278). Derrida writes: 
there was no centre ... it was not a fixed locus but 
a function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite 
number of sign substitutions came into play. (1978: 
280) 
Both Kleinzeit and Orff initially resist the endless 
number of sign substitutions, but both accept the legacy 
of indeterminacy by the close of the novels. For 
Kleinzeit, the realisation is that "the absence of a 
centre is here the absence of a subject and the absence 
of an author" (Derrida, 1978: 287): he is absent as 
subject, and must needs continually reinvent himself ("as 
theme, as subject", above), and he is absent as author, 
as it is made clear that his authority does not originate 
with him. For Herman Orff, "the play is always the play 
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of absence" (Derrida, 1978: 292); he must reconcile 
himself to the loss of Luise, and he must give up his 
addiction to loss itself. The Kraken, another Orphic 
voice, tells Orff: 
THIS MYSTERY ... SHOWS ITS MEDUSA FACE TO COMPEL 
RECOGNITION, TO WARN THAT UNDERSTANDING STOPS BEFORE 
IT AND GOES NO FURTHER. THIS IS THE FACE OF MEDUSA 
WHO CANNOT BE IGNORED, CANNOT BE INTRUDED UPON, 
CANNOT BE POSSESSED. YOU HAVE NEVER GIVEN YOURSELF 
TO THIS ONE WHO WILL NOT GIVE HERSELF TO YOU, YOU 
HAVE WANTED ONLY THE SWEETNESS OF EURYDICE TO LOVE 
AND TO BETRAY. THIS IS THE FACE OF WHAT CANNOT BE 
BETRAYED. 
(The Medusa Frequency 121-22) 
The "Medusa face" represents that which cannot be 
controlled; that over which no authority can be 
exercised. At the beginning of the novel, the Kraken 
describes himself as the receptacle of the terror of 
creation: "YOU MADE ME HOLD THE TERROR THAT YOU COULD NOT 
HOLD ••. THE TERROR OF ITSELF .•. AND WORLDS THAT MIGHT 
BE" (The Medusa Frequency 10). He is also the father of 
Eurydice, who represents the loss of all that might be. 
The Kraken is at once the potential to be, and the 
potential to lose; he is the always already absent 
presence which can never be attained. In 
"Transformations and Patricidal Deconstruction", Patrick 
Mahoney cites Sarah Kofman, who compares terror of the 
law of phallogocentrism to the terror of the Medusa: 
The voice of truth is always that of the law, of 
God, of the father. The metaphysical logos has an 
essential virility. Writing, that form of 
disruption of presence, is, like the woman, always 
put down and reduced to the lowest rung. Like the 
48 
feminine genitalia, it is troubling, petrifying - it 
has a Medusa effect. (1985: 125-6) 
The Kraken can thus be read as a figure of the false 
centrality of the logocentric -discourse. All that is 
present is absence; thus Orff's sense of loss is 
displaced, as Luise was never really present to him, and 
therefore cannot be lost. What Orff must accept is the 
unknowableness of the Medusa, rather than yearning for 
the familiarity of the loss of Eurydice. That he 
achieves this is implied by the close of the novel: he 
sees "Medusa, flickering and friendly, trusting (him) 
with the idea of her" (The Medusa Frequency 143). For 
Kleinzeit, the peaceful acceptance of his own 
displacement occurs on the last page, when he takes a 
Japanese brush from the hand of Death and draws "in one 
smooth sweep a flat black circle, sweet and round" 
(Kleinzeit 191). The circle is always already the 
beginning and the ending; it encompasses all, but 
contains nothing; the ultimate cipher, it is the centre 
without centre. As Gosta Kraken notes, "everything is 




1. See, for example, Amaryll Chanady's excellent book, 
Magical Realism and the Fantastic : Resolved versus 
Unresolved Antinomy (1985), in which she traces the 
use of the term "magical realism", and examines key 
Latin American texts in terms of the definition 
which she finally adopts. Milan Kundera's The Art 
of the Novel (1991) is also useful in establishing 
the scope of magical realism. 
2. "Consensus reality" is Kathryn Hume's term, which 
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Riddley Walker, written almost entirely in an invented 
form of the English language, presents a series of complex 
interpretive challenges to the reader, and perhaps this 
accounts in part for its great critical success. The 
reader, in striving to make sense of the phonetic 
orthography of the text, joins Riddley in his quest to 
untangle the cryptic clues of his nuclear-age 
predecessors. Riddley's search is for an apocalypse -- a 
renewal -- both of forgotten knowledge and of lost 
innocence. This chapter discusses the nature of that 
search, by examining the meaning of the Apocalypse, and 
analysing Riddley's entrapment in a deterministic cycle of 
destruction. Myths dominate the text, and I argue that 
the desire for the Apocalypse can be read as a desire to 
break free of the dichotomy of mythical versus historical 
time. The allusive language of the text facilitates puns 
which deconstruct the reader's own cultural myths, 
mirroring in the act of reading the process in which 
Riddley himself participates. Finally, Riddley's ability 
to re-write the dominant myth of his culture (by providing 
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a new type of puppet show) is, ·I argue, a sign of 
hopefulness: the "Fools Circel" {Riddley Walker 5) may be 
broken. 
Russell Hoban's Riddley Walker has received much 
critical acclaim since its publication in 1980. The novel 
differs from Hoban's other works in that it is set 
completely within a fantasy world. The fantastic "other" 
does not merely intrude into the world of the novel as it 
does in The Medusa Frequency: Riddley Walker creates a 
realm of "otherness". Generically, the novel can be 
classified as a work of apocalyptic science fiction. The 
notion of the apocalypse is central to my reading of the 
novel; Hoban teases the reader with this term's 
connotations of destruction and revelation, and the 
relationship between these two concepts. 
Riddley Walker has been compared to Walter Miller's A 
Canticle for Liebowitz {1960) in its treatment of the 
apocalyptic subject matter; the protagonist, a boy of 
twelve, spends the duration of the novel trying to make 
sense of the riddles of his culture's past, which are the 
cultural remnants of the reader's present. 
( 
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The story is set in post-nuclear holocaust East Kent, 
"2347 o.c. which means Our Count" (Riddley Walker 5) 
about 3000 years hence. Hoban's world is one which seems 
to the reader to have devolved to a primitive 
developmental stage in both its economy and its culture; 
communities of "Inlanders" live in simple "forms", but do 
little farming, as they spend most of their time foraging 
for pieces of machinery and other artifacts of "Good 
Time", which is the twentieth century. They aspire to the 
technology which was the 11 1 Big 1", equating this with 
modern conveniences, rather than with thermonuclear 
weapons (the latter is the reader's understanding of the 
term). Only the "connexion men" and the "Mincery" are 
literate, and information is essentially orally 
transmitted through the performance and "tel"(ling) of 
Eusa shows. Riddley inherits the role of connexion man 
(interpreter of the Eusa myth) when his father is killed 
early in the novel, and as the shaman of his tribe, 
attempts to make sense of their myths in an effort to 
understand the motivations and desires of his society. 
The question of whether Riddley Walker is indeed an 
example of apocalyptic literature is not as easily 
resolved as I have glibly asserted above. Some critics 
maintain that 
Apocalypse must be discussed as a religious 
structure. The nature of a particular god may vary, 
but a man-made disaster, even if it is 'final', 
should not be called apocalyptic, or the term loses 
its reference (Lewicki, 1984, xvi). 
Riddley Walker portrays a society which has no 
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conception of a single god-figure, and this would seem to 
disqualify the text from the apocalyptic genre. However, 
although the generic necessity of the presence of God as a 
locus of control and preordination may be disputed, 
Riddley Walker does fulfill this condition in an unusual 
way. In this case, god is no longer conceived as the 
Judeo-Christian deity of the twentieth century, but has 
instead evolved into "the girt dans of every thing the 1 
Big 1 the Master Chanjis" (Riddley Walker 157), which 
.. ""'·· 
Riddley and his fellows seek with a fervour which 'is at 
once religious and scientific. This sacred construct, 
symbolised by the 11 1 Big 1", is godlike in that it 
surpasses human understanding, and (like the Judeo-
Christian God) it necessitates destruction even as it 
promises salvation. 
The numinous plays a crucial role in the novel, being 
the essential focus of Riddley's quest. Through an 
alchemical transformation of the reader's idea of the 
scientific into the Inlanders' sense of the mystical, and 
vice versa, Hoban problematises the stability of both 
concepts. The "god" of Riddley's universe is a 
synergistic union of scientific and mystical concepts. 
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Although the action of the novel is centered on 
"Cambry" and what was once Canterbury Cathedral, Riddley 
Walker contains no explicit references to the Judea-
Christian God. However, despite the traditionally 
religious origin of the concept of the apocalypse, it has 
been noted that there is a growing tendency towards a 
"secular" conception of the term, devoid of reference to 
the numinous. In fact, Lewicki himself observes that the 
secular notion of the apocalypse "was increasingly 
understood to denote destruction rather than rebirth" 
(1984: xiv),. which overlooks an essential defining element 
of the apocalypse: that it be the herald of a rejuvenating 
rise from the ashes of previous disaster. · 
Armageddon literally "the place of the last 
decisive battle at the Day of Judgement; hence used 
allusively for any final conflict on a grand scale" 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 635) is necessary, but 
not sufficient, for the Apocalypse. The Apocalypse 
embraces Armageddon. However, most critics use the terms 
synonymously in the manner described by Lewicki, focussing 
on the portrayal and implications of ultimate destruction, 
as well as on other aspects usually associated with the 
Apocalypse: regeneration, revelation and spiritual 
renewal. 
Riddley Walker is an example of Lewicki's "secular" 
notion of apocalyptic literature in so far as it portrays 
56 
a period chronologically after the event a nuclear war 
-- which the reader has come to think of as Armageddon. 
However, the expected apocalypse is paradoxically absent, 
for, as Kreuziger cautions: "the creation of purpose and 
meaning collides with the possibility of non-meaning and 
chaos" (1982: 78). The apocalyptic validates that which 
precedes it by transcending it; yet, for Riddley Walker, 
the "end" (the twentieth century armageddon which predates 
the diegesis) opens up a chasm of circularity which 
subverts its own apocalyptic intent. 
Riddley struggles through a renewed Dark Age; 
ironically, twentieth century knowledge is lost, and 
Riddley and his contemporaries find themselves 
perpetuating a cycle in which they desire an Armageddon, 
mistaking it for the Apocalypse. The great and often 
tragic irony of the novel is that revelation is forever 
deferred by destruction caused in the hope of attaining 
the desired revelation. 
A true revelation (of the type which Riddley seeks, 
and I will argue finds) would disrupt this 
destructive cycle. However, the desire for the "1 Big 1" 
(which brings self-destruction rather than the societal 
advances it appears to promise) is validated by the 
mythology of the post-Armageddon society, which finds its 
origin in the Eusa Story. The Eusa myth is therefore a 
double-edged sword of the Apocalypse: at once a 
cautionary and prophetic tale, it offers an illusory 
revelation, while actually foretelling further 
destruction. 
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Riddley's task is to establish whether the "1 Big 1" 
plays the role of a "God" and thus heralds a revelation, 
or whether his society is trapped within the secular 
circularity of Armageddon without renewal. Thus, while 
Riddley Walker is often identified as apocalyptic fiction!, 
in terms of Lewicki's strict definition, the novel tends 
more toward the presentation of post-Armageddon entropy. 
Riddley's struggle to obtain a moment of revelation amidst 
the entropic decline of his society becomes the catalyst 
of the confusion which propels his quest. 
In many ways, Riddley Walker is patterned identically 
to other Hoban novels such as The Lion of Boaz-Jachin and 
Jachin-Boaz {1973) and Pilgermann {1983). In these 
novels, a young male protagonist begins a quest towards 
manhood which is precipitated by a sexual experience with 
a woman, and the receiving of some mark of the quest -- a 
physical sign of difference written on the body (for 
example, the castration of Pilgermann and the ritual 
scarring of Riddley with the Eusa brand mark). The 
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psychological journey necessitates an ordering and 
understanding of the past in order to negotiate the 
opportunities presented by the future. In "Post nuclear 
post card", Schwenger uses the example of a man whose back 
is literally scarred by the atomic blast at Hiroshima to 
illustrate how 
His back ... became a more significant message ... 
This is the retroactive nature of our knowledge. 
(1992: 9). 
The paradox is that nothing can be read from the 
front; like Derrida's postcard, it is the message on the 
back which begs interpretation, and yet defies it 
(Schwenger, 1992: 9). Riddley attempts to read the 
message written on his own back, by his atomic-age 
predecessors, and the sign of his authority as reader is 
contained within the Eusa scar on his belly. This 
epitomises his dilemma: his eyes, turned to the future, 
are focussed by the past. 
Hoban's male protagonists are isolated by the 
condition they find themselves in 2, and it is their 
striving to make sense of their difference which propels 
their quests toward self-knowledge. While Boaz-Jachin 
struggles to establish himself in the shadow of his 
father, who has exchanged one fatherly stereotype 
(remaining with and protecting his family) for another 
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(abandoning them in favour of a mid-life-crisis younger 
lover), Riddley begins a quest for the essential truths 
which he, as "connexion man", is expected to relay to his 
community. Hoban's obsession with the Bildungsroman theme 
finds voice again through Riddley Walker. Jack Branscomb 
identifies this pattern in Hoban's novels, and points out 
that although the model is the conventional one of the 
search for happiness, the outcome is not: 
They launch themselves or are thrust· into searches 
for wholeness which turn out to be circular, leading 
them into the past before allowing them to escape 
into the present ... They develop, not towards 
conventional happiness, but toward reintegration of 
the self, recovery of the past, openness toward the 
future, and freedom to act in the present (1986: 33). 
Riddley in particular must struggle to obtain 
"freedom to act in the present", as the novel shows him 
attempting to oppose powerful deterministic forces (the 
impulse towards self-destruction epitomised by the "1 Big 
1") which seem to preclude any personal freedom at all. 
This is the reason that critics are divided about the 
general tone of Riddley Walker, many opting for a 
pessimistic reading qualified by the doomed cycles of 
inevitability which permeate the novel. Riddley's 
community seems literally hell-bent on reinventing the 
nuclear devices of destruction which caused their fall 
from the grace of "Good Time", the very "Good Time" which 
they think to reclaim by this means. Ignorance and greed 
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seem to have control over their fate as they blindly 
stumble towards another hollow "Apocalypse". The critical 
alternative is a reading which allows a moment of 
optimism; my analysis will read Riddley's final role as 
puppeteer of his own show as a sign of a break with the 
negative deterministic cycles of history. 
iii: Hist~~y a~d ~yth 
In order to establish the scope for possible escape 
. from the cycles of determinism threatened by the Eusa 
myth, it is necessary to examine the relationship between 
history and myth. Mircea Eliade, in The Myth of the 
Eternal Return, discusses the notion of circularity 
(fundamental to Riddley Walker) in terms of an opposition 
between sacred and profane time. Eliade identifies as 
"sacred" any action which finds a precedent in "a reality 
which transcends (it)" (1965: 4); its value lies in its 
property of "reproducing a primordial act, of repeating a 
mythical example" (1965: 4). The sacred, then, is the 
realm of the myth. Historical time is profane, and is 
defined by its linearity. In profane time, events occur 




Thus, reality is acquired solely through repetition 
or participation; everything which lacks an exemplary 
model is "meaningless", that is, it lacks reality. 
Men would thus have a tendency to become archetypal 
and paradigmatic. This tendency may well appear to 
be paradoxical, in the sense that the man of the 
traditional culture sees himself as real only to the 
extent that he ceases to be himself ... and is 
satisfied with imitating and repeating the gestures 
of another. (Eliade, 1965: 34) 
Riddley's task, in Eliade's terms, is to escape the 
process of transformation of history into myth, which his 
society encourages. By Riddley's time, the historical 
fact of the twentieth century nuclear war has amalgamated 
previous myths (such as the Legend of st Eustace) and 
situated itself firmly within sacred time; it has mutated 
into a self-replicating myth. The very performance of the 
Eusa shows which Riddley is bound to maintain is in itself 
a device for the continued mythologisation of the events. 
Eliade notes 
(t)he ahistorical character of popular memory, the 
inability of collective memory to retain historical 
events and individuals except insofar as it 
transforms them into archetypes (1965: 46) 
and it is this type of transformation which I identify at 
work in Riddley's community. 
Individuals, transformed into archetypes, are denied 
their individuality. An example of the depersonalisation 
which such archetyping causes is the tradition of the 
ritualistic twelve-yearly interrogation and execution of 
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the Ardship of Cambry, figure-head of the "Eusa folk". The 
Eusa folk are 
a tribe of deformed monsters descended from the 
original nuclear victims and made to interbreed to 
preserve the last scattered imprints of a now 
vanished science. (Alvarez, 1981: 16) 
The Ardship is ritually beheaded by the men from the 
Mincery. Lissener explains this to Riddley, and also 
reveals the historical origin of the child's rhyme, "Fools 
Circel 9wys". Riddley initially doubts Lissener's story, 
as the rhyme is completely meaningless, and thus harmless, 
to him. 
He said, "Wel Im the Ardship of Cambry enn I." 
I thot he wer making a joak. I said, "Thats about it 
and you bustit out before the 1st chop too. So now 
its some 1 elses tern inside the circel innit." 
He said, "Thats right. 12 mor years or so and 
Goodparley can have his self a nether Ardship." 
He said, "Wel its sharna pax and get the peal innit. 
1st the easy askings then its helping the qwirys then 
its Chops your Aunty and your head on a peal. Dent 
you know the rime?" 
I said, "What rime do you mean?" 
What he done then he sung Fools circel 9wys: 
Horny Boy rung Widders Bel 
Steal his Fathers Ham as wel 
Bernt his Arse and Forkt a Stoan 
Done It Over break a bean 
out of Good Shear vackt his wayt 
Scratcht Sams Itch for No. 8 
Gone to senter nex to see 
Cambry coming 3 times 3 
Sharna pax and get the peal 
When the Ardship of Cambry comes out of the 
heal 
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The way he sung it made my blood run col. I cud see 
like in a dream figger running in a kynd of dream 
space. I said, "Thats Fools Circle 9wys thats jus a 
game." 
He said, "O yes its a game right a nuff if you like 
to call it that only it aint too much fun for the 
Ardship what gets his head took off at the end of 
it." 
(Riddley Walker 75-6) 
Through the use of macabre irony, the above extract 
illustrates the process of mythologisation, and its self-
perpetuating nature. Riddley's ignorance of the political 
nature of the child's rhyme is another example of the 
semiotic instability of his language: what he takes to be 
meaningless is meaningful, and what he thinks is "blipful 11 3 
is not symbolic at all. Eliade writes: 
insofar as an act (or an object) acquires a certain 
reality through repetition of certain paradigmatic 
gestures, and acquires it through that alone, there 
is an implicit abolition of profane time, of 
duration, of "history"; and he who reproduces the 
exemplary gesture thus finds himself transported into 
the mythical epoch in which its revelation took 
place". (1965: 35) 
Eliade's observation is supported by Goodparley's 
participation in the bloody ritual of interrogation and 
murder, and Lissener's partial acquiesence (he fathers the 
heir without whom he could not be executed, and he 
believes that using the same methods of investigation 
might reveal the truth they both seek, if only he could 
escape). The society's desire for "Good Time" is an 
effort to collapse historical difference through the 
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performance of "sacred rituals". Both Lissener and 
Goodparley believe that the ritual of "helping the qwirys" 
will unlock the door to a genetic treasure-house of 
memories, thus repeating the "sacred" moment when the 
mysteries of the "1 Big 1" are revealed. 
Leonard Mustazza examines the role of myth and 
history in Riddley Walker; he points out that "Riddley's 
people accept both the (Eusa) story and its moral theme, 
which testifies to the prestige the myth enjoys in that 
traditional culture" (1989: 21). He goes on to identify a 
crucial transition in Riddley's society in the shift from 
a mythic understanding on Riddley's part to an historical 
one. This occurs when Riddley hears opposing versions of 
the end of the Eusa story (which he had believed as "old 
spel"lgospel up till then) from Lissener and Goodparley. 
The opposing possibilities for closure offer not only 
alternatives on the level of narrative, but also in terms 
of politics: 
the ruling powers of the country - notably Goodparley 
- are more concerned with history than myth, more 
concerned with how knowledge of the past can lead to 
future developments than with the lessons of the 
past. (Mustazza, 1989: 25) 
I would argue that Mustazza's simple opposition of 
myth 1 history: primitive 1 progressive society is 
challenged by Hoban. I have shown above that what 
Goodparley is concerned with is not history (although he 
believes this to be so), but rather myth. The historical 
events have been so occluded by the accretion of myths, 
that Goodparley's striving for the repetition of an 
historical event has become a mythical desire for the 
return to the "sacred" realm of "Good Time". While it 
appears that Goodparley is concerned with history, he is 
instead caught within the cyclical process of mythical 
self-replication. Myths revel in their obtuseness, the 
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possibility for a multiplicity of readings allowing for an 
appreciation of their cyclical resonance -- Riddley's 
myths are meaningful to the reader in the twentieth 
century, as well as in the fictitious future of the text. 
Myths are therefore authorised in a way that history is 
not, for history is a series of unique events, while myths 
endlessly recapitulate themselves. Repetition 
'authorises' myth. This authority is present in the text 
in the form of 
"some thing in us it dont have no name •.. it aint 
ben beartht it never does get beartht its all ways in 
the woom of things all ways on the road." Seams like 
I ben all ways thinking on that thing in us what 
thinks us but it dont think like us. Our woal life is 
an idear we dint think of nor we dont know what it 
is. 
(Riddley Walker 6,7) 
Hoban shows that what Mustazza and Goodparley see as 
"history" perpetuates itself in an equally circular 
, 
fashion; after a twentieth century armageddon, the 
Inlanders begin the quest for the "1 Littl 1" and the "1 
Big 1" (gunpowder and nuclear weaponry) all over again. 
Granser blows himself up while mixing gunpowder; his head 
impaled on a pole, he represents the mythic figure of 
Eusa, for'telling' inevitable destruction). His sticky 
end predicts a repetition of this "history", and the 
iconic nature of the symbol places the events within 
sacred, rather than profane, time. This is reinforced by 
the allusion to the image of Eusa, beaten to death after 
"Bad Time": 
"They took his head off then they put it on a poal 
for telling." 
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(Riddley Walker 117) 
The Mincery has tried deliberately to foster the 
mythologisation of the remnants of twentieth century 
history in order to authorise their own actions. 
Goodparley wishes to act in historical time, but is 
trapped by his own machinations in the realm of myth. 
What he sees as the source of his power (his control of 
the Eusa myth) is in fact the very thing which disempowers 
him -- no one can control the myth, as it supersedes 
individual events and people. Goodparley's belief that he 
is free to act in historical time, and not predetermined, 
is denied by his.own tendency to "see himself as real only 
to the extent that he ceases to be himself ... and is 
satisfied with imitating and repeating the gestures of 
another" {Eliade, 1965: 34). 
Riddley rejects this: 
I cud feal some thing growing in me it wer like 
a grean sea surging in me it wer saying, LOSE 
, IT. Saying, LET GO. Saying, THE ONLYES POWER IS 
NO POWER. 
(Riddley Walker 162) 
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Riddley's realisation that the "truth" of his myth is 
in actuality the result of political manipulation for 
"sacred" purposes stimulates a similar insight on the part 
of the reader: while he apprehends the political 
difference between versions of the Eusa myth, we are 
encouraged to perceive a paradoxical similarity between 
myth and history. The line between the two is necessarily 
blurred, as the reader knows the history (twentieth 
century atomic news) of the myth, and realises (with 
Riddley) that truth resides in neither category. Although 
in response to Marquez's work, Gerald Martin's comment 
that 
readers have generally failed to recognise that 
although history is sometimes devoured by myth, every 
myth has its History. This novel is not about some 
undifferentiated fusing of 'history-and-myth', but 
about the myths of history and their demystification. 
{1989: 223) 
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is equally pertinent here. Riddley 'cannot form a 
single interpretation of his history; as his history is 
the reader's present, Riddley's inability to provide a 
single reading of his past subverts the reader's attempts 
to do the same with her present. 
"I dont think it makes no diffrents where you 
start the telling of a thing" 
(Riddley Walker 8) 
Ever a disingenuous narrator, Riddley opens the novel 
at a moment of epiphany: he describes the rite of passage 
into manhood -- the killing of a wild boar -- which should 
signify a momentous entrance into the adult world of his 
community. Ironically, for Riddley the epiphany lies not 
in the symbolic act, but in the realisation that "The woal 
thing fealt jus that littl bit stupid" (Riddley Walker 1). 
His society poised on the brink of change, Riddley is an 
outsider from the beginning. From the very first page of 
the narrative, Riddley is displaced in the language of 
Derridean discourse. No longer a boy, he cannot respect 
the occasion of his manhood; his incredulity places him 
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outside categorisation -- he is not just between the 
stages of boyhood and manhood, but outside them 
altogether. This initial displacement of the protagonist 
is a feature common to all of Hoban's novels under 
discussion. 
As the novel progresses, he becomes more rebellious; 
defying conventions is the hallmark of Hoban's heroes. In 
Riddley's case, it is only a matter of time before he 
crosses the fence (literally). Even during children's 
games, he "all ways rathert be the Ardship nor 1 of the 
circel I liket the busting out part" (Riddley Walker 5). 
The irony of this statement is that the "busting out" 
leads to more "ardship" than Riddley can imagine: he 
suffers both physical and psychological hardship through 
his meeting with Lissener, the Ardship of Cambry. 
In many ways, Riddley becomes remarkably aware of the 
social and political forces which regulate his society; 
however, he remains unaware of the ironic jokes played 
upon him by his own language. The tension between 
Riddley's ·language and that of the reader is so great that 
critics have gone so far as to identify language as one of 
the protagonists of the novel (Maynor and Patteson, 1984: 
18-25). 
Although Riddley's society is largely pre-literate 
(with only a privileged few -- the Mincery and the 
connexion men-- able to read and write), language plays a 
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pivotal role in the community. Its influence is most 
greatly felt in the prevalence of myths which regulate and 
explain aspects of the characters' lives. The central 
myth which governs the Inlanders' behaviour is the story 
of Eusa, which is a pseudo-scientific religious allegory 
susceptible to use as political propaganda; however, 
analysis of other myths will serve to contextualise this 
most important one. 
The novel begins with the relation of the myth "Hart 
of the Wood" (Riddley Walker 2); it is a creation myth, 
explaining the origin of charcoal. At the same time, the 
myth functions as a cautionary tale, and forms part of the 
symbolic fabric of Riddley's society in so far as it 
elaborates on other dominant myths, such as the Eusa myth. 
There is a sense of intertextuality (emphasised by the 
multiple meanings of homophones) which permeates all the 
myths and is emphasized at the outset of "Hart of the 
Wood": 
There is the Hart of the Wud in the Eusa Story* that 
wer a stag every 1 knows that. There is the hart of 
the wood meaning the veryes deap of it thats a nether 
thing. There is a hart of the wood where they bern 
the chard coal that a nether thing agen innit ..• Why 
do they call it the hart tho? Thats what this here 
story tels of. 
* Iwl write down the Eusa Story when I come to it. 
( Riddley Walker ·2) 
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The above extract illustrates the complexity of 
Riddley's language: one word or concept can have a 
multiplicity of meanings, depending on context. These 
many meanings continually efface and replace one another, 
destabilising the already complex semiosis of the 
language. As David Dowling suggests, 
Riddley faces a deconstructionist nightmare. He 
already lives in a deconstructed world where no 
position is privileged, no code to decoding apparent. 
Apparent key words like "aulderjolder", "hart/heart", 
"woodjwould" and "saviourjsaverjsavor" replicate and 
mutate dizzyingly even as he contemplates them. 
(1988: 183) 
The myths, then, seem to be guides to understanding 
the phenomena of Riddley's world, and yet paradoxically 
serve to complicate that understanding even as they 
attempt to simplify it. A synopsis of "Hart of the Wood" 
illustrates this: During "Bad Time", a man, woman and 
child struggle against starvation in the post-nuclear 
wasteland. A "clevver looking bloak" offers them fire in 
exchange for the body of the child as food. The parents 
agree: 
The man and the woman then eating ther chyld it wer 
black nite all roun them they made ther fire bigger 
and bigger trying to keap the black from moving in on 
them. They fell a sleap by ther fire and the fire 
biggering on it et them up they bernt to death. They 
ben the old 1s or you myt say the auld 1s and be come 
chard coal. Thats why theywl tel you the aulder tree 
is bes for charring coal. 
(Riddley Walker 4) 
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The myth explains the origin of charcoal in a tragic 
tale of trickery, betrayal and loss -- in the same manner 
as the Eusa myth deals with the scientific facts of 
nuclear fission. The presence of the "clevver looking 
bleak" foreshadows the character Mr Clevver, at whose 
instructions Eusa creates nuclear weapons and ushers in 
"Bad Time" in the Eusa Story. Further, the name of "The 
Hart of the Wood" story reiterates central concepts like 
"hart" and "woodjwud" from the Eusa myth. In the Eusa 
story, Eusa reduces himself in size until he enters the 
atom; fission is explained in the following way: 
1. Wen Mr Clevver wuz Big Man uv Inland thay 
had evere thing clevver ••. Eusa ••. wuz werking for 
Mr Clevver wen thayr cum enemes aul roun & maykin 
Warr. 
4. Eusa wuz a noing man ••• He smaulert his 
self down tu it he gon in tu particklers uv it. 
5. Smauler & smauler thay groan with Eusa in 
tu the hart uv the stoan hart uv the dans. 
6. Cum tu the wud in the hart uv the stoan. 
8. He cum tu the Hart uv the Wud it wuz the 
Stag uv the Wud it wuz the 12 Poynt stag .•. On the 
stags hed stud the Littl Shynin Man the Addom 
12. Eusa sed tu the Littl Man the Addom, I nead 
tu no the No. uv the 1 Big 1 & yu mus tel me it •.• 
Eusa sed, if yu wean tel in 1 may be yul tel in 2. 
Eusa wuz pulin on the Littl Mans owt stretcht arms 
14. Pult in 2 lyk he wuz a chikken. Eusa 
screamt he felt lyk his own bele ben pult in 2 & 
evere thing rushin owt uv him. 
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(Riddley Walker 28-30) 
Hoban uses repetition of central terms (such as 
"wood"/"wud") and ideas (such as the conflict between 
unity and division on both the personal and the political 
scale) in much the same way as he used repetition of the 
"barrow full of rocks" phrases in Kleinzeit. The meanings 
are never fixed or stable; there is rather 
an interlacing which permits the different threads 
and different lines of meaning -- or of force -- to 
go off again in different directions, just as it is 
always ready to tie itself up with others (Derrida, 
1978: 3). 
By using this narrative device, Hoban has created 
myths,as "there is no real end to methodological analysis, 
no hidden unity to be grasped once the breaking-down 
process has been completed. Themes can be split up ad 
infinitum" (Derrida, 1978: 287). 
One of these recurrent themes is the ambivalent 
figure of female sexuality. As has been mentioned above, 
it is a sexual experience with a woman which precipitates 
Riddley's quest; the woman concerned is Lorna Elswint, the 
"tel woman", or female shaman, of his tribe. In his role 
as connexion man, Riddley figures as her shamanic 
complement. Hoban presents prominent female characters as 
oracles of wisdom and sources of deceit in all of his 
novels (Sophia, meaning literally 'wisdom', is 
Pilgermann's muse, while Melanie Falsepercy the false 
Persephone -- misleads Herman Orff in The Medusa 
Freguency). In Riddley Walker, it is Lorna's words which 
begin Riddley's search for truth. He "freshens the Luck" 
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(has sexual intercourse) with her, and she "tels" for him: 
"Its some kynd of thing it aint us but yet its in us. 
Its looking out thru our eye hoals ... It puts us on 
like we put on our cloes. Some times we dont fit. 
Some times it cant find the arm hoals and it tears us 
a part" 
'(Riddley Walker 6) 
This mystery propels Riddley into the act of writing 
the novel, an act of creativity which, I will argue, 
contributes towards providing the true apocalypse, and 
functions as the alternative to the search for the "1 Big 
1": 
Thats why I finely come to writing all this down. 
Thinking on what the idear of us myt be. Thinking on 
that thing whats in us lorn and loan and oansome. 
(Riddley Walker 7) 
Lorna Elswint figures as the positive aspect of 
femininity in Riddley Walker, and is complemented by 
"Aunty", a fearful symbol of death and sexuality. Hoban 
perpetuates two of the archetypal stereotypes of 
femininity: the loverjmother figure who nurtures, 
protects and inspires, and the witchjcrone figure, who is 
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awesome and has a murderous power. By combining the 
death-witch with images of powerful sexuality, Hoban plays 
on the notion of the 'little death' of orgasm, and so uses 
Aunty as another symbol of circularity: the petit mort in 
life is, Hoban suggests, a shadow of an orgasmic death. 
Georges Bataille argues that 
the depression following upon the final spasm may 
give a foretaste of death ... the individual splits 
up and his unity is shattered from the first moment 
of the sexual crisis ..• A rush of blood upsets the 
balance on which life is based. A madness suddenly 
takes possession of a person ... for the time being, 
the personality is dead. (1962: 102, 105, 106) 
For Bataille, sex at once contains and mirrors death; 
for Hoban, death at once contains and mirrors sex. This 
is shown in the myth "The Bloak as Got on Top of Aunty", 
which begins: 
Every body knows Aunty. stoan bones and iron tits 
and teef be twean her legs plus she has a iron 
willy for the ladys it gets red hot. When your time 
comes you have to do the juicy with her like it or 
not. 
(Riddley Walker 87) 
In this story (also set in "Bad Time"), a suicidal 
man who has lost his wife and children to the plague goes 
out looking for Aunty; because he desires her, she lets 
him live: "'No youre not dead becaws you got on top of me 
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and I pult in my bottom teef for you"' (Riddley Walker 
88). Feeling triumphant, the man goes on to boast to 
another woman that he has been with Aunty and survived. 
To celebrate, he has sex with the woman, until, exhausted, 
he stops to rest. "'I think youwl rest a little longern 
you think,'" she says, revealing herself as "'Auntys 
saymling sister'" Arga Warga (Riddley Walker 89). "Arga 
Warga" is another term for Death, which has its origin in 
the onomatopoeic parallel with the baying of the wild dogs 
which roam Inland. The parallels between Riddley 
"freshening the Luck" with Lorna and thus learning 
something of the mysteries of life, and this story are 
striking. Sex itself becomes a double-doored portal to 
the mysteries of life and death, functioning as did the 
olive tree in The Medusa Freguency as a gateway to the 
unconscious drives of creation and destruction. 
Hoban uses sexual arousal to symbolise extreme self-
awareness of both the physical and psychological body. An 
example of this is the epiphany Riddley experiences when 
he finally reaches Cambry and intuits a sense of the 
inter-connectedness of the symbols of his myths and the 
'reality' he discovers in the ruins of the former 
Canterbury cathedral: 
Becaws it come to me then I knowit Power dint go a 
way. It be and it wer and it wud be. It wer there 
and drawing I began to get as cited thinking on 
them things ••. Yet unner neath the Zero Groun I 
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lissent up a swarming it wer a humming like millying 
of bees it wer lOs of millyings. I began to feal all 
juicy with it ... Not jus my cock but all of me it 
wer like all of me wer cock and all the worl a cunt 
and open to me 
(Riddley Walker 150, 151, 153-4) 
The sexual imagery is complex: Hoban seems to align 
the feminine with the processes of both life and death, 
resulting in an orgasmic moment of revelation. This is 
further complicated by the opposing forces of myth and 
history at play in the novel. Myths, such as the two 
related above, are re-told and interpreted by the "tel-
woman", while history is written by men 4. Hoban 
problematises the relationship between myth and history in 
Riddley Walker, aligning myth with the feminine (and 
therefore as the realm of a threatening, yet revelatory 
essential truth), while history is figured as masculine. 
This conclusion can be drawn through an analysis of the 
Eusa myth. 
Central to the analysis of the Eusa myth is the 
relationship between the reader and the protagonist. The 
novel depends largely on the intersection between the 
protagonist's point of view and that of the reader, for 
its success. The futuristic setting of the novel 
facilitates a disjunction in what Hume would term 
"consensus reality" (1984: 21) between the reader and 
Riddley; this allows for the fantastic "tokens" of which 
MacLean writes, where twentieth century commonplaces (such 
as aeroplanes and video) are rendered fantastic to 
Riddley's contemporaries. In order that the antinomy 
between the reader's consensus reality and that of the 
characters be resolved, the reader necessarily 
participates in the 'decoding' of the text. This 
authorial strategy allows Hoban to tell an essentially 
moral tale without appearing heavy-handedly didactic, as 
the reader is obliged to participate in formulating her 
own conclusions as a result of the presentation of 
opposing viewpoints. A brief examination of the role of 
the reader will illustrate the complexity of this 
relationship to show how it is manipulated by Hoban 
~hrough the Eusa myth. 
According to Wolfgang Iser, any act of reading 
involves: 
78 
two ranges of indeterminacy: (1) between text and 
reader, (2) between text and reality. The reader is 
compelled to reduce the indeterminacies, and so build 
a situational frame to encompass himself and the 
text. (Furthermore,) the literary text ... delivers 
different information to different readers - each in 
accordance with the capacity of his comprehension. 
(1988: 22) 
Susan Suleiman emphasizes that the work is more than 
the text, as it needs realisation in the act of reading in 
order to exist. She further suggests that realisation is 
directly dependent on "the individual disposition of the 
reader" (1980: 8). This is a central factor in Riddley 
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Walker, as both Riddley and the actual reader of the novel 
are, in a sense, readers in the text. Riddley 'reads' 
remnants of the reader's culture; the reader reads 
Riddley's reading critically, only to find this criticism 
being redirected at her own conventions of reading. 
Riddley Walker is fascinating because of this process; the 
redoubling (reader reads Riddley reading traces of reader) 
which constitutes the act of our reading is illustrated 
thematically in the novel. 
The idea that everyone is merely a minor character in 
another person's life-story, that every subjectivity is 
reduced to the status of object, recurs throughout Hoban's 
work 5. While this theme was one of the focal points in 
The Medusa Frequency, it emerges with more subtlety in 
Riddley Walker. Twentieth-century readers find themselves 
reading a reading of their own culture; we are characters 
in Riddley's hisjstory, just as he is a character in the 
novel we hold in our hands. 
The tragic irony in Riddley Walker is generated by 
the tension between the reader's interpretation of the 
textual events, and that of the protagonist. Hoban 
emphasizes the possibilities for a linguistic 'free play' 
of meaning by describing the intricate and logical 
deliberations of Riddley and Goodparley as they struggle 
to make sense of what to the reader is the simple 
description of a work of art from the Middle Ages, The 
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Legend of St Eustace. Written in twentieth century 
standard English, The Legend of St Eustace (Riddley Walker 
118-19) seems dull and lifeless by comparison with the 
vigourous, allusive language which Riddley and his fellows 
use. Goodparley attempts to "connect" (interpret) the 
Legend: 
1. . .. St Eustace is seen on his knees before his 
quarry, a stag, between whose antlers appears, on a 
cross of radiant light, the figure of the crucified 
saviour 
(Riddley Walker 118-19) 
is read as 
A stag. Wel thats our Hart of the Wud innit ... "a 
cross of radiant light". Which is the same as 
radiating light or radiation •.. Wel we know from our 
oan Eusa story where you fynd the Hart of the Wud. 
youwl fynd a shyning be twean his horns. Which that 
shyning is the Littl Shynin Man the Addom. Only in 
this legend its callit "the figure of the crucified 
saviour" ••. Iwl tel you theresa working in this 
thing theres a pattren theres mor connexions nor wewl 
ever fynd reveals of. 
(Riddley Walker 122-23) 
That Goodparley and Riddley use the same intellectual 
strategies to discover the truth as are favoured by the 
reader's own culture (logic, rationality etcetera) to 
arrive at completely different conclusions, destabilises 
the reader's confident authority in her own reading 
strategies. 
81 
The Eusa myth is the mysterious text inviting 
readings by both the characters in and the reader of the 
novel, Riddley Walker. It is an orally transmitted myth 
which is retold and reinterpreted by Riddley's community. 
For the reader, it mythologises the armageddon of nuclear 
war which the twentieth century fears, while for Riddley 
and his contemporaries, it is a myth of origins, and a key 
to the future. Again, in a typically paradoxical fashion, 
Hoban unites the end of the world with the beginning of 
civilisation, showing the interdependence of the two 
concepts and minimising the all too obvious differences 
between them., The Eusa myth functions in Riddley's 
society as a "lessing and a lerning" (Riddley Walker 78) 
to his people. It provides a narrative account which 
is, unsurprisingly, distorted -- of the nuclear 
destruction presumed to have occurred around the year 
2000. Although Riddley's is a largely illiterate society, 
the Inlanders are aware of the approximate date of the 
nuclear disaster because 
"We dont know jus how far that count ever got becaws 
Bad Time put an end to it. Theres a stoan in the 
Power Ring stannings has the year number 1997 cut 
into it nor we aint never seen no year number farther 
on nor that." 
(Riddley Walker 120) 
Having no know~edge of the Christian calendar, this 
discovery engenders a feeling of inadequacy which is 
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ironic to the reader, who realises that her own 
civilization has its origins thousands of years prior to 
this date. Riddley's wistful comment 
"Dyou mean to tel me them befor us by the time they 
done 1997 years they had boats in the air and all 
them things and here we are weve done 2347 years and 
mor and stil slogging in the mud?" 
(Riddley Walker 120) 
serves to remind the reader that the will to destruction 
seems disguised as the race for progress. 
In many ways, the Eusa myth is to the Inlanders what 
the Bible is to Christians: it is "written" in numbered 
sections reminiscent of Biblical verses, and it details 
the primal Fall (when Eusa "pult the Littl Shyning Man the 
Addom in 2"), the post-lapsarian spiritual and material 
darkness (in which Riddley languishes), and fosters a 
longing for what is fated to be another Armageddon 
(presaged by the deadly effects of the "1 Littl 1", 
gunpowder). As readers, we seem to be placed in a 
position of superior knowledge to Riddley; he travels the 
Fool's Circle searching for the "1 Big 1", not knowing or 
understanding its nature, while we know it to be atomic 
power. Although we cannot truly comprehend nuclear 
disaster on such a scale, we believe we are aware of its 
possible consequences, which seem to have resulted before 
Riddley's time. 
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The destruction is seen as almost inevitable; that 
we are bound to a cycle of history repeating itself is 
emphasized in a conversation between the puppeteer and 
Eusa during a show: 
Orfing says, "··· I mean if you hadnt opent up the 
Little Shyning Man the Addom and let out the Nos. of 
the Master Chaynjis of the 1 Big 1 then if you hadnt 
put that knowing in that box ... 11 
Eusa says, "If I hadnt some 1 else wudve done. Whyd 
the Hart of the Wud stan why dint it run? Whynt the 
Littl Shyning Man hop it whynt he vack his wayt out 
of there dubbel qwick 1st time he ever seen me? Iwl 
tel you why its part of ther game thats why. The 
Hart of the Wud and the Littl Shyning Man the Addom 
they cant live without you get the knowing of them 
nor you cant get the knowing of them til you kil the 
1 and open up the other. Then its on you innit. 
Hevvy on your back for ever." 
(Riddley Walker 50) 
The myth is transmitted orally by means of Eusa. 
shows, a stylised form of puppet show with links to the 
tradition of Punch and Judy. They are performed for the 
people by the Pry Mincer and the Wes Mincer, who represent 
the centre of political power in Riddley's time, the Ram. 
Every community (or "fents", so named because of the 
group's territorial defences) has a connexion man, whose 
function is to interpret the meaning of the Eusa show for 
his people. This is a job which Riddley inherits after 
his father is killed in an accident early in the novel, 
and (as I have discussed above) it alienates him from his 
community. Riddley's role of shaman, combined with his 
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unusual intelligence, leads to warnings from such "hevvys" 
(who maintain order on the forms) as Fister Crunchman that 
"Youre myndy dont you see. You ben lernt to read and 
write and all ways thinking on things. Trubba not 
nor I aint staring but I wunt want to be like that it 
aint no way for a man to be ... Dont think too much 
youwl grow hair on the in side of your head." 
(Riddley Walker 61) 
In this respect, Riddley suffers alienation from his 
peers as a result of his different way of perceiving the 
world; this emphasis on differing modes of perception is 
characteristic of all of Hoban's protagonists. 
Because of the disparity in basic knowledge and 
experience between the implied reader and the protagonist, 
the Eusa myth has an unusual status when compared to other 
myths. Conventionally, 
There is no unity or absolute source of the myth. 
The focus or the source of the myth are always 
shadows and virtualities which are elusive, 
unactualisable and nonexistent in the first place. 
(Derrida, 1978: 286) 
However, in this case, the reader believes herself to 
be aware, by virtue of her position in history, of the 
origin of the myth (as a description of the technological 
advances and moral choices which led to the armageddon); 
it is its interpretation which remains shadowy and elusive 
to the reader. We struggle to make sense of the way the 
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Inlanders have understood something which seems all too 
plain to us. Although a general sense of the disaster of 
"Bad Time" is conveyed (all too familiar in the light of 
current fears about nuclear war), the specifics remain 
hazy, and this is further complicated by the unusual 
interpretations of the myth offered by the different 
characters. For the Inlanders, the origin of the myth is 
unknown, but believed to lie in historical events, and the 
interpretations vary in their detail (particularly in 
their political bias), but confirm one another 
allegorically in spirit. Indeed, the Eusa myth and its 
descendants, the shows, often disagree: 
"It says in Eusa 18 : 'Eusa put the 1 Big 1 in barms 
then him & Mr Clevver droppit so much barms thay kilt 
as menne uv thear oan as thay kilt enemes.' Yet now 
in this here show youre telling us it bint like 
that." 
(Riddley Walker 48-9) 
Hoban intends to draw the reader's attention to her 
own vulnerability to the existence of a multiplicity of 
readings, and the possibility of misinterpretation: "The 
question is of course raised whether our reading of these 
terms is not as distant from that of past ages as the 
reading of 3000 years hence is distant from us" (MacLean, 
1988: 217). 
The core text-within-the-text (the Eusa myth) is the 
apparent remnant of a previous civilisation. Marie 
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MacLean identifies anything which "provides a concrete 
link between the two worlds ... the present and the 
paraxial, the self and the other" (1988: 211) as a token. 
In the case of Riddley Walker, the Eusa myth and The 
Legend of St Eustace (an extant Twentieth century text) 
are both tokens of what to the Inlanders is fantastic 
("boats on the air and picters on the wind"), but to the 
reader, the norm. This confirms Jackson's assertion that 
fantasy is an index of the limits of the dominant cultural 
order (1981: 4) -- the modern reader is forced to confront 
the limits of the contemporary world by seeing that world 
as distorted by the mythifications (writing and readings) 
of the future. The status of both the Eusa Story and The 
Legend of St Eustace as tokens is confirmed by the 
orthography of both texts, which differs from that of the 
frame narrative. The Legend is written in twentieth 
century standard English, while the Eusa myth is 
transcribed in a lexical form most similar to Old English 
spelling. The contemporary reader is obliged to entertain 
Riddley's apparent misreadings of these tokens, whose very 
coherent existence problematises the notion of the 
reader's own cherished, conventionally acceptable cultural 
myths. The position of authority apparently afforded to 
the reader by her historical precedence to Riddley's world 
is therefore steadily undermined as the novel progresses. 
This results in the the final subversion of any 
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pretensions towards absolute authorial control over the 
"truth", and the creation of an alternative to this model 
of narrative authority, realised in the creation of the 
Punch and Judy shows. 
Hoban manipulates this unusual relationship between 
reader and protagonist to great effect in the novel; 
Riddley becomes a kind of post-atomic Huck Finn whose 
ignorance apparently artlessly foregrounds the ignorance 
of the reader. Alvarez points out the similarity between 
the two characters: 
The voices are very similar, at once young and 
knowing, innocent and disillusioned, the voices of 
survivors fumbling with a language they have never 
been formally taught. (1981: 16) 
This combination of innocence and disillusionment is most 
clearly illustrated by the language used in the novel. In 
Riddley Walker, Hoban provides a detailed examination of 
the role of language by creating for the purposes of the 
novel, his own version of the English language. Porter 
writes that Hoban 
reinvent(s) language in the future in order to 
challenge the conditions of normal discourse in the 
present. (1990: 447) 
Most critics address the problem of the language of 
apocalyptic fiction, raising questions which Hoban 
necessarily answers in the text. Porter asks: "How might 
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we understand nuclear physics when we cannot speak about 
the atom in ordinary language?" (1990: 448), which follows 
from Heisenberg's assertion that "our common notions do 
not apply to quantum events, and consequently we cannot 
speak about atoms in the unambiguous language of normal 
discourse" (Porter, 1990: 449). Not only is our language 
inadequate, but further, Schwenger argues that "nuclear 
war is unthinkable ... because none of the images that 
characterise our previous experience is adequate to this 
one" (1991: 39). In creating a unique language in Riddley 
Walker, Hoban implicitly denies the ability of standard 
English to express its nuclear subject. An extract from 
the Eusa myth will serve to illustrate this point: 
The Eusa Story 
1. Wen Mr Clevver wuz Big Man uv Inland thay had 
evere thing clevver. Thay had boats in the ayr & 
picters on the wind & evere thing lyk that. Eusa 
wuz a noing man vere qwik he cud tern his han tu 
enne thing. He wuz werkin for Mr Clevver wen 
thayr cum enemes aul roun & maykin Warr. Eusa 
sed tu Mr Clevver, Now wewl nead masheans uv 
Warr, Wewl nead boats that go on the water & 
boats that go in the ayr as wel & wewl nead 
Berstin Fyr. 
5. Foun the syn uv dansing on partickler traks 
thay dogs & follert harking 1 tu uther hot & 
clikkin & countin thay gygers & thay menne cools 
uv stoan. Smauler & smauler thay groan with 
Eusa in tu the hart uv the stoan hart uv the 
dans. Evere thing blippin & bleaping & movin in 
the shiftin uv thay Nos. Sum tyms bytin sum tyms 
bit. 
(Riddley Walker 28, 29) 
The extract from the Eusa myth, whose language 
predates the language of Riddley's own narrative, 
illustrates the decay of standard English in the novel. 
The punctuation and syntax of the language reflect the 
oral tradition from which it supposedly springs, and the 
re-formulation of twentieth century technological and 
computer jargon (computer bits and bytes) in this 
apparently 'primitive' context shows the paradox of the 
'new' reverting to the 'old', emphasizing on a lexical 
level the theme of cyclical repetition which recurs 
throughout the novel. 
For Hoban, ... to speak the language of the atom is 
to speak the language of pun, which does not reveal 
the structure of the atom so much as criticise the 
forces which exploit it. (Porter, 1990: 451). 
The figure of the Littl Shynin Man the Addom, for 
example, recalls atomic theory as well as the Christian 
figure of Adam. The reader necessarily combines both 
meanings into his or her understanding of Riddley's term; 
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the Littl Shynin Man figures as a post-atomic icon of pre-
lapsarian innocence and hope, which necessarily predicts 
its own loss; it combines the first man with his 
inevitable destruction. Mr Clevver, in whose service Eusa 
manufactures "barms and Berstin Fyr" (Riddley Walker 28, 
30) is not described until the closing stages of the 
novel, when Riddley recognises Mr Clevver in the puppet 
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used for another character, Mr On the Levvil, and 
describes it as having the "same red face and littl black 
beard and the same horns growing out of his head" (Riddley 
Walker 201). The devilry of duplicit 'on-the-level' 
cleverness is emphasized by the redoubled irony to which 
only the reader is privy; it is a cleverness (the will to 
power) which Riddley eventually rejects. Instances of 
this ironic reading dynamic are frequent throughout the 
novel; an example is Riddley's term "spare the mending", 
which translates into the standard English 
"experimenting". Riddley's formulation is recognisable to 
the twentieth-century reader by virtue of both its 
phonetic similarity and context, yet contains within it 
the implication that experimenting leads to the very 
disasters which it seeks to avert. 
In order to correct the mistakes of Hoban's 
characters, readers must submit to paronomasia, to 
postatomic wordplay, which often implicates them in 
the nuclear crime which brought Riddley's world so 
low. Through the action of punning, the privileged 
position of the reader that is, the faulty 
consciousness of Riddley's past turns out to be 
the focus of the irony. (Porter, 1990: 458) 
Similarly, concepts like "gready mints" encourage the 
reader to think not only of "ingredients", but also of 
"greed", particularly the childish gluttony for sweets. 
Goodparley's search for the gready mints of the "1 Big 1" 
attracts ironic commentary from the reader -- Goodparley's 
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striving for power is like the childish greed for sweets -
- and this irony is prompted by the orthography of the 
word. Porter writes: 
From our privileged point of view, we know that 
Riddley is not punning; he has simply made a mistake. 
And yet the mistake is meaningful, for the mutation 
has doubled, if not trebled, the significance of the 
word ... Puns, metaphors and riddles abound in the 
novel and reveal a rhetorical vitality whose 
inexhaustible meaning exeeds both the understanding 
and control of postatomic man. (1990: 451-2) 
This "rhetorical vitality" mirrors that of the 
repeated phrases which pervade Kleinzeit's world 
(discussed in Chapter 1). Kleinzeit is no more in control 
of his language than Riddley, but the device of inventing 
"nuke-speak" for Riddley and his contemporaries allows for 
puns, which highlight the chasm between signs and 
signifieds by allowing the contemporary reader access to 
implied signifieds of which Riddley could have no 
knowledge. Further, David Lake argues that use of puns 
serves the mystical concerns of Riddley Walker: 
In mystical philosophy, nothing is really separate 
from anything else, no concept is an island, and 
punning is an essentially serious use of language. 
An orthography which helps to combine meanings is 
therefore perfectly appropriate .•. (1984: 168) 
Jackson writes that "fantasy is an expression of 
desire" (1981: 3) in that it indicates latent or even 
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unconscious desire and simultaneously removes it from the 
realm of the real, interrogating the norm by its very 
·difference. Hoban's fantasy language is in part an 
expression of the desire to 'speak' the nuclear 
unthinkable, and yet at the same time, it is intended to 
hold its very subject at bay. Words like "new clear 
family" (Riddley Walker 124) and "help the qwirys" (rather 
than interrogate) (Riddley Walker 76) are opposite in tone 
from their standard English originals, showing that 
"nuclear amnesia is not unlike other forms of repression 
... the order of discourse creates a semiotic underworld 
by effectively preventing the appearance of prohibited 
meanings" (Porter, 1990: 463). Derrida addresses the 
paradox of nuclear writing in "No Apocalypse, Not Now: 
Seven Missiles, Seven Missives". He writes that the 
apocalypse is 
a phenomenon whose essential feature is that of being 
fabulously textual, through and through. Nuclear 
weaponry depends, more than any weaponry in the past, 
it seems, upon structure of information and 
communication, structures of language, including non-
vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic 
decoding. But the phenomenon is fabulously textual 
also to the extent that, for the moment, a nuclear 
war has not taken place: one can only talk and write 
about it. (1984: 23) 
Thus, Hoban writes of "a phenomenon ... that is 
fabulously textual", yet at the same time, beyond 
"ordinary language", and indeed, "unthinkable". While 
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Derrida equates his "missives" with "missiles", (and 
indeed suggests that all literature is of the nuclear 
age!), Schwenger points out that 
In deterrence diplomacy, the missile is aimed, but 
its real aim is precisely not to attain that towards 
which it is aimed. The more believable it is that 
the missile will reach its target, the less likely it 
is that it will ever do so; its aim becomes false the 
more it rings true. (1992: 10) 
Hoban's novel Riddley Walker is just such a missive: 
it is intended to expose the twentieth-century mindset 
which precipitates the apocalypse in order to avert the 
destruction, yet the better it expresses its nuclear 
subject, the further the language of the text evolves from 
standard English, to the point where the novel's 
difficulty discourages reading. Some critics have 
suggested that it is these linguistic complexities which 
indicate that language has a life of its own. "Riddley 
may have got it wrong, technically speaking at any rate, 
but language gets it right" (Porter, 1990: 458). The puns 
and ironic apparent slippages of language actually serve 
to uncover the truth, after all. 
Hoban likes to play with the idea of language as an 
independent protagonist, almost deliberately defying the 
control of the speaker. Riddley tries to escape the 
forces which would make a story of him. He literally 
jumps the "fents" surrounding his home "form", rather than 
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remaining the obedient interpreter of political propaganda 
disguised as religious dogma; at the end of the novel, he 
becomes a new sort of puppeteer, and instead of presenting 
the officially-sanctioned Eusa shows, he walks his riddles 
(Riddley Walker's true nature is indicated by his name) 
with Punch and Judy. Yet, by refusing to become a part of 
the Mincery's story (by refusing to aid in the greedy 
struggle for power which the repetition of the Eusa myth 
is designed to perpetuate), Riddley has written himself 
into our story, and therefore does not overcome his fate 
at all. Perhaps Hoban's assertion "We make fiction 
because we are fiction" (1992: 146) is better read: "We 
are fiction because we make it"! 
While most critics have tended to focus on the 
language of Riddley Walker and the portrayal of the post-
Apocalyptic landscape and culture, both David Lake and 
Nancy Dew Taylor explore the mysticism which underlies the 
novel. The dense language of Riddley Walker owes some of 
its success to the way it is able to reflect concepts for 
which there are no words in standard English. Clearly 
significant concepts such as "wood" and "wud" can only be 
differentiated through the futuristic orthography; 
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language itself becomes a tool of mysticism in Riddley 
Walker. 
Riddley's role as tribal shaman obliges him to pursue 
mystical interpretations of the events and narratives to 
which he is privy. He first realises this in conversation 
with Lorna Elswint: 
Lorna said to me, "You know Riddley theres some 
thing in us it dont have no name." 
I said, "What thing is that?" 
She said, "Its some kynd of thing it aint us but 
yet its in us. Its looking out thru our eye hoals. 
May be you dont take no noatis of it only some times 
You look at lykens on a stoan its all them tiny 
mannyings of it and may be each part of it myt think 
its sepert only we can see its all 1 thing. Thats how 
it is with what we are its all 1 girt big thing and 
divvyt up amongst the many." 
(Riddley Walker 6) 
As the novel progresses, Riddley tries to understand 
his place in the world, which involves an appreciation of 
the indivisibility of a universe which is forever divided 
against itself. The more he learns about his community, 
the more Riddley realises that nothing is "sepert" from 
anything else. It is this realisation which leads him to 
reject the struggling for political power which is present 
in the form of the race for gunpowder. He refuses to 
assist Goodparley in his search for the "yellerboy stone" 
(sulphur) which is the missing "gready mint" because he 
realises that the "1 Littl 1" is not the key to "Good 
Time": 
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Becaws it come to me what it wer wed los. It come to 
me what it wer as made them peopl time back way back 
bettern us. It wer. knowing how to put ther selfs 
with the Power of the wood be come stoan. The wood 
in the stoan and the stoan in the wood. The idear in 
the hart of every thing. 
If you cud even jus only put your self right with 1 
stoan. Thats what kep saying it self in my head. If 
you cud even jus only put your self right with 1 
stoan youwd be moving with the girt dans of every 
thing the 1 Big 1 the Master Chaynjis. Then you myt 
have the res of it or not. The boats in the air or 
whatever. What ever you done wud be right. 
(Riddley Walker 156, 57) 
The final sentence of this extract can be interpreted 
in two ways: whatever you had done would have been the 
right thing to have done, or, whatever wrongs you had 
caused before, would be rectified. Hoban intends both 
meanings to be understood: being 1 with "the girt dans of 
every thing" would be the right thing to do, as it would 
be a salvation from the sins of the past (the cycles of 
historical destruction). Riddley tries to unravel the 
tangle of oneness and twoness in an attempt to become one 
with the life force which "aint us but yet its in us 
looking out thru our eye hoals" (Riddley Walker 6). 
Lake identifies the "two main opposing forces of the 
whole novel: the mystical unity of being, and the two-
ness (fission or division) between and within beings" 
(1984: 164). These ideas underlie the Eusa Story, which 
is about divisions on all levels: a war which divides 
"Good Time" from Bad, enemy from enemy, Eusa from his 
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peers. The Littl~ Shynin Man is "pult apart", and man is 
separated from an Edenic 'holy communion' with Nature 
(Eusa's dogs Folleree and Folleroo are "up on thear hyn 
legs & taukin lyk men" before nuclear fission, while after 
the disaster, there were "Dog paks after peapl and peapl 
after dogs tu eat them the saym." [Riddley Walker 29, 
31]). Riddley discovers the opposition between unity and 
division on his way to Cambry: 
You try to make your self 1 with some thing or some 
body but try as you wil the 2ness of every thing is 
working agenst you all the way. You try to take holt 
of the 1ness and it comes in 2 in your hans. 
(Riddley Walker 143,4~) 
Through his experiences on the journey around the 
"Fool's Circel", Riddley realises that.the microcosm is 
inseparable from the macrocosm. This is illustrated 
effectively by the metaphor of Eusa. In the Eusa Story, 
Eusa shrinks to the size of a molecule to confront the 
Littl Shyning Man (the atom); "Atomic fission is an emblem 
of the great fission within humanity, and between humanity 
and God/Nature" (Lake, 1984: 166). Riddley realises that 
the greedy struggle for power will lead to the gruesome 
division of head from body, mind from heart, which is 
illustrated in the beheading of Granser, the geographical 
separation of the Ram the seat of government -- from 
Inland, and the image of Mr Clevver attaching a mechanism 
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to Eusa's head and extracting all his knowledge into a box 
(computer), leaving him pathetically powerless and empty 
(Riddley Walker 46). 
Perhaps the most ambiguous and confusing figure in 
Riddley Walker is Greanvine, the carved image of a face 
with a 
Thick mouf ~ open and leafy vines growing out of 
boath sides and curling up roun his head ... The way 
his mouf wer open and how his eyes lookit it wer like 
he dint know what to make of it. Like he ben 
breaving and suddn the breaf coming out of his mouf 
ternt into vines and leaves. 
(Riddley Walker 160) 
This vivid image appears first in Riddley's mind, but 
is immediately confirmed in the carved figure which 
Riddley finds at the Cambry site. The reason Greanvine is 
such a confusing symbol to the reader is that even Riddley 
doesn't know what to make of him. He reminds Riddley of 
almost every significant authority figure he has 
encountered: 
Take a way the vines and leaves and it myt be Punchs 
face or it even myt be Eusas face ... It wer the face 
of the boar I kilt and the dog that old leader. It 
wer the face of my father what ben kilt ... It wer 
Belnot Phist hung up by his hans ... and it wer the 
Littl Shynin Man ... Yes it wer Goodparleys face 
moren any bodys may be. Orfings as wel 
(Riddley Walker 160-1) 
99 
Greanvine is in everyone; everyone is in Greanvine. 
This is the clue which unlocks the symbol: Greanvine is 
perhaps the name of "some kynd of thing it aint us but yet 
its in us ... looking out thru our eye hoals" (Riddley 
Walker 6). Further, he senses that Greanvine is 
particularly masculine: 
Not a woman this wernt a woman thing ... This here 
man dying back in to the earf and the vines growing 
up thru his arse hoal up thru his gullit and out of 
his mouf ... A woman shewl dy back in to the earf but 
not the same as a man. 6 
(Riddley Walker 163) 
Yet, Greanvine cannot be read as a symbol of a death-
urge within men (and thus simplistically opposed to the 
life-giving feminine forces of oneness with mythical 
time), because it is on seeing Greanvine that Riddley 
decides to reject the "ways of men", epitomised in the 
political machinations of Goodparley and his fellows. On 
finding the face, Riddley says: 
I wernt looking for no Hy Power no mor I dint want no 
Power at all .•. I dint know what the connexion wer 
with that face in my mynd only I knowit that face wer 
making me think diffrent. 
(Riddley Walker 161) 
So, Greanvine is at once surprised and threatened by 
"dying back into the earf", and yet he also represents an 
escape from the deadly cycle of destruction. Schwenger 
'I 
100 
notes that "the foliage sprouts only out of the mouth of 
this Green Man (which) indicates a speaking, although one 
which is beyond words" (1992: 142). What, then, does 
Greanvine speak of, which is able to release Riddley from 
the destruction yearning for political power which had 
overcome him? 
Schwenger suggests that Greanvine is in fact the 
medieval "Green Man", a well-known figure represented in 
medieval art: "studies of the Green Man's meaning usually 
come to no conclusion about that meaning" (1992: 139). 
Riddley's confusion, therefore, is not unprecedented. What 
is certain about the image is that it is open to continual 
reinterpretation -- like the Eusa story, it is not a 
closed, finite symbol. Unlike the Eusa story, however, 
Greanvine is incomplete. While the Eusa myth may have 
more than one ending, it nevertheless offers a sense of 
closure which Greanvine can never offer. 
It is this lack of closure which offers an entry 
place for hope in the novel. Taylor points out that 
Riddley Walker is a message of "pessimism, mysticism and a 
desire for hope" (1989, 27); the pessimism of which she 
writes is the apparently deterministic nature of the 
cycles of history which binds the Inlanders to the 
mistakes of their ancestors, and the hope is embodied in 
Riddley's struggle to untangle the riddles of the past. 
Greanvine can also be read as a figure of hope, but it is 
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a hope which is beyond articulation. Greanvine speaks 
with the tongue of nature (literally, the vines from his 
mouth), and his message is one of renewal for the earth: 
Which theres hoap of a tree if its cut down yet itwl 
sprout again. And them tinder branches theyre of wil 
not seaze. Tho the root of it works old in the earf 
and the stick of it dead in the groun yet even jus 
only the srnel of water and itwl bud and bring forit 
... Inland may be cut down yet them branches wil keap 
corning. Peopl may try to kil them branches only itwl 
be the peopl what fall down and dy them branches wil 
grow out of ther rnoufs which thats our blip and syn. 
(Riddley Walker 34) 
Despite the weighty responsibility of the atomic 
error of his predecessors and the greed for gunpowder of 
his peers, Riddley draws hope from the healing power of_ 
the earth. It is through this recognition that Riddley is 
able to separate his interests from those who would use 
him for political ends: 
So there I wer then may be I wer 1 with Greanvine 
only it lookit like I come in 2 with every 1 else 
I really fealt like the onlyes Power wer no Power nor 
I cudnt think of no 1 I wantit to be on the same side 
with no rnor. Wel the dogs. 
(Riddley Walker 164) 
What Riddley has achieved is a glimpse of "1st knowing", 
harmony with nature which, Lorna tells him, was lost when 
"clevverness" carne. Significantly, 1st knowing is lost 
through greed, just as greed threatens to bring about a 
renewed "Bad Time": 
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man and woman got that 1st knowing from the dog ... 
Dint have no mor fear in the nite they put ther self 
right day and nite that wer good time. Then they 
begun to think on it a littl. They said, "If the 1st 
knowing is this good what myt the 2nd knowing and the 
3rd be and so on?" 
(Riddley Walker 18) 
Riddley's friendship with the wild dogs who accompany-him 
on the "Fools Circe!" culminates in the epiphany of the 
1st knowing which he learns from Greanvine. 
Riddley uses this 1st knowing to begin afresh with 
the"new show" (Riddley Walker 202), instead of submitting 
to his politically sanctioned role as Eusa show connexion 
man. Significantly, his first performance is received by 
the sceptical Weaping Form, who represent the pessimism of 
which Taylor writes (p 100 above). The headman of Weaping 
Form is not hopeful for the future: 
"0 ter morrerwl come up Erny. Ter morrer all ways 
comes up the thing is to be 1 of them as comes up 
with it." 
(Riddley Walker 204) 
At the same time, though, Weaping Form represents a break 
with the past -- as Taylor points out, it is not a part of 
the "Fools circel" (1989, 36) -- just as Riddley's Punch 
and Judy show breaks with the tradition of Eusa. Herein 
lies the "hoap of a tree" Riddley proves that it is 
possible to write himself right, by re-writing the Eusa 
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myth in the form of the new shows, and by writing the 
story of his discovery as an anachronistic legacy of 
deterrance to the people of his past -- the contemporary 
reader. 
Notes 
1. T. J. Morrissey's "Armageddon from Huxley to Hoban" 
(1984: 197-213) and Natalie Maynor and Richard F. 
Patteson's "Language as Protagonist in Russell 
Hoban's Riddley Walker" (1984: 18-25) are two cases 
in point. 
104 
2. Kleinzeit finds that his mysteriously ailing 
hypotenuse troubles none of the other patients in his 
ward, despite the common plague of the yellow paper; 
Orff is one of a privileged few who is visited by the 
head of Orpheus; Pilgermann is rejected as a Jew 
during the purges and as a man after his castration, 
and literally undertakes a solitary pilgrimage. 
3. Riddley believes the extant twentieth century text 
"The Legend of St Eustace" to be a cryptic message 
from his ancestors, whose secrets, if deciphered, 
would lead his people back to "Good Time". 
4. I use the term "history" here to refer to 
Goodparley's understanding of the word; while I have 
argued above (section III) that this is a false 
categorisation, and that Goodparley is in effect 
contributing to the mythologisation of history by 
harking back to the sacred time of the 1 Big 1, there 
is a clear distinction in the novel between the 
"sacred" myths told by the women, and the apparently 
"profane" history perpetuated by the men. Lorna 
Elswint's story "Why the Dog Wont Show Its Eyes" 
(Riddley Walker 16) is a sacred myth, whereas the two 
versions of the end of the (sacred) Eusa myth, given 
by Lissener and Goodparley, are profanely historical, 
because they have political agendas -- the sacred has 
been corrupted for profane ends. 
5. An example of this is Herman Orff's encounters with 
the same man in the guise of different personalities 
in The Medusa Freguency. 
6. In all of Hoban's novels under discussion, the female 
characters are marginalised from the struggle for 
authority. Women are figured as enigmatic emblems of 
masculine fears or desires; they function as the 
embodiment of the taunting signifier whose signified 
is forever absent. This "double displacement" 
(Spivak, 1983, 176) is discussed at greater length in 
the next chapter. 
R~c~p~~ati~g th~ Ma~gi~= 
Pilg~~~a~~ a~d th~ Hy~~~ 
Hoban's novel Pilgermann (1983) begins with an 
acknowledgment: 
Riddley Walker left me in a place where there was 
further action pending and this further action was 
waiting for the element that would precipitate it 
into the time and place of its own story. 
(Pilgermann 9) 
In many respects the novel pursues ideas raised in 
its predecessor, particularly in its obsession with the 
concepts of circularity and repetition, both on the level 
of the diegesis and in the narrative style itself. 
However, in Pilgermann, Hoban adopts an entirely different 
approach to his subject matter: what the reader was asked 
to infer from both the language of Riddley Walker and the 
'ignorance' of its protagonist, is expressed self-
consciously in the overt metaphysical musings of 
Pilgermann. The novel combines the realist mode of 
narrative with elements of the fantastic and the 
grotesque; some critics have even labelled the novel 
"science fiction" (Cheever, 1986: 335). The uneasy co-
existence of apparently mutually exclusive modes of 
narrative is typical of Hoban's novels: he rejects 
conventional generic labelling, claiming that any 
distinction between fantasy and reality "is meaningless to 
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me. Everything includes everything" (personal 
communication, 27 March 1994). 
While this chapter cannot hope to include everything, 
it will focus on Pilgermann's castration and its 
implications for his authority and the construction of his 
narrative voice, and will then turn to an examination of 
the mode of "writing" which Pilgermann adopts. Through a 
discussion of the narrative modes 1 genres of science 
fiction, fantasy and the grotesque, I will show how the 
narrative structure of Pilgermann replicates its thematic 
concerns with doubleness and uncertainty. Drawing on 
feminist theories of subjectivity and authority, as well 
as on the theories of Jacques Derrida (in particular, the 
ideas of displacement and the figure of.the hymen) I will 
provide a reading of Pilgermann's narrative designed to 
highlight the incongruities which the novel leaves 
deliberately unresolved. I will suggest that the tile 
pattern designed in Antioch is an attempt to circumvent 
the disempowerment of the castration by restoring 
Pilgermann's symbolic authority -- what has been written 
on his body, he in turn writes on the landscape. 
The nature of the first-person narrative voice 
employed in Pilgermann is unique among Hoban's 
protagonists: Pilgermann at once present and absent, a 
discrete character and a collection of ideas. He 
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describes himself as ''waves and particles" (Pilgermann 
11), and mournfully laments his immortality: 
I don't know what I am now. A whispering out of 
the dust. Dried blood on a sword and the sword 
crumbled into rust and the wind has blown the rust 
away but still I am, still I am of the world, still I 
have something to say, how could it be otherwise, 
nothing comes to an end, the action never stops, it 
only changes ... 
(Pilgermann 11) 
While Riddley Walker was charged with the 
responsibility for his community's spiritual development, 
Pilgermann does not have such a clearly defined mission. 
He journeys toward Jerusalem in response to a Bath Kol, 
the voice of God which is "not so much a voice but the 
daughter of a voice" (Pilgermann 32). On the road he 
meets with a party of pilgrim children, who claim that 
"Jerusalem will be wherever we are when we come to the 
end" (Pilgermann 64). 
This pilgrimage motif is reminiscent of Branscomb's 
observation (quoted earlier) that all Hoban's protagonists 
undergo a physical journey of psychic self-discovery. 
However, it is significant that all of them are in some 
way physically damaged, and it is the bearing of the 
literal mark of their difference which precipitates their 
narratives. In an analysis of The Mouse and his Child 
(Hoban's novel for children), Joanne Lynn points out that 
Significantly, all the benign characters are lame, 
broken or worn •.. All have been clearly marked by 
their contact with reality; only the shallow or 





Riddley bears the Eusa mark on his belly, Jachin-Boaz 
is scarred by the leonine claws of his son's anger, 
Kleinzeit is physically ill and Herman Orff is, to some 
extent, mentally deranged by his experiments with Fallok's 
creativity machine. Pilgermann's wound is doubled: he is 
initially wounded into Jewishness through circumcision, 
and this primal mark of difference is occluded by 
castration. 
Pilgermann's life story is set in Germany during the 
Middle Ages; he is attacked and castrated by a roving band 
of Christian peasants in July 1096. He cites the Jewish 
fast-day of Tisha b'Av, a day of mourning for devout Jews, 
as the moment "his being goes back to" (Pilgermann 13). 
It is the origin of Pilgermann as the narrator of the 
novel; the identity "Pilgermann" did not exist before the 
castration on this date. He makes it clear with his first 
words that "Pilgermann" is not his real name: 
Pilgermann here. I call myself Pilgermann, it's 
a convenience. What my name was when I was walking 
around in the shape of a man I don't know, I simply 
can't remember. 
(Pilgermann 11) 
He is able to take on the twin identities of 
Pilgermann and narrator only after his castration. Sandra 
Gilbert and Susan Gubar propose that "Male sexuality 
is not just analogically but actually the essence of 
literary power. The poet's pen is in some sense (even 
more than figuratively) a penis" (1979: 14). However, in 
Pilgermann's case the paradox is that it is only after his 
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castratio~ the loss of his penjpenis -- that he is able 
to write. It would seem that he writes not with the 
pen/penis, but with the bloody wound of its absence. 
Pilgermann is clearly intended to be seen as a text 
written in "blood", in so far as it records the bloody 
injustices perpetrated in the name of religion (both 
Christianity and Islam). This metaphor is exemplified 
when the blood of the Christian residents of Antioch is 
spilled on the Hidden Lion tile pattern in an act of 
retribution for the slaying of Muslims by the besieging 
Crusaders. The blood is deliberately left unwashed as a 
visible sign of the judgement against the "provocation and 
•• insult" (Pilgermann 181) of the murders; this reminder 
doubles in significance when it is read also as a 
judgement on the audacity of the creation of the tile 
pattern itself. Pilgermann's loss of his penis is a 
similar judgement: in his case, the insult for which he is 
punished lies ostensibly in his not turning aside from the 
"land of milk and honey" Sophia, the tax-collector's 
wife, with whom he commits adultery on the day of 
mourning. 
Whether his sin was adultery or lack of respect for 
Tisha b'Av, or even the arrogance of his desire itself --
as Pilgermann says, "There's allegory for you, the vision 
of naked Wisdom and the Jew lusting after her." 
(Pilgermann 14) the result is the loss of his penis. 
Another connection with Riddley Walker can be drawn here: 
the "Littl Shynin Man the Addom" finds his partner in 
Pilgermann, who can be read as a medieval Adam. His 
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sexual transgression becomes a metaphor for the search for 
divine Knowledge (and consequent authority) exemplified by 
the symbolic Sophia. Her reappearance in different guises 
throughout the text (the tax-collectors wife, the wife of 
the relic-hunter and the ship which carries Pilgermann to 
Antioch all bear the same name) serves to maintain the 
focus of Pilgermann's quest. Pilgermann's Fall from the 
ladder (literally propped up against Sophia's window) is a 
fall from Eden which banishes him to the desolation of 
castration, where he can no longer commune freely with his 
God. The God of the Jews refuses to answer his cries for 
help as he lies in the street; instead, he is aided by the 
Christ in whom he has no belief. The redemptive blood 
sacrifice which would restore his original state of g'race 
finds its parallel in Pilgermann's castration: it is 
because of the spilled blood that he is able to write 
(both the narrative, and, as I shall show, the tile 
pattern), and through writing, he attempts to right 
himself. However, the castration has robbed him of the 
instrument with which Gilbert and Gubar would have him 
write. How, then, does the "Pilgermann" (author) identity 
come into being, if he loses his "pen" (in Gilbert and 
Gubar's terms above) at the instant that he ascends to 
authority? 
After being propositioned by Bodwild, the libidinous 
sow, Pilgermann wonders if "a live eunuch could couple 
with a dead sow by means of a ghost of a penis" 
(Pilgermann 77). I would argue that he retains at least a 
"ghost of a pen", with which he is able to write a story 
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of some kind. Emasculated, he forfeits conventional 
. authority; yet, he does succeed in authoring some sort of 
narrative. Pilgermann denies himself the status of the 
conventional narrator, saying: 
I can't tell this as a story because it isn't a 
story; a story is what you have when you leave most 
of the action out. 
(Pilgermann 38) 
This apparent opposition between narrative and action 
can be understood through Jorge Luis Borges' assertion 
"One literature differs from another, prior or posterior, 
less because of the text than because of the way in which 
it is read ..• " (Cheever, 1986: 335). Leonard Cheever 
argues that what Borges says of texts is especially true 
of actions as represented in texts: 
actions must be interpreted from the present, thus 
Pilgermann is not to be viewed as a historical novel 
in the usual sense of a work which presents an 
illusion of what the past was like. (1986: 335) 
Therefore, Pilgermann's assertion that "a story is 
what you have when you leave most of the action out" gives 
an impression of narratives being somehow "fixed" or 
immutable (in the way that myths are "fixed" and yet 
simultaneously open to varying interpretations), whereas 
I 
"action" is transient, referential, and above all serves 
to situate the reader within her own time. "Stories", for 
Pilgermann, are timeless, while "action" is a measure of 
time. 
111 
History -- the history of Christian persecution of 
the Jews -- writes itself onto his body by castrating him, 
and the wound which remains writes history as a 
consequence. Yet the history it writes is not (as was 
Riddley Walker's) his (own) story -- the Pilgermann 
identity has lost its individual masculine authority 
(symbolised by the penis), and remains as a dispersed 
identity, "waves and particles" (Pilgermann 11) of 
individuality whose "consciousness is not continuous, 
only a mode of perception used irregularly by strangers" 
(Pilgermann 206). Pilgermann's consciousness is inside 
the reader's consciousness -- we understand Pilgermann's 
world as revealed through his narrative by using his 
consciousness as our "mode of perception". Thus, the 
novel is a blend of stories, ·both those of Pilgermann's 
life, and those pertaining to others outside of his 
experience. He is able to write of things of which he 
claims to have had no knowledge -- this defies the 
authorial convention of coherence of focaliser. 
Pilgermann's castration enables his writing, both of 
the narrative which is the novel, and of the tile pattern 
in Antioch (which I shall come to later). The absence of 
the penis leads not to an inability to author, but to a 
loss of authority -- the narrator is no longer an 
individual consciousness with a unique perspective and a 
strictly delimited sphere of experiential knowledge. 
Hoban challenges the convention that a narrator should 
either be both omnipotent and omniscient, or else both 
impotent and unknowing. He does this by providing 
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Pilgermann, whose physical (and, as I have argued, 
metaphorical) impotence grants him the omniscience which 
makes him privy to detailed "memories" of a lifetime not 
his own 1• Further, Pilgermann writes "I myself am a tiny 
particle of Memory" (Pilgermann 102), and his own 
experiences are apparently available to others -- "a mode 
of perception" used by strangers. This construction of 
the narrator is suggestive of the Jungian model of the 
collective unconscious, of the type of 'universal mind' 
which Lorna Elswint believes is "looking out thru our eye 
hoals" in Riddley Walker (p 6). 
Following the initial trauma of his castration and 
the appearance of a vision of Christ to a Jew calling upon 
his God for mercy, Pilgermann is further shocked to be 
informed that he desired castration -- that his desire 
authorised the act -- and because of this, he will not be 
restored to his manhood. The conversation between the 
convalescing Pilgermann and his unwanted Christ 
problematises the notion of authority criticised by 
Gilbert and Gubar above: 
Jesus said, "I said it is what you wished." 
I said, "Can you have seen Sophia and say that? 
I am young, the blood in me runs hot, I lust but I am 
unmanned. I lust, I long, I yearn, I hunger, I hum 
like a tuning fork, I flutter like a torn banner in 
the wind. That which I was I can never be again, that 
which I am is intolerable, that which I shall be I 
cannot imagine. I glimmer like a distant candle, I 
mottle like the sunlight on the carpet, like the 
shadows of leaves. I am something, I am nothing, I am 
here, I am gone." 
"It is what you wished," said Jesus. "only now 
do you hum, flutter, glimmer, mottle, be something, 
be nothing, be here, be gone with me." 
(Pilgermann 25) 
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It is interesting to note that the eloquence of 
Pilgermann's speech is as new to his experience as the 
experiences themselves are. From his loss, his creativity 
is born. He writes with the "blood" of his wound. That 
loss is necessary for creativity, is a familiar theme in 
Hoban's work 2. The twinning of literary creation with 
sexual metaphors is also familiar: in Kleinzeit, "Like 
thunder and lightning the seed of Word jetted into the 
yellow paper" (Kleinzeit 160). For Pilgermann, literary 
and sexual creativity are expressions of the same creative 
force. He describes conception as "egg and sperm writing 
their word of flesh" (Pilgermann 92), and wonders of a 
mute boy he meets, "Had his speech been castrated?" 
(Pilgermann 126). 
The metaphor of castration operates on two levels: 
not only does it subvert the penis-centered authority 
which disqualifies the unique type of creative act that 
Pilgermann attains in narrating his tale, but it also 
functions as a signifying precursor of death. In Riddley 
Walker, Hoban uses sexual orgasm as a microcosmic 
forerunner of the experience of death, which was portrayed 
as ultimately orgasmic 3. For Pilgermann, the premature 
impotence of castration is representative of man's final 
impotence in the face of death. He is able at once to 
lament his state, and to accept its inevitability: 
"I am a eunuch. I am cut off from my 
generations, I am not a man, I am nothing." 
(Pilgermann 112) 
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"I was already castrated, was I not, by 
mortality?" 
(Pilgermann 200) 
Bruder Pfortner (death), the castrator, is as overtly 
sexual a figure as was Aunty in Riddley Walker. Many of 
the most grotesque sequences in the first section of the 
novel feature the horrific description of the rape of 
mortals by the skeletal Bruder Pfortner at the moment of 
their deaths. Death is again figured as orgasmic: 
"When I say, "Sleep with me!" nobody says no," 
he said. "Kings and queens, I have them all, no inch 
of them is forbidden to me; nuns and popes, ah! 
There's good loving! I am the world's greatest 
lover, that's a simple fact, though I say it myself. 
Well, there's no need for me to blow my own trumpet -
-you'll see when you sleep with me." 
(Pilgermann 58) 
The symbol of castration at once encourages 
Pilgermann to write, and prefigures his death. Because he 
is "cut off from his generations", he sublimates his 
procreative desire into 'generating' the text. As Gayatri 
Spivak states, "The desire to make one's progeny represent 
his presence is akin to the desire to make one's words 
represent the full meaning of one's intention" (1983: 
169). Having forfeited the penis-pen, but retained the 
urge to procreate, what sort of text does Pilgermann 
write? Firstly, as I have stated above, Pilgermann is not 
an omniscient, omnipotent authorial figure, and the 
narrative lacks conventional elements (such as a coherent 
focaliser, and closure -- ironically, a kind of textual 
death). The story Pilgermann is not empowered (as was 
Riddley Walker's narrative) to avert the disaster of which 
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it speaks; on the contrary, it is through the creative act 
of writing the tile pattern in Antioch, that further 
religious persecution and death result. As in Riddley 
Walker, the writing creates, but in this case, it creates 
destruction the text becomes a testament to its own 
futility. The reason for this is hinted at within the 
narrative itself: 
"You know how it is even at the most desperate 
moments, even in matters of life and death - part of 
your mind is busy with its own affairs .•. Part of my 
mind was singing a little song, it hadn't much tune, 
there were no proper words, it just went: 
'Tsitsa, tsitsa bern, tsitsa tsitsa bern, 
Tsitsa tsitsa bembel bembel bembel bembel bern.' 
I was thinking what a lot of bems and rudzes 
there are in the universe, what an altogether 
bembelish and rudzukal thing it is, to say nothing of 
the tsitsas ..• From that moment I called myself 
Bembel Rudzuk so that I should never forget the 
bembelish and rudzukal nature of the universe ... 
(Pilgermann 226-27) 
This story of naming illustrates the act of 
linguistic castration whereby the signifier is cut off 
from the signified. The threat of meaninglessness is what 
castrates language -- yet, as Pilgermann suggests, death 
is what gives meaning to life; living and language become 
metaphors for one another. In Spivak's terms, the desire 
to procreate is metaphorically the desire to write, and 
thus to give presence to "the full meaning of one's 
intention" (1983: 169). Both desires are impossible, as 
in Derridean terms, presence is endlessly absent, and· 
language is "castrated". Once again, Hoban returns 
thematically to his aphorism "We make fiction because we 





Pilgermann can be divided diegetically into three 
parts: initially recounting the beginning of the journey 
from Germany to Jerusalem, during the year 1096, the story 
moves through four chapters relating Pilgermann's capture 
as a slave, his release and his subsequent residence in 
Antioch from 1096 to the final phase of his death in the 
fall of that city to the Crusaders in 1098. The central 
part of the novel consists of metaphysical musings which 
centre on the creation of a ceramic tile pattern called 
Hidden Lion. Hidden Lion, or The Willing Virgin, is a 
pattern of Pilgermann's design, commissioned by his Muslim 
benefactor, Bembel Rudzuk. While the physical tile 
pattern dominates the novel, it is merely an aspect of the 
underlying obsession with patterning with which the novel 
is concerned. The repetition of shapes is a visual 
representation of the reiteration of ideas, such as the 
name of Sophia and the metaphor of castration, which 
resound through the text. 
The conflict between Pilgermann's desire for 
originality and authority -- his desire to give origin to 
both child and word -- and his inescapable enmeshment in 
patterns beyond his control (such as the pattern of 
displacement which hinges on his being Jewish, for 
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, 
example), generate the action of the novel. 
Paradoxically, while Pilgermann is denied progeny by his 
castration, he still manages to produce both physical and 
textual offspring -- a son is born to him after his 
castration, just as the novel is "written" after his 
death. As I suggested in the introduction to this 
chapter, the tile pattern can be read as another form of 
writing. The pattern is the central motif of the novel, 
and, having discussed the margins at length, this section 
will focus on the pattern at the centre of the text. The 
Hidden Lion functions as a symbolic encoding of the 
mysteries which Pilgermann seeks, as all other patterns in 
the novel derive from it: as he suggests, 
I had become more and more strongly aware that the 
visual manifestation of a pattern comes only after 
the pattern is already in existence and already 
infinite ... 
(Pilgermann 149) 
Pilgermann designs the Hidden Lion pattern after 
being commissioned to do so by Bembel Rudzuk, his owner 1 
benefactor, who liberates him from the slave seller 
Prodigality in Antioch. His arrival in the city has been 
ominously patterned on familiar symbols: travelling to 
Jerusalem on the ship "Balena", he is captured by pirates 
aboard the "Nineveh", and thus becomes a Jonah-figure in 
Antioch. Pilgermann demonstrates the same resistance to 
being absorbed into pre-existing stories as does Orpheus 
in The Medusa Freguency; he says: 
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Having already been transferred from the "Balena" to 
the "Nineveh" and having so far proclaimed nothing on 
behalf of the L~rd I preferred not to be aware of any 
further names of significance for a time; I wished if 
possible to be reabsorbed into the ordinary. 
(Pilgermann 111) 
However, he is equally unable to resist incorporation 
into the symbolic pattern of the story. He soon discovers 
Rudzuk's vessel is called "Sophia", the name significantly 
shared by his Christian lover and the wife of the relic-
hunter. By the time of his arrival in Antioch, Sophia's 
name has an increased resonance for Pilgermann, having 
been the cause of his castration and the saviour of his 
life in the forest. Combined with the whale and Nineveh, 
the symbolism of these events is obvious: Pilgermann is 
sent to Antioch to proclaim the Lord, and through doing 
so, will gain the Wisdom he sought at the outset of his 
journey. "Proclaiming the Lord" is a paradoxical task for 
Pilgermann, for although he was born a Jew, his castration 
effectively cuts him off, not only from his generations, 
but from the Jewish congregation. Further, he encounters 
Christ after his castration, and is told '"'Whatever I am, 
•.• I'm the one you talk to from now on" (Pilgermann 24). 
Pilgermann's conception of God has changed as the novel 
progresses: he no longer believes in the unitary God of 
the Jews, or even the tripartite God of Christianity, but 
rather: 
It is my belief that God is of an artistic 
temperament and has therefore chosen to let his own 
work be beyond his understanding; I think this may 
well be why he abandoned the He identity and has 
moved into the It where he is both subject and 
object, the doer and the done. God is no longer 
available to receive or transmit personal messages; 
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he has been absorbed into the process and toils 
ignorantly at the wheel with the rest of us. 
(Pilgermann 98) 
Pilgermann's situation as author -- unmanned by 
castration, he has lost the "penis/pen" type of authority 
referred to in section I above -- can be paralleled with 
his own understanding of God's position: "he is both 
subject and object", rather than a discrete authority 
figure. His task (of "proclaiming the Lord") seems an 
impossible one, and it is consequently fitting that he be 
given an impossible place to fulfil it: Antioch in 1096 
is held by the Muslim Saracens, has a minor Jewish 
population, and will fall to Bohemond, the Christian hero 
of the First Crusade of Pope Urban II, in 1098. Like 
Pilgermann, the city is divided against itself in 
religious matters. 
The impossible task of bearing witness to God should 
be read creatively; I have shown above that Pilgermann's 
desire for progeny is initially gratified through the 
generation of the text, and finally fulfilled literally in 
the birth of his son. Similarly, through the design and 
creation of the Hidden Lion 1 Willing Virgin tile pattern, 
Pilgermann attempts to provide a witness to God in 
Antioch. At Bembel Rudzuk's prompting, he designs a 
hexagon-based pattern in red, black and tawny tiles, which 
Rudzuk has built on a flat plane specially prepared for 
this purpose. The local brickmaker, Tower Gate, suggests 
that a tower be built on the centre of the tiled plain "to 
give us a platform from which to observe the action of the 
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pattern" (Pilgermann 140). The action which they want to 
observe is 
intransitive motion ... the motion in a tile pattern 
is intransitive, it does not pass; it moves but it 
stays in our field of vision. It arises from 
stillness, and I should like to think about the point 
at which stillness becomes motion. 
(Pilgermann 118) 
By observing this action, they hope that "Thing-in-
Itself" will "reveal more of itself" (Pilgermann 117). 
Thing-in-Itself is a philosophical construct; it refers to 
that which cannot be perceived -- that is, to the 
numinous. Bembel Rudzuk realises the futility of trying 
to apprehend the unapprehendable, and yet hopes to catch 
sidelong glimpses of it through the creation of the 
pattern. In a way, he hopes to see what Pilgermann claims 
the stones of Antioch understand: that "God is motion!" 
(Pilgermann 120). This is identical to the Biblical 
desire of the Bal;>ylonians, to "build a ... tower, whose 
top may reach unto heaven" both projects are attempts 
to see the face of God. 
There are clear parallels between the Hidden Lion and 
the Old Testament story of the Tower of Babel. The 
Biblical story resembles the story of the Hidden Lion, 
particularly in the following verses: 
GENESIS 11 3 And they said to one another, Go to, 
let us make brick, and burn them thoroughly. And 
they had brick for stone, and slime they had for 
mortar. • And they said, Go to, let us build a city, 
and a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven; •.. s 
And the LORD came down to see the city and the tower, 
which the children of men builded. 6 And the LORD 
said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all 
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one language; and this they begin to do: and now 
nothing will be restrained from them, which they have 
imagined to do. 7 Go to, let us go down, and there 
confound their language, that they may not understand 
one another's speech. 9 Therefore is the name of it 
called Babel 4 
Unlike the Tower of Babel, the completion of the tile 
pattern is unhindered by intervention from a divine 
source. On the contrary, rather than prompting God to 
communicate His wrath to mankind, people begin to see the 
tiles as a holy message to God, and begin a tradition of 
encoding secret prayers of hopefulness in the form of 
monetary offerings in the tiles themselves: 
"So be it," said Bembel Rudzuk. "The pattern is 
abstract; let the money also be used abstractly. I 
shall put it into one of the tiles of the pattern 
where it will be united with the design on the 
pattern and with the names of Allah in celebration of 
your gratitude to Him the Responsive, Him the 
Restorer." 
(Pilgermann 148) 
The difference between the tile pattern and Babel, 
then, is that the pattern is used to speak to God, while 
God spoke to the people through his act of destroying the 
tower of Babel. Both constructions, however, are used as 
vehicles for speech, or for speech confounded. Just as 
God chooses to punish mankind by confusing their speech, 
so the message of the tile pattern goes awry. Ultimately, 
what was intended as a symbolic representation of the face 
of the infinite is corrupted into a site of murder and 
retribution. The parallels between Babel and the Hidden 
Lion will be revealed through a close reading of both 
symbols. 
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Patrick Fish argues that the "moment of Babel" 
represents the final trajectory of man's Fall from Edenic 
grace. He writes: 
Babel then is a sign of the courage and folly of a 
people trying to reach, with flawed materials, the 
'gates of the gods'. (1989: 4) 
God's pronouncement of wrath hinges not on the 
apparent arrogance of mortals who wish to build a tower 
"whose top may reach unto heaven", but on the threat of 
the pure language which the builders possess: "And the 
LORD said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all 
one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing 
will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to 
do." That "pure language" which mankind possessed is 
reminiscent of the divine speech, the Logos, which is 
written of in John 1: "In the beginning was the WORD, and 
the WORD was with God, and the WORD was God." Fish 
writes: 
This Logos stands as a Utopian promise, a language so 
pure, so quintessential that to discover it again 
will ensure a semantics not about life but of life. 
The promise of this primal language is that we will 
no longer have to harness words, batter and barter 
with them. (1989: 3) 
This divine act of confounding the pure speech by 
imposing the Babel of confusion upon the builders serves 
to render language an impotent instrument which forever 
begs translation; it is the injection of impurity into the 
system of signification -- one can no longer be certain of 
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the meaning of any word, as all become contingent 
translations of the others. 
Just as the builders of Babel began with one language 
(and, by implication, one purpose), so the creators of the 
tile pattern start with one clear idea. The repetition of 
the same geometric shapes and shadings can be read as a 
continual reiteration of that single idea: a picture of 
stillness becoming motion. However, Antioch in 1098 is 
definitely post-Babel, and as such, the curse of necessary 
translation already exists, even in an object which seems 
to contain no speech. Before language even enters the 
pattern, two translations can be made of it. As Rudzuk 
describes: 
"One of the virtues of this simple but at the same 
time complex design," said Bembel Rudzuk, "this 
design in which we see the continually reciprocating 
action of unity and multiplicity, is that it suits 
its apparent action to the mind of the viewer: those 
who look outward see the outward pre-eminent; those 
who look inward see the inward." 
(Pilgermann 139) 
so, the language of the Hidden Lion is already 
impure; it needs no divine intervention to confound it. 
Matters can only worsen, it seems, when literal language 
is written onto the tiles. Bembel Rudzuk decides to 
inscribe the reverse side of every tile with one of the 
names of Allah; after a while, Pilgermann sees the pattern 
itself generating new names of Allah through the dances of 
the children: 
The children soon began to walk on the tiles in 
special ways and to dance on it, sometimes stepping 
124 
only on the red triangles, sometimes only on the 
black. Seeing them always out of the corner of my 
eye, I found in my mind new and unwritten names of 
God: The Tiptoeing; The Sidewise-Jumping; The 
Hopping; The Leaping; The Dancing; The Whirling. 
(Pilgermann 147) 
The pattern, then, generates new proper names for 
God. Derrida, in his analysis of the Babel story, focuses 
on the implications of naming which are inherent in the 
tale. He argues that the real conflict between the tribe 
of Shem (which means "name") and God is one of naming: 
God .•. becomes beside himself in the face of this 
incredible effrontery and says to himself: So that's 
what they want to do, they want to make a name for 
themselves and impose their lip upon the world. He 
then interrupts the edification and in turn imposes 
his name on their tower (or his tower) ... God says: 
Babel. It is thus a proper name. {1985: 101) 
What Derrida is emphasising is the nature of the 
struggle for authority over language, as he argues that 
the proper name must be distinguished from the common noun 
by its untranslatable nature. Further, the name "Babel" 
means, or has come to mean, "confusion", thus also 
hindering its translation. As Derrida argues: 
To translate Babel by "confusion" is already to give 
a confused and uncertain translation. It translates 
a proper name into a common noun. Thus we see that 
God declares war by forcing men, if you will, to 
translate his proper name with a common noun. In 
effect, he says to them: Now you will not impose a 
single tongue; you will be condemned to the 
multiplicity of tongues; translate, and to begin 
with, translate my name .•. He imposes a double bind 
on them when he says: Translate me and what is more 
don't translate me. I desire that you translate me, 
that you translate the name I impose on you; and at 
the same time, whatever you do, don't translate it, 
you will not be able to translate it. {1985: 102) 
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Bembel Rudzuk's action of inscribing the reverse of 
the tiles with the many names of Allah can be read as an 
attempt to translate and record the untranslatable name of 
God. By writing on the tiles, words become part of the 
pattern, and, just as the tribe of Shem were punished for 
their audacity in attempting to impose one language on the 
world, so Rudzuk and Pilgermann are punished for 
attempting to fuse word and object, pattern and God. This 
punishment is handed down through the blood sacrifice of 
the Antioch Christians; once again, blood writes itself on 
Pilgermann's creation. 
iii: Pilge~~ann displa~ed 
Pilgermann's tale is a ~ifficult one to read: it 
offers the reader few guiding literary conventions. The 
novel neither begins nor ends; it is "always vibrating" on 
a frequency to which, Pilgermann claims, few are tuned. 
Pilgermann's journey through hellish forests with devilish 
companions is replicated in the reader's experience: we 
traverse uncharted fictive territory, where the narrator 
is not a stable, or even individual, consciousness whom 
the reader can trust as focaliser; where time is warped 
into a continuous Moebius' strip; where events are 
incongruously personified (Pilgermann's young death, for 
example), and human characters are, equally grotesquely, 
dehumanised; where patterns are more powerful than people. 
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Although it would seem to be a historical novel, 
Pilgermann is as much a novel about the future as it is 
about the past -- which is why Hoban writes of it as the 
place where the "further action •.. pending" (p 9) from 
Riddley Walker comes into being. However, it would seem 
that Pilgermann is not so much the completion of the 
story-telling impulse of Riddley Walker as it is a 
narrative to fill the space between Riddley'S time and our 
own. Pilgermann, the historical predecessor to Riddley 
Walker, comes into being after the latter. Pilgermann 
becomes our "connexion man" (Riddley Walker 21) -- a 
consciousness privy to the past, enduring through the 
present; existing neither here nor there, he is a 
passageway between the two, leading to the nightmarish 
future of Riddley Walker. 
The idea of neither-here-nor-thereness, of absent-
presence/present-absence, is Pilgermann's enduring motif. 
The protagonist is forced to move from a world of apparent 
absolutes into the shadowy realm of the undecidable; he 
learns to accept this as the events unfold. The mere 
existence oj Pilgermann's young death and the headless tax 
collector illustrate this. An uncomplicated example of 
the erosion of certainty is Pilgermann's question to the 
pilgrim children: 
"Do you know where Jerusalem is?" I say to him. 
"Do you know how far it is to Jerusalem?" ... 
"Jerusalem will be wherever we are when we come 
to the end." 
(Pilgermann 64) 
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The boy's answer dissolves the dichotomy of 
Beginning/End. This pattern is repeated in the structure 
of the text, which denies narrative closure by occupying a 
position which is neither present nor retrospective. 
Indeed, it is this quality of "betweenness" which Hoban 
continually returns to: he describes the Hidden Lion tile 
pattern as "motion ... (which) arises from stillness" 






looked at the road that was the place of 
Without moving it ran through the valley and 
mountains, at the same time running and 
still, at the same time here and gone." 
(The Medusa Frequency 36) 
Hoban's obsession with the "doubleness", with 
simultaneous "here and gone"ness, moves his texts into an 
interregnum which challenges the mutual exclusion of 
opposites. Hoban writes from within the mirror which 
separates reality from fantasy, present from absent -- in 
Rosemary Jackson's terms, Hoban's mirror is positioned 
midway between the object and image, in the paraxial zone 
"whose imaginary world is neither 'real'(object), nor 
entirely 'unreal'(image) but is located somewhere 
indeterminately between the two" (1981: 19). 
The deliberate indecision which permeates the text is 
part of the obscurity which renders Pilgermann almost 
impossible to read. The combination of historical 
political/psycho-sexual drama with lengthy metaphysical 
discourses on the nature of God and meaning, and the 
bizarre and grotesque figures which recur throughout, are 
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overwhelming. The reader is further confused by the 
contradictory symbols used in the novel (such as the 
benign, naive figure of Pilgermann's young death, in 
contrast to the ghoulish death's head, Bruder Pfortner), 
which deny the figurative coherence necessary to unite the: 
disparate elements of the text. Pilgermann is, in many 
ways, an unsatisfying reading experience. The reader's 
frustration is to some degree reduced when the text is 
read as a bricolage of ellipses and contradictions, rather 
than in an attempt to discover/create a sense of 
coherence. 
The theories of Jacques Derrida generate precisely 
this type of reading. His thought is founded on the 
metaphysics of presence, or perhaps more accurately, on 
the metaphysics of absence. Spivak summarises his work in 
saying that Derrida: 
substitutes undecidable feminine figurations for the 
traditional masculine ones and rewrites the primal 
scene as the scene of writing. (1983: 174) 
Pilgermann's unjdecidably unjmasculine narrator 
invites a Derridean reading. Deconstruction proceeds by 
identifying the two components of any philosophical 
dichotomy; establishing which has been privileged; 
inverting the direction of privilege between them, and 
finally displacing the relationship entirely. As Mark 
Krupnick suggests, Derrida does not merely foster a 
revolution in thinking; he displaces thought (1983: 1-17). 
Pilgermann situates itself within a world of inversion and 
displacement; I will argue that it is a text which 
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demonstrates "certain marks" in Derrida's chain of 
nomenclature, particularly the term hymen. 
The hymen is "between"; it both describes and 
originates in the disjunction left by the process of 
displacement. Mark Krupnick writes: 
Displacement is above all about writing itself, but 
it is also about women and the unconscious and 
Jewishness. For these are all exemplary instances of 
the marginal, and in the deconstructive analysis of 
texts the outsider returns to contest and demoralise 
authority. {1983: 3) 
Pilgermann is displaced by his Jewishness in medieval 
Christian Germany; Jews were commonly feared and despised 
as practitioners of the occult, and devourers of Christian 
children. This attitude is reflected by Konrad, the 
German peasant -- owner of Bodwild, the lascivious sow who 
smells Pilgermann out as a Jew: 
"They won't get near pork," said Konrad, "them 
children of darkness, them Jewish devils. They call 
up Asmodeus, they drink the blood of Christian 
children, they say the Lord's prayer backwards, them 
Christ-killers." 
(Pilgermann 79) 
Further, Jews bear a physical mark of their sacred 
covenant with difference, and it is this mark which the 
band of peasants who castrate Pilgermann wish to 
eradicate: 
"Cut it off and make a Christian of him," says 
the man with the sow. 
{Pilgermann 17) 
However, this prioritising of the authority of 
Christianity over the displaced Judaism is inverted by the 
130 
act intended to erase the differentiating sign: 
Pilgermann is not rendered any more the Christian by the 
absence of the sign of circumcision than he is by its 
presence. This is illustrated by the gruesome return of 
the circumcision image, described as a dream of Pope 
Unguent VII. The hellish image deliberately evokes 
similar scenes by the medieval Flemish artist, Hieronymus 
Bosch (to whom the novel refers) -- the dream is dominated 
by "cranes and scaffolding and ladders", as is Bosch's 
famous "Last Judgement" triptych. The dream is an 
amalgamation of barbarous attempts made by Christians to 
deny the Jewish heritage of Christ: 
With bricks and mortar made of the clay of Jews, made 
of the straw, lime, sand, water and blood of Jews 
Unguent is trying ... (to) put a foreskin made of 
flayed Jews on the member of Christ. 
· (Pilgermann 54) 
Unguent's dream reveals the conventionally 
unacknowledged dependence of Christianity on Judaism. In 
Derrida's terms, the dichotomy "Christianity/Judaism" is 
displaced Judaism is elevated to a position of 
relative authority in an act which questions the 
foundation of the authority of either. The displacement 
of the relationship between the two terms is realised in 
the inability of either to regain or maintain complete 
dominance. It is through the process of displacement that 
the hymen is revealed. Derrida defines the hymen as 
an operation that both sows confusion between 
opposites and stands between the opposites "at once". 
What counts here is the between, the in-between-ness 
of the hymen. (1981: 212) 
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Displacement ~eveals the presence/absence of the 
hymen, "the confusion between the present and the non-
present" (1981: 212). I have placed "reveals" under 
erasure, as the hymen cannot be revealed in the true sense 
of the word, being between its own presence/absence. The 
hymen reveals itself through displacement, but 
displacement is itself not a simple procedure. Spivak 
argues that women are "doubly displaced" by the 
deconstructive reading, as the notion "woman" is retained 
as metaphor of displacement; she writes "Derrida asks us 
to notice that all human beings are irreducibly displaced, 
although .•. women alone have been diagnosed as such" 
(1983: 170). As Krupnick notes, other examples of the 
marginalised, including Jews, are aligned with women 
(quoted p 130 above). Spivak uses the term "double 
displacement" to describe the process of conceptual 
adjustment regarding the status of women which occurs when 
man realises his own displacement. The male 
deconstructionist, she writes, "having stepped into the 
place of displacement, has displaced the woman-model 
doubly" (1983: 171). 
(P)erhaps the point is that the deconstructive 
discourse of man (like the phallocentric one) can 
declare its own displacement (as the phallocentric 
its placing) by taking the woman as object or figure. 
(1983: 173) 
In Pilgermann, the Christian peasants unwittingly declare 
their own displacement by taking the Jew as "object or 
figure 11 • 
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The mechanism of double displacement which Spivak 
identifies in the case of women operates in Pilgermann in 
two ways. Firstly, Pilgermann is initially displaced as a 
Jew, and then doubly displaced as eunuch, for he is 
rendered neither Christian nor Jew by the act of 
castration. Quoting Deuteronomy 23:2, Pilgermann says he 
is not eligible for inclusion into the Jewish community in 
Antioch, as he "is crushed or maimed in his privy parts" 
(Pilgermann 132)). Secondly, women in Pilgermann are 
doubly displaced. Within the phallogocentric discourse, 
women are positioned as other; I noted above (p 132) 
Spivak's observation that Derrida "asks us to note that 
.•. women alone have been diagnosed as {displaced)" (1983: 
17)) (my emphasis). Thus, when Pilgermann is displaced by 
his castration, he does not join women in a zone of 
equality of displacement; rather, he displaces them doubly 
by situating women in an area of mystical, symbolic 
otherness. Women remain objects in Pilgermann's chain of 
signifiers; they are denied subjectivity by their double 
displacement. "Sophia-Wisdom-Taboo-Lover-Mother" is an 
example of one of Pilgermann's constructions of woman 
which denies her subjectivity in its accretion of symbolic 
resonances. Although Pilgermann perpetuates the process 
of displacement, he is able to recognise the 
constructedness of this identification of woman: "There's 
allegory for you, the vision of naked Wisdom and the Jew 
lusting after her." (Pilgermann 14). Spivak summarises 
this as follows: 
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a certain metaphor of woman has produced (rather than 
merely illustrated) a discourse that we are obliged 
"historically" to call the discourse of man ... the 
discourse of man is in the metaphor of woman. (1983: 
169). (my emphasis) 
Derrida's concept of displacement describes the 
status of Pilgermann within the text. However, the term 
displacement needs a successor, for what remains when the 
dichotomy has been displaced? From what position does the 
displaced Jew-eunuch author the text? The next link in 
Derrida's chain of signifiers is the hymen, which signals 
the place of differentiation, while at the same time 
denying difference. When read through the Derridean veil 
of the hymen, displacement forms an intricate criticism of 
the very decisiveness on which language is based: the 
system of differences by which the signified is defined, 
·is subsumed by difference itself. Resolution is not only 
impossible, it is made redundant. Derrida's concept of. 
the hymen articulates "a literary practice that challenges 
the philosophy inherent in all literary criticism 
(insofar) as criticism attempts to decide on the truth or 
meaning of a text" (Bass, 1984: 72). The hymen "sees 
literature as a practice of suspending decision, of 
articulating doubleness" (Bass, 1984: 74). Derrida 
writes: 
Thanks to the confusion and continuity of the hymen, 
and not in spite of it, a (pure and impure) 
difference inscribes itself without any decidable 
poles, without any independent, irreversible terms. 
Such difference without presence appears, or rather 
baffles the process of appearing, by dislocating any 
ordinary time at the centre of the present. (1981: 
210) 
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Derrida's notion of the hymen combines simultaneous 
absence and presence with the idea of motion; the hymen is 
a process (rather than an entity) which reveals itself 
only insofar as it.remains hidden. It is the epitome of 
paradox; Alan Bass reads the hymen as "Between-ness -- the 
suspended decision (which is) intolerably anxiety-
provoking for thought as we know it" (1984: 74). 
Pilgermann, then, situates itself between what is present 
and what is absent; it denies the simple structure of 
opposing terms in favour of the vague and unstable 
difference between the terms. It is important to note 
that difference itself is not removed -- "difference 
inscribes itself without any decidable terms" -- it is the 
ability to decide which is undermined. The fundamental 
nature of the hymen is that difference is-"'no longer 
formulated in terms of the priority accorded to one of any 
pair of opposite terms. As Barbara Johnson notes, "what 
these hierarchical oppositions do.is to privilege unity, 
identity, immediacy and temporal and spatial presentness" 
(1981: viii). In Pilgermann's world, these are the very 
concepts which are questioned. 
The nature of the hymen confuses the attempt at 
definition; it cannot be slipped between the hermeneutical 
act of reading, and the text, as if the hymen were a 
thing, a veiled interpretive tool, open to the tactical 
manipulation of the critic. The nature of the hymen 
defies this attempt: it is neither between the act of 
reading and the text, nor does it reside in 
interpretation, nor does it envelop the text. In fact, 
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the only way to approach the hymen is to set your goal not 
at the hymen itself, but beyond it. Derrida writes: 
To repeat: the hymen, the confusion between the 
present and non-present, along with all the 
indifferences it entails within the whole series of 
opposites ... produces the effect of a medium (a 
medium as element enveloping both terms at once; a 
medium located between the two terms) •.. The hymen 
"takes place" in the "inter-", in the spacing between 
desire an~ fulfillment, between perpetration and its 
recollection. (1984: 212), (my emphases) 
Where is this aporia which houses the hymen? Is it 
at once the margin, as Krupnick and Spivak suggest, and 
the centre of the confusion? It becomes impossible to 
describe the hymen further, without placing every 
adjective always already under erasure; perhaps more 
fruitful is to desist from the full frontal attack on the 
term, and to go beyond it by examining the processes which 
reveal it. 
What is initially striking about the quotation from 
"The Double Session" above is that this defi:Hi:t:.i:eH denies 
itself definitiveness, being dominated by words like 
"confusion", "enveloping/between", "indifferences". To 
set our sights beyond the hymen in Pilgermann itself, we 
find these terms recurring indefinitely as we approach the 
narrative structure and generic classification of the 
novel. From the point of view of genre, Pilgermann is at 
once history, fantasy, romance; it encompasses all, and 
yet seems to fulfill the requirements of none. Cheever, 
in an article entitled "Is Russell Hoban's Pilgermann a 
Science Fiction Novel?" describes Pilgermann as "an anti-
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historical novel" (1986: 335), following Le Guin's term 
"thought experiment", a classification accorded to works 
which examine contemporary reality from ostensibly exotic 
perspectives. According to Cheever, Pilgermann is 
anti-historical in that it postulates an imaginary 
past .•. in order to show the present in a new and 
different light. (1986: 336) 
"Anti-historicism" becomes the defining element of 
science fiction in Cheever's argument. Cheever's "science 
fiction" resides within the doubleness articulated by the 
hymen in that it is at once "scientific" (and therefore of 
the real world) and "fictitious" (not real). Science 
fiction, for Cheever, is of the present, and yet not 
present; in Derrida's terms, it is a "difference without 
presence (which) baffles the process of appearing~ by 
dislocating any ordinary time at the centre of the 
present." (quoted above). Derrida's description of the 
hymen describes the mechanism of the relationship between 
science fiction and the present established by Cheever: 
future-historical time is "dislocated", simultaneously 
present in (the form of the text) and absent from the 
reader's present. In Pilgermann, this is emphasised from 
the outset : 
I don't know what I am now •.• I speak from where I 
am; I speak from between the pieces; ... my 
consciousness is not continuous, I am only a mode of 
perception irregularly used by st~angers. 




Pilgermann is neither purely a historical nor a 
futuristic construct; he claims to have continued to exist 
from his "time" through the reader's time, and suggests he 
will endure beyond both. He is an impure collection of 
"waves and particles" rather than a discrete being, and, 
as we know from modern physics, the waves and particles of 
matter endure beyond the integrity of their source: 
Pilgermann writes "the ringing of the steel is sung in the 
stillness of the stone" (Pilgermann 11). Pilgermann is 
thus present to us (both in the act of our reading -- he 
is the "mode of perception"jfocaliser who opens the text 
to us -- and literally -- he asks us to believe -- as 
"waves and particles" of undecomposed energy) while 
necessarily remaining absent from our time. Cheever's 
notion of science fiction seems satisfied. 
According to other definitions, however, Pilgermann 
could equally well be regarded as fantasy. The hymen·at 
once envelops the text and divides it; I would argue that 
Pilgermann is at once science fiction and fantasy. 
Todorov defines the fantastic as a genre which hinges on 
the reader's act of hesitation. Without the suspension of 
decision, the fantastic must be eradicated -- it 
metamorphoses either into the uncanny (when a rational 
explanation for apparently supernatural events is 
tendered), or into the marvellous (when no rational 
explanation can be considered at all). Todorov writes: 
the text must oblige the reader ... to hesitate 
between a natural and a supernatural explanation of 
the events described ..• this hesitation may also be 
experienced by a character •.. and at the same time 
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the hesitation is represented, it becomes one of the 
themes of the work. (1975: 33) 
Immediate parallels with Derrida's description of the 
hymen emerge: both the hymen and the fantastic are 
revealed through the suspension of the reader's decisive 
faculty. The hymen articulates the doubleness which 
nurtures the fantastic -- both concepts are liminal in 
that they inhabit the space between the things which they 
are not, defining themselves by the absence of the others. 
Episodes where the distinction between the fantastic and 
the real are deliberately occluded recur throughout 
Pilgermann; a good example is the description of 
Pilgermann's encounter with the peasant who castrated him, 
and the sow that smelled him out: 
The sow is looking at me from under her blonde 
eyelashes. She turns her snout towards me and begins 
to grunt urgently, perhaps ecstatically. I say 
ecstatically because I note that she has been mounted 
by the ever-potent Bruder Pfortner who is himself 
grunting ardently as he makes love to her ... 
I kneel beside the sow listening attentively to 
her grunts. "Quick!" I say to the peasant, "Get a 
basin!" 
"What for?" he says. 
"To catch the blood," I say as I cut the sow's 
throat ... The peasant grabs a billhook but before he 
can take a step towards me Bruder Pfortner ..• has 
leapt upon him and is enjoying him. The peasant 
utters a choked cry, gives birth to his death 
immediately, and falls on his face on the ground. 
(Pilgermann 65-6) 
In this extract, the description of the murder of the 
peasant and his sow is made to appear "unreal" because of 
the intervention of the "fantastic" in the form of Bruder 
Pfortner. In fact, the effect of the narration which 
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privileges the role of the fantastic (Pilgermann as 
subject of the implied verb "kill" is displaced in a sense 
by the indirect object, Bruder Pfortner) is to propel the 
reader into the zone of undecidability -- into the hymen. 
The fantastic is neither entirely real nor entirely 
marvellous; the hymen neither solely a barrier nor merely 
a portal. Both the genre·of the fantastic and the concept 
of the hymen can be regarded as a conspiracy of 
intellectual subversiveness; to perceive both the 
fantastic and the hymen, the reader must indulge in a game 
of sorts with the text, allowing the suspension of 
decision to qualify the perception of both. What Derrida 
emphasises is the necessity of that suspension and the 
subversiveness it entails, while Jackson is the critic of 
the fantastic who most emphasises the subversive nature of 
the genre. The hymeneutical reading displaces any final 
decisive moment, which would rupture the hymen (and the 
fantastic) completely. Derrida writes: 
The hymen, the consummation of the differends, the 
continuity and confusion of the coitus, merges with 
what it seems to be derived from: the hymen as 
protective screen, the jewel box of virginity, the 
vaginal partition, the fine, invisible veil which, in 
front of the hystera, stands between the inside and 
the outside of a woman, and consequently between 
desire and fulfillment. (1981: 213) 
The hymen is described as "the confusion between the . 
present and the non-present", the "continuity and 
confusion" which stands between "desire and fulfillment". 
In the same way, the fantastic is that which is not 
present in either the real or the marvellous; it stands 
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between the uncanny and the marvellous and is defined by 
its refusal to decide on the terms of its difference. The 
fantastic, therefore, shares with the hymen the quality of 
between-ness; Pilgermann as fantasy text is enveloped in 
the necessary undecidability of the hymen. 
Another dominant mode which permeates Pilgermann is 
the grotesque. The grotesque is related to the hymen, but 
in a way which differs from the relationship I have 
established between the fantastic and the hymen. While I 
have argued that the hymen at once envelops and occupies 
the lacuna between the differends which delimit the 
fantastic, I will suggest that the grotesque exemplifies 
that hymen's quality of doubleness, of simultaneous 
existence within mutually exclusive realms. While the 
fantastic is concerned with at once plugging and 
enveloping the gap between 5±"a~y terms, the grotesque is 
that which contaminates both terms, each with the other. 
Pilgermann is dominated by images of the grotesque: 
the rotting headless corpse of the tax-collector, the "sow 
with her scarlet necklace of blood" (Pilgermann 80), the 
human-head cannon balls at Antioch -- all are horrific 
images somehow misplaced, rendered comic. One of the most 
effective vehicles of Pilgermann's liminality is the mode 
of the grotesque. Geoffrey Harpham, in an excellent work 
on the subject, On the Grotesgue (1982), writes: 
That the grotesque exists has always been a given. 
But it is up to the culture to provide the 
conventions and assumptions that determine its 
particular forms. Culture does this by establishing 
conditions of order and coherence, especially by 
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specifying which categories are logically 
incompatible with which others. (1982: xx) 
It would seem that the grotesque allies itself with 
fantasy, at least in function: it serves to interrogate 
the parameters of the ordinary by its "excursion into 
disorder" (1981: 4). Jackson writes: 
fantastic literature points to or suggests the basis 
on which cultural order rests, for it opens up, for a 
brief moment, onto disorder, onto illegality, onto 
that which lies outside the law, that which is 
outside the dominant value systems. (1981: 3-4) 
While on the one hand, the grotesque seems identical 
with the fantastic, on the other, it seems to embody the 
spirit of deconstruction: 
(Grotesqueries) stand at a margin of consciousness 
between the known and the unknown, the perceived and 
the unperceived, calling into question our ways of 
organising the world. (Harpham, 1982: 3) 
The mechanism of questioning which Harpham argues the 
grotesque represents, is, I will argue, allied with the 
interrogative nature of the hymen. Harpham emphasises the 
illegitimate co-existence of something within mutually 
exclusive realms, while Derrida writes that the hymen is 
A masked gap, impalpable and insubstantial, 
interposed, slipped between, the entre of the hymen 
is reflected in the screen without penetrating it. 
The hymen remains in the hymen. The one -- the veil 
of virginity where nothing has yet taken place --
remains in the other -- consummation, release and 
penetration of the antre. (1981: 215) 
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The crucial sentence here is "The hymen remains in 
the hymen" -- Derrida is playing on the contrasting 
connotations of the word: the consummation of marriage is 
opposed to virginity. He demonstrates the fallibility of 
the term he has chosen to the principle it illustrates: 
even the hymen must admit its own division against itself, 
and must take its meaning from its simultaneous occupation 
of two apparently exclusive areas of difference. The 
grotesque can be defined in a precisely similar fashion; 
it 
call(s) into question the adequacy of our ways of 
organising the world. (Harpham, 1982: 3) 
This effect of the grotesque (reminiscent of 
Derrida's characterising of the hymen as an "effect" 
(above)) is similar to the eff·ect of displacement, that 
mechanism which initially propels the understanding 
towards the formulation of the concept "hymen". The 
grotesque exemplifies the process of displacement, by 
"calling into question" the authority of our 
dichotomising, hierarchical "ways of organising the 
world11 • Also, the grotesque shares the characteristic 
ambivalence of the hymen: 
the sense of the grotesque arises with the perception 
that something is illegitimately in something else. 
The most mundane of figures, this metaphor of co-
presence, in, also harbours the essence of the 
grotesque, the sense that things which should be kept 
apart are fused together. (Harpham, 1982: 11), 
(author's emphasis) 
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The hymen is the figure of "impossible split 
reference" (Harpham, 1982: 13), the threat of consummation 
always already present within the sign of virginity, just 
as the grotesque functions as an antechamber wherein the 
comic and the horrific mingle inseparably. The operations 
of both the hymen and the grotesque are evident in 
Pilgermann. Several episodes in Pilgermann are at once 
amusing and horrific; an example is Pilgermann's encounter 
with the bear-worshipper, whom he sees hanging the bear 
from a tree beside the road: 
Before I could think what I was doing I had cut the 
rope with the knife given me by the second Sophia. 
The bear crashed to the ground and lay there without 
moving. The man turned on me in a fury. "You 
murdering fool!" he screamed, "You've killed God!" 
I said, "I didn't mean to kill him." 
"But you have killed him!" he said. "God was 
everything to me, he was big and strong and shaggy, 
he was like a bear." 
"He was a bear," I said. 
"Of course he was," said the man. 
(Pilgermann 56) 
The comedy of the scene arises from the bizarre 
beliefs of the bear-worshipper, who, prevented from 
hanging his God, illogically accuses Pilgermann of trying 
to murder him. The image of the hanging, as well as the 
need of the man to kill that which he worships, however, 
is not funny, and the combination of the two responses to 
the incident generates the grotesque. The desire to 
eradicate the object of adulation is grotesque, because 
the murder of the loved object is a taboo which repeats 
the condition of the grotesque: "things which should be 
kept apart are fused together" (Harpham, 1982:11). 
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Perhaps the most grotesque figure in the novel is 
Bruder Pfortner, who first appears as a disarmingly 
conventional figure of Death on a white horse: 
I hear the low voice of a bell that nods to the 
walking of an animal. "Thou also," says the rough 
and broken voice of the bell, so I know it to be the 
bell hung from the neck of Death's pale horse. I see 
Death on his horse, all luminous bones that look as 
if they would clatter but they move in perfect 
silence. 
(Pilgermann 44) 
At this first meeting, death conforms to the 
caricatured personification whom Pilgermann expects, and 
so, whilst ghoulish in aspect, is not grotesque. The 
second meeting is slightly more disturbing: 
There was a low chuckle in my ear and a hard hand 
clapped me on the shoulder in great good fellowship. 
It was that bony personage who had been riding his 
horse in the wood .•. This time he was on foot; he 
was dressed as a monk and like me he carried a 
pilgrim's staff. It was very shadowy under his hood, 
one couldn't properly say there were eyes in the 
eyeholes of his skull-face but there was definitely a 
look fixed upon me; it was that peculiarly attentive 
sidelong look seen in·self-portraits. 
(Pilgermann 57) 
The unnatural familiarity of "great good fellowship" 
with a personified Death initially unsettles Pilgermann, 
and this impression grows when death is described no 
longer in terms of the familiar (and therefore to some 
degree domesticated) Grim Reaper stereotype, but rather as 
a fellow pilgrim. This is defamiliarisation at its most 
effective: the transformation of the familiar (pilgrim) 
by its extraordinary association with the exotic, 
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transforms both elements ("pilgrim" accrues sinister 
overtones borrowed from death, while the death's head 
pollutes the sanctity of pilgrimage). The moment becomes 
truly grotesque when Pilgermann recognises in Death a sort 
of self-portrait: the impossible contamination of life 
with death/death with life has occurred, blurring the 
distinct boundary between the two. Harpham states that 
"the perception of the grotesque is never a fixed or 
stable thing, but always a process, a progression" 
(1982:14). A progression of this sort is found in this 
passage, which culminates in a "peculiarly attentive 
sidelong look" (57) at both life and death. Pilgermann 
misjrecognises himself in the mirror of his own mortality,5 
and is initially repelled by the image of his own death, 
or lapse into undifferentiation. However, as the novel 
-progresses, Pilgermann not only recognises the death in 
himself, but fosters and nurtures it. Pilgermann begins 
to "order his experience and his environment" (quoted 
above) around the figure of his "young death". 
Interestingly, the young death is also described in terms 
of its mirror-like similarity: 
And now I became aware of perhaps someone else, 
it was only the faintest light and shadow as it were 
sketched on the air, a ghostly chiaroscuro walking 
familiarly with the rest of us as if by right. This 
sketchy figure was in truth familiar, uncertain of 
feature as it was: it was immediately recognisable 
to me as an early state of my death. I felt drawn to 
it as a father to a son. This simulacrum was in no 
way childlike, it was a fully-grown duplicate of me 
but not yet fully defined, not yet fully realized, 





Whereas Death personified had evoked fear and 
loathing, the young death inspires fatherly compassion in 
Pilgermann, who strives to be worthy of it; indeed, when 
visited by the figure as a portent of his impending death, 
Pilgermann comments with relief: 
still I can't be such a bad fellow to have a 
death like this. 
(Pilgermann 217) 
By this stage, the grotesque has been removed from its 
position in the margin. Death is still grotesque, but the 
grotesque is no longer horrific in the way that it was 
when it threatened from the margin -- being displaced from 
the margin has naturalised the grotesque, made it seem 
, normal. - Thus, the concept of death has become s~ familiar ... ~ :".,;,t~~~-,~~';f..;;:: 
to him that Pilgermann ~urtures it -- the young death is : 
as familiar as the caricature of the Grim Reaper 
stereotype, and so poses no threat to the order of his 
world. The grotesque has become the marginal forced to 
the centre, yet it retains its marginal qualities; the 
border itself is questioned. 
The examples I have given above illustrate the nature 
of the grotesque, and how it parallels the functioning of 
Derrida's hymen by virtue of its liminality. What is 
interesting is how this process is found operating even on 
the microscopic level of words themselves. This occurs at 
the very beginning of the novel and opens the door to the 
uncertainties which follow; Pilgermann is rescued from the 
. . .. ~ .· . . 
castrating mob by the tax collector husband of the first 
Sophia, and is confused about what the man says to him: 
Pray for him! Did he actually say that, did I hear 
him right? "Betet fur mich." What else could it 
have been? "Tretet mich"? "Kick me"? Ridiculous; 
that man could not possibly have asked me either to 
pray for him or to kick him. I have a sudden 
hysterical vision of the two cherubim leaning towards 
each other over the Ark of the Covenant, the one 
saying "Pray for me" and the other "Kick me". 
(Pilgermann 18) 
Pilgermann's "sudden hysterical vision" is of the 
grotesque -- he perceives the ridiculous impossibility of 
both alternatives, feels obliged to reconcile himself to 
the acceptance of one of the alternatives. The impossible 
choice is similar to the 'choice' between the comic and 
the horrific; a choice which cannot be made, as the 
.. 
grotesque is at once neither and both. Derrida writes of -
the hymen that: 
It is neither desire nor pleasure but in between the 
two. Neither future nor present, but between the 
two. It is the hymen that desire dreams of piercing, 
of bursting, in an act of violence that is (at the 
same time or somewhere between) love and murder. If 
either one did take place, there would be no hymen. 
But neither would there simply be a hymen in (case 
events go) no place. With all the undecidability of 
its meaning, the hymen only takes place when it 
doesn't take place, when nothing really happens, when 
there is an all-consuming consummation without 
violence, or a violence without blows, or a blow 
without marks, a mark without a mark (margin) etc., 
when the veil is, without being, torn, for example, 
when one is made to die or come laughing. (1981: 213) 
Pilgermann's dilemma is over precisely this kind of "act 
of violence that is (at the same time or somewhere 
between) love and murder". "'Betet fur mich'" implies an 
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act of love; "'Tretet mich'" is the violent murder. 
Pilgermann cannot be sure that either of these ideas was 
indeed vocalised; both are incongruous, out of context. 
This is the nature of the hymen itself: "If either one did 
take place, there would be no hymen ... With all the 
undecidability of its meaning, the hymen only takes place 
when it doesn't take place, when nothing really happens". 
The grotesque, then, is the zone where "nothing really 
happens", or, as Harpham writes, "Looking for unity 
between centre and margin, the interpreter must, whether 
he finds it or not, pass through the grotesque" (1982: 
38). 
The process of perceiving the grotesque involves 
perceiving that which is in the margin. Pilgermann in its 
entirety demonstra,tes this: the first part of th~ .. novel,_ 
up to Pilgermann's arrival in Antioch, is dominated--by 
grotesque images (the headless tax-collector, Bruder 
Pfortner, Bodwild the lustful Jew-killing sow, and 
others). This focus is suspended during the central part 
of the novel, which concentrates instead on the 
metaphysical musings of Bembel Rudzuk and the creation of 
the Hidden Lion tile pattern, and then, to close, the 
focus on the grotesque is resumed, culminating in 
Pilgermann's vision of his unborn son stumbling through 
the battlefield and away from his murdered mother 
(Pilgermann 217). The first and last sections act as 
flanking panels of a narrative triptych in the style of 
Hieronymus Bosch; the grotesque forms the "margins" of the 
text, and yet makes those margins the central concern. 
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The process of bringing the margin to the centre, 
while insisting on its marginal qualities, is emphasized 
on every level of the text. Pilgermann's attempt to write 
the tile pattern as if he were not writing from the 
ma~~~"feeft~~e causes the landscape to be fouled with the 
blood of his castration. The tile pattern is a writing 
which cannot heal, because it participates in the 
displacement (in this case, of the name of God) which is 
always dependent on the initial rejection of the margin. 
The bloody wound of the absence of the penis, which 
enables Pilgermann to author a text in the absence of 
authority, becomes the epicentre of a quake whose tremors 
reach out and destroy the "Hidden ·Lion" pattern. 
Pilgermann's effort to capture "stillness in motion" is an 
att~mpt to bring the margin to the centre; the hymen which 
separates and at once enfolds them is ruptured. In 
retrospect, Pilgermann comes to this realisation: 
Ah! Now as I walk I know there is no separateness in 
the world, I know that the souls of things and the 
souls of people are inextricably commingled; I know 
that the dome and the woman both are manifestations 
of something elemental that is both beauty and wisdom 
and it is forever in danger, for ever being lost, 
torn out of our hands, violated •.• how should it not 




1. For example, he writes, "There comes to mind 
unaccountably an order of the day from Jenghis Khan 
to his horsemen at some distance from 1071, a 
century or two perhaps." (Pilgermann 96) 
2. Another example is found in Riddley Walker, where 
Riddley's ability to tell his own story is bought at 
the expense of his role of shaman in his society. 
3. The story "The Bleak as Got On Top of Aunty" 
(discussed in the previous chapter) illustrates this 
point. 
4. From The Holy Bible: King James Version 1611 • The 
selective quotation I have used for analysis is 
substantiated by the complete extract below: 
GENESIS 11 1 And the whole earth was of one 
language, and of one speech. 2 And it came to 
pass, as they journeyed from the east, that they 
found a plain in the land of Shinar; and they 
dwelt there. 3 And they said to one another; Go 
to, let us make brick, and burn them thoroughly. 
And they had brick for stone, and slime they had 
for mortar. 4 And they said, Go to, let us build 
a city, and a tower, whose top may reach unto 
heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be 
scattered abroad on the face of the whole earth. 
5 And the LORD came down to see the city and the 
tower, which the children of men builded. 6 And 
the LORD said, Behold, the people is one, and 
they have all one language; and this they begin 
to do: and now nothing will be restrained from 
them, which they have imagined to do. 7 Go to, 
let us go down, and there confound their 
language, that they may not understand one 
another's speech. 8 So the LORD scattered them 
abroad from thence on the face of all the earth: 
and they left off to build the city. 9 Therefore 
is the name of it called Babel; because the LORD 
did there confound the language of all the 
earth: and from thence did the LORD scatter them 
abroad upon the face of the earth. 
5. Pilgermann's misjrecognition of himself in the face 
of Death parodies Lacan's theories of the 
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construction of the subject through the "mirror 
stage": 
There is a fading or aphanisis of the subject, 
in favour of the imaginary image. It is in the 
imaginary image that the child sees his identity 
and his unity, around the image that he orders 
his experience and his environment, and to the 
image that he attaches his desire (Tavor Bannet, 
1989: 15). 
The child is attracted to the mirror-image because it 
recuperates him (sic) from his state as 
"uncoordinated, powerless and fragmentary subject" 
(Tavor Bannet, 1989: 15). Pilgermann, on the 
contrary, denies this wholeness: he becomes 
increasingly fragmented as the novel progresses, 




The three preceding chapters have illustrated Hoban's 
concern with recognising the margin -- for Kleinzeit and 
Orff, their status as authors, for Riddley, his shamanic 
otherness, for Pilgermann, his nonjJewishness -- and 
with attempting to reinstate a kind of authority which is 
qualified to speak from and of the margin. In Authority 
and Identity, I argue that Hoban marginalises the 
'authority' of the author by destabilising the 
structuralist model of language. The endless chains of 
signifiers whose meanings are continually deferred serve 
to illustrate inversion of the usual hierarchy of 
privilege: no longer is the author in control of 
language, but rather the ever-absent 'authority' of 
language dominates the will of the author. Having 
inverted the direction of privilege, Hoban continues to 
displace the hierarchical model altogether: dominance, 
both of author over language, and of language over 
meaning, is denied. The author is not the locus of 
control, but then, neither is language meanings are 
always inferred from the brink of endless deferral, which 
is absence. Thus, Kleinzeit's dilemma is not only to 
write words on the yellow paper, but to attempt to fix 
the meaning of those words to the marks which signify 
them: 
Kleinzeit read the three pages he had written today 
and the three pages he had written before. Now as 
he read them the words lay on the paper like 
dandruff. He shook the paper, brushed it off. 
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Nothing there. Black marks, oh yes. Ink on the 
paper right enough. Nothing else. 
(Kleinzeit 167) 
Kleinzeit's impossible task -- to reunite the sign 
and the signified -- is a simulcrum of Riddley's attempt 
to redress the wrongs of his nuclear-age predecessors. 
Riddley's awareness of the 11 lness .•. (which) comes in 2 
in your hans 11 (Riddley Walker 144) is an understanding of 
the inevitability of multiplicity within unity. Despite 
his realisation that he can never really succeed, Riddley 
wants to reunite the Littl Shynin Man, to return to the 
pre-lapsarian wholeness which he believes is epitomised 
in the nameless 11woom of her what has her woom in Cambry" 
(Riddley Walker 156) -- that thing that 11 think us but it 
dont think like us 11 (Riddley Walker 7). The Little 
Shynin Man represents the 1 become 2, and the disasters 
which follow foster the need for the 2 to become 1 again: 
hes qwite a peace of work that Littl Shyning Man ... 
Like it says in the Eusa Story when he comes in 2 
his cock and balls theyre on his lef side his head 
and neck theyre on his right .•• When hes in 2 and 
you slyd him to gether the 2 ~s of him come to 
gether with a clack. 
(Riddley Walker 200) 
However, Riddley acknowledges that the 2 can never become 
1 again: Granser's head cannot be sewn back onto his 
body, and even the reunification of the Eusa figure in 
the show makes an ominous 11clacking11 noise: 
I wunner if Goodparley ever thot of a bang when he 
heard that. 
(Riddley Walker 200) 
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Endlessly confused by the circularity of a multiplicity 
of symbols, Riddley becomes convinced of one certainty, 
one 1ness which is never 2: 
1 figger hes the same and very 1 in boath bags of 
figgers. Mr Clevver. Which hes Mr On The Levvil 
and hes callit Drop John as wel. There he is the 
name changes but he dont. You begin to wunner myt 
he be the 1 Big 1 of it? Or the 1 Littl 1 of it? Or 
may be there aint no such thing as a Big 1 or a 
Littl 1 its jus only all 1 and you see what diffrent 
things you see in the chaynjing lites of the 
diffrent times of the girt dans of every thing. 
(Riddley Walker 201) 
Mr Clevver, the constant threat to 1ness, is· the 
recognition of 2ness. As Riddley Walker yearns for pre-
lapsarian innocence, it is significant to note that Mr 
Clevver represents the devil -- in Biblical terms, the 
one who initially tempted Eve into sin by offeri~g her a 
choice, that is, by exposing the 2ness of the 1. Mr 
Clevver is a metaphor for the absence without which there 
can be no presence; in recognising him, Riddley 
recognises the same chasm of meaninglessness which 
threatens Kleinzeit. As Frederick Kreuziger cautions: 
"the creation of purpose and meaning collides with the 
possibility of non-meaning and chaos" (1982: 78). 
At the same time, Riddley recognises that this 
"possibility of non-meaning and chaos" may be part of the 
1ness of everything after all: "its jus only all 1 and 
you see what diffrent things you see in the chaynjing 
lites" (Riddley Walker 202). This is Pilgermann's 
discovery: 
155 
I know there is no separateness in the world ... I 
know that the woman .•. is forever in danger, for 
ever being lost, torn out of our hands, violated ... 
how should (she) not be violated ... ? 
(Pilgermann 89) 
In Pilgermann, Hoban offers a protagonist who is 
most clearly and obviously marginalised, which is why the 
discussion of displacement is extended in the third 
chapter, Recuperating the Margin. Hoban has said of 
himself that: 
"to be a Jew is always to be the Other, and the 
feeling of otherness and strangerness, strangerhood, 
alienation, is always with me". (1984: 79) 
In the third chapter, the effect of the hymen is used to 
exam~ne the metaphor of division. once again, the hymen 
is neither a 1ness or a 2ness: it neither divides nor 
encloses completely; it is that which is always 
"between". It is the margin brought to the centre which 
speaks in all of Hoban's novels; that which should be 
silenced, echoes in the void of the absent centre. 
My analyses have concurred with Branscomb's 
assertion which I cited in the Introduction: 
Hoban's ... concerns and methods have remained 
essentially the same. (1986: 29) 
However, I have shown how Hoban revisualises the same 
concerns in new ways in every novel. In an interview 
with David Brooks, Hoban says "my perception is about 
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perception" (1984:79); it is his perceptions of his topic 
which have changed, rather than his subject itself. 
Two metaphors are constant in all of Hoban's 
novelistic 'perceptions': the metaphor of woman, and the 
metaphor of disease. These two may be part of one 
another, as is suggested below: 
Life is the original sickness of inanimate matter. 
All was well until matter messed itself about and 
came alive. Men are .rotten clear through with being 
animate. Women on the other hand have not quite 
lost the health of the inanimate, the health of the 
deep stillness. They're not quick so sick with life 
as men are. I'll tell you something I didn't tell 
Kleinzeit. The Thracian women didn't tear Orpheus 
apart. He fell apart, keeps falling apart, will 
fall apart. 
(Kleinzeit 150) 
Hoban's protagonists are all 'diseased' in one way or 
another: .. Hermann Orff hallucinates a mythical head; 
Kleinzeit fights an ailing hypotenuse; the blood·from the 
wound of Pilgermann's castration is not stemmed, but 
pollutes the landscape; Riddley is "myndy" (Riddley 
Walker 61) and scarred forever (both physically and 
psychologically) as a Eusa "connexion man". Their 
illnesses can be viewed as the divine sickness of the 
shaman; Wilkie argues that "the theme of shamanism .• 
becomes the kernel of his writing" (1989: 41), citing 
Kleinzeit's 
prerequisite shamanic symptoms of sickness; ecstatic 
fits are implied by his faintings ... Dismemberment 
of organs is inherent in Dr Pink's threat of surgery 
... the narcotic element is supplied in the drug 
Zonk •.• (he) moves between the cosmic layers of 
earth and underworld. (1989: 41-42) 
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The quotation from Riddley Walker above implies that life 
itself is the source of disease, that "being" is "being 
sick". "Disease" can be formulated as the absence of 
well-being, and indeed, all of Hoban's characters suffer 
significant absences which enhance the sickness of their 
solitude. The loss of Luise haunts Herman Orff, while 
the absence of Pilgermann's penis 'diseases' him as both 
Jew and man, for example. The achievement of Hoban's 
novels is the way in which they recuperate the diseased 
from the margin, replacing "disease" as norm. Absence 
becomes the necessary prerequisite for creativity. The 
sign is a false promise of a united signified/signifier; 
thus, to use the sign is to present a challenge to the 
threat of meaninglessness which threatens in the void of 
arbitray connection. Further, the creative urge itself_ 
is most meaningful when exercised as response.to absence. 
This is explained by Eurydice: 
"You will sing better than ever," she said. "Art is 
a celebration of loss, of beauty passing, passing, 
not to be held. Now that I'm lost you will perceive 
me fuliy and you will find me in your song; now that 
the underworld is closed to you the memory of the 
good dark will be with you always in your song. Now 
you are empty like the tortoise-shell, like the 
world-child betrayed, and your song will be filled 
with what is lost to you." 
(The Medusa Freguency 119) 
This extract illustrates perfectly the paradox that only 
that which is absent can be present: "your song will be 
filled with what is lost". For Hoban, art must be a 
celebration of the absence without which it could not. 
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exist. For this reason, the Kraken -- the voice of 
Orff's inspiration -- is figured as the terror of 
nothingness which generates everything. Hoban returns to 
this in an article about writer's block, where he 
discusses the dread of the blankness of a blank sheet of 
paper: 
In the original terror is the vital energy that is 
the beginning of beauty and everything else. (1992: 
182) 
It is noticeable that the one who is not diseased, 
the one who is not threatened by absence and 
undifferentiation, is the woman. Hoban uses the metaphor 
of woman in such a way that she is always already 
displaced, always already absent. The lack of woman is 
the lack on which other presences are founded (Orff's~ 
for example). Whether she appears as the wise Lorna, the 
elusive Sophia, the unattainable Luise, the lost 
Eurydice, the devouring Aunty or the mother goddess who 
"has her woom in Cambry", the woman is always metaphor. 
For Hoban, woman is the absence of meaning (m~taphor 
being meaning deferred) from which all attempts at 
meaning are generated; woman, like the signified, is the 
absent centre of Hoban's novels. Thus, Spivak's 
criticism of phallogocentrism can be repeated here: 
(P)erhaps the point is that the deconstructive 
discourse of man (like the phallocentric one) 
declare(s) its own displacement ... by taking the 
woman as object or figure.(1983: 173). 
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Hoban's novels take woman as metaphor for signified, 
banish both to a realm of absence, and from this 
emptiness, his voice speaks. Perhaps this is best 
expressed by Orpheus: 
"I was, I am, an emptiness. I don't know what 
anything is: I don't know what music is, I don't 
know the difference between running and stillness, 
between dancing and death. The world vibrates like 
a crystal in the mind; there is a frequency at which 
terror and ecstasy are the same and any road may be 
taken. 
(The Medusa Freguency 37) 
Thus, for Hoban, language and woman are metaphors for one 
another; they are both within the hymen, the zone of 
undecidability, and neither are diseased with the desire 
for presence which infects the heroes of Hoban's novels. 
160 
Alvarez, A., "Past, Present & Future", New York Review of 
Books, 28, no.18: 16-19 
Bass, Alan, "The Double Game: An Introduction", Taking 
Chances: Derrida, Psychoanalysis and Literature, ed. 
by Smith, J. H. and w. Kerrigan, Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1984 
Bataille, Georges, Death and Sensuality: A study of 
Eroticism and the Taboo, New York, Walker and 
Company, 1962 
Booth, Wayne c., The Rhetoric of Fiction, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1961 
Branscomb, Jack, "The Quest for Wholeness in the Fiction 
of Russell Hoban", Critique: Studies in Modern 
Fiction, 28, no. 1 (1986): 29-38 
Chanady, Amaryll B., Magical Realism and the Fantastic: 
Resolved versus Unresolved Antinomy, London, 
Garland, 1985 
Cheever, Leonard A., "Is Russell Hoban's novel Pilgermann 
a Science Fiction Novel?", Extrapolation, 27, no. 4 
(1986): 334-40 
collins, Robert A. and Howard D. Pearce., eds., The Scope 
of the Fantastic: Theory, Technique, Major Authors, 
Westport, Greenwood Press, 1985 
The scope of the Fantastic: Culture, Biography, 
Themes, Children's Literature, Westport, Greenwood, 
1985 
Derrida, Jacques, "Structure, Sign and Play in the 
Discourse of the Human Sciences", Writing and 
Differance, trans. by Alan Bass, Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1978 
Dissemination, trans. by Barbara Johnson, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1981 
161 
' 
The Margins of Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass, 
Brighton, Harvester, 1982 
"No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven 
missiles, seven missives)", trans. by Catherine 
Porter and Phillip Lewis, Diacritics, 14 (1984): 20 
- 31 
The Ear of the Other: Otobiography. Transference, 
Translation, McDonald, c. V., ed., trans. by P. 
Kamuf, New York, Schocken, 1985 
Dewey, Joseph, In A Dark Time: The Apocalyptic Temper in 
the American Novel of the Nuclear Age, West 
Lafayette, Purdue University Press, 1990 
Dowling, David, "Russell Hoban's Riddley Walker: Doing 
the Connections", Critigue, 29 (Spring 1988): 179-87 
Eliade, Mircea, The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. 
Willard E. Trask, New Jersey, Princeton University 
Press, 1965 
Ewen, Joseph, "The theory of character in narrative 
fiction" (in Hebrew), Hasifrut, 3, English abstract 
pp. vii-ix 
Fish, Patrick, "On Babel/Babel On", unpublished MA 
dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1989 
Flores, Angel, "Magical Realism in Spanish American 
Fiction", Hispania, 38, no. 2 (1955): 187-93 
Gilbert, Sandra M., and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the 
Attic: the woman writer and the nineteenth century 
literary imagination, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1979 
Harpham, Geoffrey G., On the Grotesgue, New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 1982 
Hassan, Ihab H., The Dismemberment of Orpheus: towards a 
postmodern literature, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1971 
162 
Hitchcock, Patricia, "Modest Mysticism: An Interview with 
Russell Hoban", Isis, 2 (1977): 28 
Hoban, Russell, The Mouse and His Child, New York, Harper 
and Row, 1967 
The Lion of Boaz-Jachin and Jachin-Boaz, London, 
Jonathan Cape, 1973 
, Kleinzeit, London, Jonathan Cape, 1974 
Turtle Diary, London, Jonathan Cape, 1975 
"A Little As Plaining about Riddley Walker", The 
Bookseller, 3890 (12 July 1980): 175 
Riddley Walker, London, Jonathan Cape, 1980 
Pilgermann, London, Jonathan Cape, 1983 
Interview, interviewed by E. Myers, Literary Review, 
28 (1984): 5-16 
"It cancels all distance between our unthinking.and 
the unthinkable", The Listener, 112 (27 September 
1984): 3-4 
Interview, interviewed by David Brooks, Helix, 
spring (1985): 21-22, 71-85 
The Medusa Freguency, London, Jonathan Cape, 1987 
The Moment Under the Moment, London, Jonathan Cape, 
1992 
Hollinger, V., "Cybernetic Deconstructions --Cyberpunk 
and Postmodernism", Mosaic: A Journal for the 
Interdisciplinary study of Literature, 23, no. 2 
(1990): 29-44 
Hume, Kathryn, Fantasy and Mimesis: Responses to Reality 
in Western Literature, New York, Methuen, 1984 
163 
Iser, Wolfgang, "The Reading Process: A Phenomenological 
Approach", Modern Criticism and Theory, ed. by David 
Lodge, London, Longman, 1988 
"The Reality of Fiction: A Functionalist Approach to 
Literature", New Literary History, 7, no. 1 (1975): 
7-35 
Jackson, Rosemary, Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion, 
London, Routledge, 1981 
James, Clair, "Narrative Against Nuclear War", Modern 
Language association of America Publications, 106, 
no.5: 1175-76 
Johnson, Barbara, Translator's introduction to J. 
Derrida, Dissemination, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1981 
Kayser, Wolfgang, The Grotesque in Art and Literature, 
trans. by Ulrich Weisstein, Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press, 1963 
Kreuziger, Frederick A., Apocalypse and Science Fiction: 
A Dialectic of Religious and Secular Soteriologies, 
California, American Academy of Religion, 1982 
Krupnick, Mark, "Introduction" to Displacement: Derrida 
and After, ed. M. Krupnick, Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press, 1987 
Lake, David J., "Making the 2 One, Language and Mysticism 
in Riddley Walker", Extrapolation, 25, no. 2 (1984): 
157-170 
Leader, Zachary, "The allness of the everything", The 
Times Literary supplement, no. 4172 (1983): 259 
LeClair, Tom, "Review: The Medusa Frequency", American 
Book Review, 10, no. 4 (1988): 3 
Lewicki, Zbigniew, The Bang and the Whimper: Apocalypse 
and Entropy in American Literature, Westport, 
Greenwood, 1984 
164 
Lodge, David, The Modes of Modern Writing: Metaphor, 
Metonymy, and the Typology of Modern Language, 
London, Edward Arnold, 1977 
The Art of Fiction, London, Penguin, 1992 
Lynn, Joanne, "Threadbare Utopia: Hoban's Modern 
Pastoral", Children's Literature Association 
Quarterly II, no. I (1986): 19-24 
MacLean, Marie, "The Signifier as Token: The Textual 
Riddles of Russel Hoban", Journal of the 
Australasian Universities Language and Literature 
Association, 70 (1988): 211-19 
Mahoney, Patrick, "Transformations and Patricidal 
Deconstruction" in The Ear of the Other: 
Otobiography. Transference, Translation, McDonald, 
c. v., ed., trans. by P. Kamuf, New York, Schocken, 
1985: 94-98 
Mar~in, Gerald, Journeys Through the Labyrinth: Latin 
American Fiction in the Twentieth Century, London, 
Verso, 1989 
Maynor, Natalie, and Richard F. Patteson, "Language as 
Protagonist in Russell Hoban's Riddley Walker", 
Critigue: Studies in Modern Fiction, 26, no. 1 
(1984): 18-25 
Morehead, J. H., "Atomic Language (Comment on Hoban, 
Russell Riddley Walker) 11 , New York Times Book 
Review, 86, no. 32 (1981): 25 
Morrissey, Thomas J., "Armageddon from Huxley to Hoban", 
Extrapolation, 25, no. 3 (1984): 197-213 
Mustazza, Leonard, "Myth and History in Russell Hoban's 
Riddley Walker", Critigue: Studies in Contemporary 
Fiction, 31, no. 1 (Fall 1989): 17-26 
Olsen, Lance, "Review: The Medusa Freguency", American 
Book Review, 10, no. 4 (1988): 3 
165 
- / 
Porter, Jeffrey, "'Three Quarks for Muster Mark': Quantum 
Wordplay and Nuclear Discourse in Russell Hoban's 
Riddley Walker", Contemporary Literature, 31, no. 4 
(1990): 448-69 
Rimmon-Kenan, Shlomith, Narrative Fiction: Contemporary 
Poetics, London, Routledge, 1983 
Schlobin, Roger c., The Aesthetics of Fantasy Literature 
and Art, Sussex, The Harvester Press, 1982 
Schwenger, Peter, "Writing the Unthinkable: Literature 
and Literary Attempts at Exploring the Nuclear 
Holocaust", Critical Inquiry, 13, no.1 (1986/7): 31-
48 
"Circling Ground Zero: Nuclear Holocaust and the 
Exploding Word", Modern Language Association of 
America Publications, 106, no. 2 (1991): 251-62 
Letter Bomb: Nuclear Holocaust and the Exploding 
Word, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1992 
Schwetman, John W., "Russell Hoban's Riddley Walker and 
the Language of the Future", Extrapolation, 26, no. 
3 (1985): 212-19 
Spivak, Gayatri c., "Displacement and the Discourse of 
Women", Displacement: Derrida and After, M. Krupnick 
ed., Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1983 
Suleiman, Susan R. and Inge Crosman, eds., The Reader in 
the Text: Essays on Audience and Interpretation, New 
Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1980 
Tavor Bannet, Eve, Structuralism and the Logic of 
Dissent: Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, London, 
Macmillan Press, 1989 
Taylor, Nancy D., "'···you bes go ballsy': Riddley 
Walker's Prescription for the Future", Critique: 
studies in Contemporary Fiction, 31 (1989): 27-39 
Thiher, Allen, Words in Reflection: Modern Language 
Theory and Postmodern Fiction, Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1987 
166 
Thomson, P., The Grotesgue, London, Methuen, 1972 
Todorov, Tzvetan, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to 
a Literary Genre, trans. Richard Howard, Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press, 1975 
Uglow, Jennifer, "Leavin the worl behynt", Times Literary 
Supplement, 31 October (1980): 1221 
Wilkie, Christine, Through the Narrow Gate: The 
Mythological Consciousness of Russell Hoban, 
Rutherford, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 
1989 
167 
